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INTRODUCTION

He cannot long be good that knows not why he is good.
Richard Carew'

Important as it always is to try to do the right thing, it can be even more
important to understand what one is doing. This is not only because
understanding is necessary in order for one to be able to discern what is truly
good in any particular situation: the general rules, useful as they are, cannot
always be relied upon. It is also because understanding-to know what is
(including to know what one is doing and why)-such understanding is very
good in itself. This points up the importance for us of prudence.
Prudence can be institutionalized, so to speak, in a constitutional system,
something which is discussed in the course of several of the discussions which
follow. Much ofwhat we do recognize as good is incorporated in, or depends
upon, the workings of long-established institutions. These institutions have
been investigated in various books of mine, beginning in the doctoral
dissertation which became my first book.2
In the background, if not even at the foundations, of any constitutional
system are reflections upon the very notion of morality. It can sometimes help
us see ourselves by considering how other peoples have come to terms with
the challenges of life and community and perhaps also of understanding
itself.3
1. Richard Carew, Survey of Cornwall 219 (1602); see infra notes 42, 209, 418.
Compare infra text accompanying note 239.
2. See GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTTuTIONAUST: NOTES ON THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1971) [hereinafter ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTrTuTioNALIST]. For subsequent
investigations of the Constitution, see GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION: A COMMENTARY (1995) [hereinafter ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTrITUToN]; George ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787: ACOMMENTARY [hereinafter
ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787].
3. See, e.g., GEORGE ANASTAPLO, BUT NOT PHILOSOPHY: SEVEN INTRODUCTIONS TO
NON-WESTERN THOUGHT (2002) [hereinafter ANASTAPLO, BUT NOT PHILOSOPHY]. On how

Americans have responded to such challenges, see GEORGE ANASTAPLO, ABRAHAM LINCOLN:
A CONSTITUTIONALBIOGRAPHY (1999) [hereinafter ANASTAPLO, ABRAHAM LINCOLN]; GEORGE
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The human being, as well as the citizen, has to be considered in these
inquiries. The human being is often best looked at, and thought about, with
the help of works of art. And it is often, if not usually, the case that the more
exalted the human being is, the more civic-minded the citizen will be."
I have, with a view to bringing together wide-ranging but related remarks
crafted for various occasions, developed my Explorarions genre.'
It is
critical, in thinking about what is said over the years, to be aware of the
circumstances in which diverse remarks are made. Among the revealing
elements of those circumstances are the audiences which happen to be dealt
with.
Circumstances can also affect who or what one has been influenced by.
The importance in these matters of friendship is hard to exaggerate, especially
as one is directed to and supported in pursuit of the very best.6
The collection one brings together from time to time, with a view to
illuminating problems and issues of one's day, can be very much a personal
thing. This is evident in the elaborate cross-references I usually provide to
other things of mine. The significance of circumstances is suggested by the
detailed accounting for my materials which I have provided in bibliographies
where the sources of my published things are charted in detail.7 I am glad to
be able to acknowledge again the generosity of the editors of this law review
in permitting me to develop and share my thinking as I am privileged to do
ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORALIST: ON LAW, ETHICS, AND GOVERNMENT

[hereinafter

ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORALIST].

4.

On what works of art can teach us about the human being, see GEORGE ANASTAPLO,

THE ARTIST AS THINKER: FROM SHAKESPEARE TO JOYCE (1983) [hereinafter ANASTAPLO, THE

ARTIST AS THINKER]; GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE THINKER AS ARTIST: FROM HOMER TO PLATO
& ARISTOTLE (1997) [hereinafter ANASTAPLO, THE THINKER AS ARTIST]. These inquiries were
anticipated by GEORGE ANASTAPLO, HuMAN BEING AND CITIZEN: ESSAYS ON VIRTUE, FREEDOM,
AND THE COMMON GOOD (1975) [hereinafter ANASTAPLO, HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN], and by
the notes in ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTIONALIST, supra note 2.

Consider as well a Letter to the Editor I prepared in July 2003 for my fellow Chicagoans:
It has not been sufficiently publicized that there is currently on loan at our Art Institute,
from Madrid's Prado, Velizquez's "Aesop" painting. It is a great exemplar of what may
be called conjectural portraiture, an achievement that it would be a shame for any local art
lover to miss. One can be both humbled and exalted upon studying this masterpiece, an
uncanny probing of the philosophical soul.
5. For citations to myExplorations,see infra notes 26,38, 108, 127, 142,256,371,410.
See also the bibliographies cited to in infra note 7. Most of the notes for this Article have been
prepared at this time (2003).
6. See, e.g., infra note 176; see also Parts 6 and 7 and the Conclusion of this Article;
infra text accompanying note 248.
7. Forthese bibliographies, see George Anastaplo, Constitutionalism,The Rule ofRules:
Explorations,39 BRANDEIS L.J. 17, 219-286 (200 1); George Anastaplo, Law & Literatureand
the Moderns: Explorations,20 N. ILL U. L. REV. 251, 581-710 (2000); LAW AND PHILOSOPHY:
THE PRACTICE OF THEORY 1073-1145 (John A. Murley, William T. Braithwaite and Robert L.
Stone eds., 1992 ); Leo Strauss: A Bibliographic Legacy (John A. Murley ed., forthcoming).
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here.
1. READING THE CONSTITUTION
As the British Constitution is the most subtile organism which
has proceeded from the womb and the long gestation of
progressive history, so the American Constitution is, so far as
I can see, the most wondrous work ever struck off at a given
time by the brain and purpose of man.
William E. Gladstone 9

We hear a good deal these days about "original intent" and the
Constitution of 1787. Some insist that the original intent of the Framers of the
Constitution should be respected, that only thus can we avoid arbitrary
government. In this way, it is argued, the authority of the People is
recognized and the integrity of the political process is maintained. Otherwise,
it is not truly a Constitution that we live under but rather the will of one or
another set of officials who happen, for the moment, to wield power."0
The argument for "original intent" is usually accompanied at this time by
an attack upon judicial usurpation: judges are seen to have taken over
lawmaking prerogatives from legislatures, State as well as National. But
although various instances ofjudicial activism may have inspired the current
insistence upon original intent, the concern expressed here goes much deeper,
for it is a concern at its roots about the powers to be exercised by the General
Government of the United States. Thus, a recourse to "original intent" was
made in effect by some of the critics of the New Deal fifty years ago in an
effort to restrain, with the aid of the judges, what the President and Congress
were trying to do in restoring the economy of the country."
In opposition to those who stand for "original intent" are those who stand
for a "living Constitution." A living, and hence growing, Constitution is seen
to be necessary if the American people are to be able to cope with radically
8. A talk given at a Conference in Celebration of the Bicentennial of the Constitution
for College Teachers, Loop College, Chicago, Illinois, March 20, 1987. 1have used variations
of this title in other publications as well. See, e.g., George Anastaplo, How to Read the
Constitution of the United States, 17 LoY. U. CtI. L.J. 1 (1985) [hereinafter Anastaplo, How
to Read the Constitution].
9. William E. Gladstone, Kin Beyond Sea, N. AM. REV., Sept. 1878.
10. On the limits of appeals to "original intent" today, see infra text accompanying note
59.
1I.

On commerce and the commerce power, see ANASTAPLO, THECONSTITUTION of 1787,

supra note 2, at 332 (Index). See also infra note 17, infra text accompanying note 24, Part 2
of this Article.
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changing circumstances. A "horse-and-buggy constitution" must be replaced,
it has been said, by something adequate for our times. The courts may thus
be looked to in this effort to make the Constitution "relevant"--but the
courts, when they so conduct themselves, merely reflect the necessities of the
times and the will of the People, thereby permitting the People to wrench
themselves loose from "the dead hand of the past." 2
II.
The issue is joined in this fashion from time to time between those who
stand for "original intent" and those who stand for "a living Constitution."
I presume to suggest that both of these positions are sound: we want reliable
guidance from our constitutional instruments; and we want to be able to take
care of pressing and ever-changing needs.
I also presume to suggest that both of these positions (as conventionally
understood) are mistaken, perhaps most of all in that their proponents do not
appreciate how they can be properly reconciled. Vital to such reconciliation
is an informed awareness of what the Constitution does and does not say. Or,
put another way, a living or growing Constitution need not be resorted to if
it should be recognized what the true original intent of the Framers of the
Constitution was: an intent to invest Congress with broad powers to regulate
the economy of the Country and its interests in the world at large. Those
originally broad powers have been enhanced by such constitutional
amendments as the Fourteenth Amendment, permitting the General
Government to supervise various activities in the States, particularly those
concerned with race relations and with the administration of justice.' 3
Something of that supervisory power recognized in various Amendments had
been anticipated by the Republican Form of Government Guarantee in Article
IV of 4the Constitution of 1787, however neglected that power has always
1
been.
I have just spoken of "an informed awareness of what the Constitution
does, and does not, say" as being vital to the reconciliation between two
seemingly irreconcilable positions. It is such an informed awareness that I

12.

For a vigorous repudiation of this approach to constitutional interpretation, see

WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POuTICS AND THE CONSTnUION (1953). See ANASTAPLO, THE
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 457; ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION

OF 1787, supranote 2, at 333; George Anastaplo, Mr. Crosskey, the American Constitution,and
the Natures of Things, 15 LoY. U. CHi. L.J. 181, 201 (1984); infra notes 46 and 55.
13. On the Fourteenth Amendment, see ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 458; ANASTAPLO, TIE CONSTrTUTION of 1787, supranote 2,
at 334.

14.

On republican government and the Republican Form of Government Guarantee, see
THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTIUTION,supranote 2, at 463; ANASTAPLo, THE

ANASTAPLO,

CONSTITUTION of 1787, supra note 2, at 337; see also infra note 418.
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attempt to provide in my commentaries on the Constitution of 1787.'" Some
who want the General Government to exercise broad powers do not
understand how such powers are indeed provided for in the
Constitution-and so they attempt to skirt the Constitution. Others who insist
upon original intent do not appreciate what they are really asking for. We can
wonder, then, what it is that the Constitution of 1787 does provide for.
I was surprised to learn, upon preparing my first commentary on the
Constitution for publication, that there evidently had not been, since the
Ratification Campaign of 1787-1788, any other attempt among us to set forth
a book-length section-by-section commentary upon the United States
Constitution proceeding primarily from the original text itself. Even during
the Ratification period, the longer commentaries (as in The Federalistand in
the State Ratifying Conventions) were not systematic, but rather were
tailored, properly enough, to local interests and concerns. 6 This means,
among other things, that one cannot rely simply upon the suggested
interpretations of various constitutional provisions by partisans who were
determined, in 1787-1788, to secure either the ratification or the rejection of
the Constitution.
Il.
There have been, of course, many instructive systematic accounts of
constitutional law in our own time, but these have relied far more than I
wanted to do in my commentary upon judicial and other official
interpretations and applications of the Constitution. Those official
interpretations have been quite varied over the past two centuries, even over
the past half-century or so, which does not inspire confidence in the
conclusion that it is indeed the Constitution that is being expounded. 7
Perhaps the greatest systematic commentary upon the Constitution has
been that of Joseph Story a century and a half ago.'" But even that
commentary did not attempt to proceed primarily from the original text itself.
Indeed, Justice Story might have considered it "academic" and otherwise
impractical (ifnot even subversive of his own intentions) to attempt to do so.
He explains, in his Preface of 1833, what he looked to in expounding the
Constitution:

15. See supra note 2.
16. On The Federalist,see infra Part 13.
17. It can be instructive to compare constitutional law casebooks of the 1940s with those
we have today. Hardly anyone today can be interested in, say, most of the Commerce Clause
cases which were once so critical (for example, with respect to the "original package" issue).
See supra note II; infra text accompanying note 24.
18.

JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OFTHEUNITED STATES (1833).

On Justice Story, see ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at
464; ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTIONALIST, supra note 2, at 821; see also infra note 21.
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From two great sources... I have drawn by far the greatest part of
my most valuable materials. These are, The Federalist, an
incomparable commentary ofthree ofthe greatest statesmen of their
age, and the extraordinary Judgments of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall
upon constitutional law. The former have discussed the structure
and organization of the national govemrnent, in all its departments,
with admirable fulness and force. The latter has expounded the
application and limits of its powers and functions with unrivalled
profoundness and felicity. The Federalistcould do little more than
state the objects and general bearing of those powers and functions.
The masterly reasoning of the Chief Justice has followed them out
to their ultimate results and boundaries with a precision and
clearness, approaching, as near as may be, to mathematical
demonstration. 9

I have anticipated, in my comments upon the limited reliability of the
Ratification Campaign expositions of the Constitution, Justice Story's account
of how he used his materials:
The reader must not expect to find in these pages any novel views and novel
constructions of the Constitution. I have not the ambition to be the author
of any new plan of interpreting the theory of the Constitution, or of enlarging
or narrowing its powers by ingenious subtleties and learned doubts. My
object will be sufficiently attained, if I shall have succeeded in bringing
before the reader the true view of its powers, maintained by its founders and
friends, and confirmed and illustrated by the actual practice of the
government.2"
But, we should at once add, to rely, in expounding the Constitution, upon
the view of it "maintained by its founders and friends, and confirmed and
illustrated by the actual practice of the government" may be-in fact, is likely
to be-very much affected by chance political circumstances.2'
IV.
If politics and hence chance affect, naturally enough, what practical
citizens do with and say about the Constitution, it may require considerable
effort to clear away the superstructure which conceals from view the original
structure. One compromise or adjustment leads to another, as dedicated
statesmen grapple with "the actual practice of the government." After a while,
the Constitution itself can be lost sight of.2

19.
20.

STORY, supra note 18, at I, vii-viii; see also supra note 16.
Id. at 1,viii.

21. On Justice Story, see CROSSKEY, supra note 12, at 1406; see also supra note 18.
22. One indication of this is how little time is spent on the text of the Constitution in the
typical law school constitutional law course. Even less time is devoted, of course, to the
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One illustration bearing on all this which has always appealed to my
constitutional law students might be usefully recalled here. It is about Dizzy
Dean, a baseball legend in the St. Louis and Southern Illinois area in which
I grew up. He won 120 games in his first five seasons as a regular pitcher
with the St. Louis Cardinals and was only twenty-six when he broke a toe in
an All-Star game in 1937. He tried to come back too soon and, favoring his
injured toe, ruined his arm. The career of Dizzy Dean can remind us of the
distortion that can take place, and the considerable damage that can be done,
when one part of a well-constructed "system" is used to do the work intended
for another part.
Consider, for example, what has been done with "due process" because
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment became
practically unavailable soon after that Amendment was ratified.23 That this
was done to the post-Civil War Amendments, and so, soon after their
ratification, despite the great sacrifices of the war which those amendments
were intended to take advantage of and consolidate, should remind us of the
distortions that political "necessities" (or passions) can induce. Much the
same seems to have happened to the great domestic powers of Congress not
long after the ratification of the Constitution of 1787. This may be seen most
of all perhaps in what led to and resulted from misreadings of the Commerce
Clause for more than a century.2 4 Of course, we now recognize a virtually
unlimited commerce power for Congress-but that has not been because the
Constitution is "living" or "growing" but rather because we have returned to
the reading of the Commerce Clause relied upon by Chief Justice Marshall a
century and a half ago.2" By doing so we have recognized how truly practical
the Framers of the Constitution were: for it must have seemed as obvious to
them, as it now does to us, that only the National Government would be able
to exercise effectively the power to regulate the economy of the Country, just
as it must have seemed obvious to them that some such power should be
availableto the National Government (however inadvisable it may often be
to exercise much of that power and however obvious it may be that there are
both good and bad ways of exercising such power).2 6

founding constitutional document of the American regime, the Declaration of Independence.
On the Declaration of Independence, see ANASTAPLO, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 3, at 11,
31.
23. On the Fourteenth Amendment, see supra note 13.
24. On the Commerce Clause and the commerce power, see supra notes 11, 17.
25. See Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942) (Justice Jackson's comment on the
scope of Gibbons v. Ogden); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824).
26. On law and economic policy, see George Anastaplo, Legal Education, Economics,
and Law School Governance: Explorations,46 S.D. L. REV. 102, 201 (2001). See also infra
text accompanying note 67.
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V.

I have suggested that the Constitution itself can be lost sight of if we rely
upon what practical men have been obliged to do and say from time to time.
I now suggest that one cannot truly see what practical men have done if one
does not know what the original intention was-for one cannot see
adjustments, distortions, and compromises for what they are if one does not
know what is being changed, how, and why.
Furthermore, if one relies primarily on Supreme Court cases, legislative
applications, and executive interpretations, one is not apt to see fully how
well-crafted the Constitution truly is. It is only when the superb craftsmanship
of the Constitution--craftsmanship that many are not somehow aware of, even
as they proceed otherwise in reading it-it is only when its superb
craftsmanship is seen for what it is that the nature and extent of the powers of
the General Government can be reliably grasped. If the Constitution is
regarded as carefully crafted, then we can take seriously the many indications
therein that various general powers were indeed originally intended by the
Framers of the Constitution.
What does this mean, in practice, for teachers of constitutional law? My
constitutional law courses, both for political science departments and in law
schools, have been distinguished by their considerable concern with the
Constitution itself. We do not begin to look at cases until several weeks have
been spent studying fundamental constitutional documents. These documents
include Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of
Confederation, the Northwest Ordinance, and of course, the Constitution of
1787 with its subsequent amendments.2 7
It is sometimes difficult to persuade students to look at the Constitution
itself-really to look at it--especially if they have already picked up the
current orthodoxy about what the Constitution does or does not say. Also
pernicious is the general opinion, at least among supposedly sophisticated
people, that the Constitution is what the judges say it is.
I gather, from talking to other teachers of constitutional law and to many
students who have taken other constitutional law courses than mine at one
time or another, that an insistence upon an understanding of the Constitution
as the principal object of a constitutional law course is quite rare in this
Country. On the other hand, I do have the impression that the student who
does come to understand the Constitution as originally designed, is far better
equipped than most students to make sense of the many renderings of the
Constitution produced by practical men in a variety of circumstances. This
superior ability to explain transient phenomena follows from any
interpretation of the Constitution that not only examines what its parts are but

27. For these and related documents, see the appendices in THE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION and THE CONSTITUTION of 1787, supra note 2; see also infra note 31.
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also how those parts fit together.2"
VI.
We have noticed Justice Story's warning that the reader of his
Commentaries should "not expect to find in [his] pages any novel views and
novel constructions of the Constitution."29 He can assure his reader:
The expositions to be found in the work are less to be regarded as
my own opinions than as those of the great minds which framed the
Constitution, or which have been from time to time called upon to
administer it. Upon subjects of government, it has always appeared
to me that metaphysical refinements are out of place. A
constitution of government is addressed to the common-sense of the
people, and never was designed for trials of logical skill or
visionary speculation. 0
Iam obliged to endorse his repudiation of"metaphysical refinements" in
these matters. But this does not mean that the Constitution should not be dealt
with as a well-crafted instrument. Various commentaries upon the
Constitution-including my own-have been prepared with considerable care.
Should not the Constitution itself be regarded as having been made with at
least equal care-especially since its Framers included men far more talented
and far more experienced than any of us commentators are apt to be?
Just as a proper commentary can take on a life of its own, so may the
Constitution itself. That is, one can read it with the presupposition that the
whole makes sense, that it repays careful study. I should at once add that an
adequate grasp of the constitutional "whole" requires one to have a reliable
sense of the circumstances of the time when the Constitution was framed and
of the Anglo-American constitutional and legal heritage that the Framers
brought to the Federal Convention of 1787."' On the other hand, one should
not permit technicalities and the opinions of "experts" to interfere with a
common-sense perception of what is there for all to read.
The People at large, upon ratifying the Constitution, obviously did not
grasp everything that was in it. They took the word, so to speak, of their most
influential statesmen. In addition, they did grasp that the Constitution should
be read in the way that such instruments could reasonably be expected to be
read in that day. What one hopes for, therefore, as a student of the

28. A solid grounding in constitutional interpretation-that is, in reading a well-crafted
document such as the Constitution-should be invaluable for lawyers who are likely to devote
considerable effort throughout their careers to reading documents.
29. STORY, supra note 18, at 1, viii.
30. Id.
31.

See LIBERTY, EQUALITY & MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM: A SOURCE BOOK (George

Anastaplo ed., 1999); see also supra note 27.

HeinOnline -- 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 746 2002-2003

2003]

CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE GOOD

Constitution, is an account of it which reflects an informed Eighteenth
Century approach to such matters.
VII.
It is important, in considering the Constitution, to recognize in all this the
ultimate power of the People. It is, after all, the People who have ordained
and established the Constitution. This means, among other things, that
legislative supremacy, among the branches of government, is implied: it is
evident, in the Constitution, that it is the legislature, not the executive or the
judiciary, which should direct whatever ordaining and establishing is to be
done by government itself.32
The ultimate power of the People also means that the best checks upon
abuse of governmental power resides in the People, not in one or another
branch of government. After all, since the authority for the Constitution stems
from the People, who else is in principle in as good a position as the People
(when properly instructed) to assess what government does? If so, then many
of the questions we regard as constitutional questions are truly political
questions-and this recognition, too, can very much affect how we should
regard much of what passes for "constitutional law" among us.
Perhaps I venture upon what may be considered by some to be suspect
metaphysics when I wonder whether there is not a sense of "the People"
which sees the people as the embodiment of political wisdom. Thus, one
would have to try to determine not what the opinion of the People happens to
be at any particular time but ratherwhat is truly good. That is, the People, as
Supreme Legislator, can be assumed to want to do what is right-and what is
right depends upon the use of reason in order to learn the lessons taught us by
nature. Thus, it can be said, the Constitution is so devised as to permit reason
to rule. aa
In any event, much is to be said for regarding the Constitution of 1787 as
an exemplary work of the mind, adapted to the immediate circumstances and
the enduring aspirations of the American people. It is to a respectful
explication of such a text that a proper commentary should be directed by the
enlightened citizen.

32. Thus, it is Congress that has the power to ordain and establish courts inferior to the
United States Supreme Court. On the Judiciary Article, see ANASTAPLO, THE CoNsTiTuTON
of 1787, supra note 2 at 124, 136.
33. This observation has been attributed to Scott Buchanan, once Dean of St. John's
College, Annapolis, Maryland.
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34
2. THE TAKING CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and
engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole
and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other
individual in the universe. And yet there are very few, that will give
themselves the trouble to consider the original and foundation of this
right. Pleased as we are with the possession, we seem afraid to look
back to the means by which it was acquired, as if fearful of some defect
in our title; or at best we rest satisfied with the decision of the laws in
our favour, without examining the reason or authority upon which those
laws have been built .... The right of inheritance, or descent to the

children and relations of the deceased, seems to have been allowed
much earlier than the right of devising by testament. We are apt to
conceive at first view that it has nature on it's side; yet we often mistake
for nature what we find established by long and inveterate custom. It
is certainly a wise and effectual, but clearly a political, establishment;
since the permanent right of property, vested in the ancestor himself,
was no natural,but merely a civil, right.... And thus the legislature of
England has universally promoted the grand ends of civil society, the
peace and security of individuals, by steadily pursuing that wise and
orderly maxim, of assigning to every thing capable of ownership a legal
and determinate owner .... [The] right of property ..... as we have
formerly seen, owes its origin not to the law of nature, but merely to
civil society.
William Blackstone"
I.

The Taking or Eminent Domain Clause of the Fifth Amendment is
straightforward: "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation."36 If any part of a person's property is taken for public

34. This paper was prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the Southwestern
Social Sciences Association, Little Rock, Arkansas, March 30, 1989. On property, see also
infra Part 3 of this Article.
35. WILIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAwS OF ENGLAND, Book II, i, 2, 11,
15, Book IV, i, 9 (1766).
36. Similar clauses maybe found in State constitutions. For the traditional interpretation
of the Taking Clause, see JOSEPH L. SAX, Takings of Property, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1855 (1986). The Sax entry concludes,

Although no single theory wholly dominates taking law, two guidelines permit safe
prediction about the great majority of cases. Courts will find a taking and require just
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use, then he is entitled to compensation. It may be difficult to determine in
any particular situation whether any property has been taken or what it is
worth. But that there should be private property, as well as standards of
justice to be applied in dealing with it, was generally accepted in the United
States at the time that the Bill of Rights was drafted and ratified (1789-1791).
It seems to have been generally accepted at that time that such
governmental measures as restrictions upon uses of private property, export
and import regulations, various kinds of taxation, wage and price controls,
and welfare legislation did not constitute "takings" which required "just
compensation." Judicial interpretations and applications of the Taking
Clause, from the earliest days under the Constitution down to our time, reflect
this general acceptance of the scope of permissible governmental activity
(whether or not "for public use") without any requirement of compensation.
The most troublesome challenges to the traditional interpretation of the
Taking Clause arise when executive orjudicial, as distinguished perhaps from
legislative, activity deprives one in effect of the ability to use one's property
as one had. A dramatic instance is when low-level military training flights
make it virtually impossible to continue to work a chicken farm." Less
dramatic is an official diversion of streams, in the course of construction
work, which makes a private wharf far less useful.3" But it may be sounder
to consider such cases as posing issues of tort liability on the part of
government rather than as instances of takings for which just compensation
is due.39

compensation if (1)the government acquires physical possession of the property; or if (2)
regulation so reduces the owner's values that virtually no net economic return is left to the
proprietor).
Id. at 1857. Courts find it difficult, in applying the Taking Clause (as distinguished from
imposing tort liability), to go much beyond direct physical appropriation of property by the
government. See infra note 54.
37. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
38. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833). Chief Justice Marshall, who wrote the
Opinion ofthe Court, does not say that the effects of the construction work complained of here
did constitute a taking, whatever the State trial court might have believed. On the application
of the Bill of Rights to the States, see CROSSKEY, supra note 12, at Chap. XXX, "The Supreme
Court's Destruction of the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, Contained in the
Original Constitution and Initial Amendments." Professor Crosskey considered Barron v.
Baltimore to have been "incorrectly decided" in holding that Amendments II-VIII do not apply
to the States. Id. at 1076. If Mr. Crosskey is correct, was the Chief Justice willing to use this
case, ruling as he did with respect to the Bill of Rights, because the plaintiff would not have had
aclaim anyway under the Taking Clause? On Barron v. Baltimore,see George Anastaplo, Law,
Judges, and the Principlesof Regimes, 70 TENN. L. REV. 456, 519 (2003).
39. Isthe eminent domain approach, however dubious it may be, likely to be resorted to
by the complaining property owner whenever sovereign immunity doctrines rule out the tort
liability approach? The eminent domain approach, if successful, isan effective repudiation of
sovereign immunity, something which there is no evidence that the Framers of the Constitution
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II.
These observations about the Taking Clause would once have been
considered a reliable guide to an interpretation of that clause. But advocates
of "libertarian" tendencies have now emerged with doctrines that call much
governmental activity into question. A recent instance of this is a book by
Richard A. Epstein, Takings: PrivateProperty and the Power of Eminent
Domain.4 0
One questionable feature of the Epstein approach is that it presents a
political-economic agenda as a constitutional argument, an argument for
which there does not seem to be any basis either in the original intention of
the Framers of the Bill of Rights or (as Professor Epstein recognizes) in the
body ofjudicial interpretations of the Taking Clause. And yet he can be seen
to question and reject "the constitutionality of many key features of
twentieth-century American government including progressive income taxes,
the National Labor Relations Act, systems of unemployment compensation,
social security, and most forms of zoning."'"

and of the Bill of Rights intended as a constitutional necessity.
40. RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985). Critical to the Epstein position, here and elsewhere, seems to be the following
opinion:
Perhaps the clearest and most important purpose of the Constitution was to place a set of
limitations upon government power, both at the state and at the federal levels. The primary
end of the framework for government envisioned by the framers was to avoid the twin
perils of dictatorship on the one hand and tyranny by majorities on the other.
Richard Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause,51 U. C. L. REv. 703, 710
(1984). 1 believe it is sounder to regard the Constitution primarily as a considerable
empowerment of the National Government made safe in large part by a proper distribution of
powers. See infra notes 41 and 59. On the Commerce Clause, see supra note 11.
41. Jeremy Paul, Book Review: Searchingforthe Status Quo, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 743
(1986) (reviewing TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN).
Another reviewer sums up the Epstein position as "suggest[ing] that maximum hour-minimum
wage laws (pp. 279-81), the National Labor Relations Act (p. 280), the progressive income tax
(pp. 295-303), wealth transfer taxes (pp. 303-05), unemployment benefits (p. 309), social
security (p. 326), and all welfare payments (pp. 314-24) would or could be struck down. He
recognizes that all these changes are unlikely and suggests that the courts could start down his
road merely by striking down minimum wage laws (pp. 324-29)." Russell K. Osgood, Book
Review: TAKINGS, 37 J.LEGAL EDUC. 453,454 (1987).
Mr. Epstein repeatedly recognizes the scope of his demolition project. See, e.g., EPSTEIN,
supra note 40, at 281:
It will be said that my position invalidates much of the twentieth-century legislation, and
so it does. But does that make the position wrong in principle? The breadth of my
charges shows only that there is a clear pattern of constitutional decisions in a wide
diversity of cases. The linkages among the cases tend to make much of the legislation
stand and fall together. If my arguments here are correct, then any New Deal economic
and social legislation that suffers from the vices of the labor statutes in principle should
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Mr. Epstein's essay is a well-publicized version of one kind of highly
partisan scholarship, some of it rather wild, that passes for constitutional
interpretation these days. As such it requires our attention, if only to remind
us of the merits of the traditional approach.4

1I.
Mr. Epstein's detailed arguments need not concern us here. They have
been addressed at length and soundly criticized by economists, by legal
historians, and by constitutional law experts. It does seem to be widely
believed that neither the language of the Constitution nor the teaching of the
cases supports his expansive use of the Taking Clause.43
Here and there, however, ringing endorsements of Mr. Epstein's
argument can be heard."
Still others believe, notwithstanding the

be consigned to the same constitutional fate. The New Deal is inconsistent with the
principles of limited government and with the constitutional provisions designed to serve
that end.
See also id. at 65, 112, 312, 322-29. The critical issue here is not whether the New Deal
programs were well conceived-many of them may not have been-but rather whether they
were unconstitutional. See supra note 4; infra note 59.
It is curious what Mr. Epstein has to do to the Sixteenth Amendment and to the General
Welfare Clause in order to justify a demolition project which includes invalidation of the
progressive income tax along with several New Deal programs. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note
40, 296-97, 42-43. Fancy footwork is needed also to take care of the traditional defense of
sovereign immunity. See, e.g., id. at 156. Compare Thomas W. Merrill, Rent Seeking and the
Compensation Principle, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1561, 1564-65 (1986) (reviewing TAKINGS). Also
intriguing have been Mr. Epstein's efforts to explain away as well the bankruptcy power
provided in the Constitution. See Proceedings of the Conference on Takings ofProperty and
the Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 49, 155-59, 202, 204-05 (1986).
42. On prudence and the Constitution, see ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787,
supra note 2, at 337; ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at
462. See also George Anastaplo, American Constitutionalism and the Virtue ofPrudence, in
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE GETTYSBURG ADDRESS, AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALIsM 77 (Leo

Paul S. de Alverez ed., 1976); infra note 418.
43. See, e.g., Stanley C. Brubaker, ConstutionalBicentennial Symposium.: The "Rights
Revolution": Conserving the Constitution, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 261, 265 (1987)
(reviewing TAKINGS); Thomas C. Grey, The Mathusian Constitution, 41 U. MAMI L. REV. 2 1,
24 (1986) (reviewing TAKINGS); Mark Kelman, Taking TAKINGS Seriously: An Essay for
Centrist, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1829, 1829 (1986) (reviewing TAKINGS); Thomas Ross, Taking
TAKINGS Seriously, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1591, 1597 (1986) (reviewing TAKINGS); Joseph L. Sax,
Takings: PrivateProperty and the Power of Eminent Domain, 53 U. CI. L. REV. 279, 279
(1986) (book review); RichardEpstein on the Foundationsof Takings, 99 HARV. L. REV. 791
(1986).
44. The WALL STREET JOURNAL has been particularly enthusiastic. See, e.g., Gordon
Crovitz, Is the New Deal Unconstitutional?,WALL ST. J.,Jan. 13, 1986, at 24 (reviewing
TAKINGS); Claudia Rosett, The Year's Best Books, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 1985, at 7. See also
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reservations they may have, that it has been useful for him to provide the
provocations that he has. Considerable instructive discussion has been
engendered, to which Mr. Epstein has not been loathe to contribute further.45
Still, one cannot help but wonder whether any of the eminent legal
scholars whose help Mr. Epstein acknowledges in the preface to his book
ever counselled him that the pronouncements he was offering up as
constitutional argument were anything but that. One must wonder, that is,
what in the world the Constitution means to them."'
IV.
The most instructive fact about the Epstein book may be that it illustrates
the distorting effects of not reading the Constitution as a whole. Distortions
are compounded by the considerable reliance by contemporary legal scholars
upon judicial review, even though there is nothing in the Constitution which
indicates that such review of acts of Congress was anticipated. Substantial
reliance upon judicial review, ifnot even upon "judicial activism,""4 may be
seen in the extent to which Mr. Epstein wants the courts to deal with the
many ways in which he believes that governments take private property for
public use. There is reflected here the tendency of all too many people
trained in the law these days not to recognize that most governing among us
should be done politically, that the judicial role is merely that of adjudicating,
not primarily or substantially that of supervising or directing.
It is salutary to recall here the insistence, by friends of the Constitution
in the Ratification Campaign of 1787-1788, that no bill of rights was needed,
that many important rights (including those protecting property) were already
sufficiently recognized in the constitutional system they advocated. This, too,
suggests that the Taking Clause is far more modest than some of its recent
interpreters would like it to be.4"

John L. Dodd, Takings: PrivatePropertyand the Powerof Eminent Domain, 14 W. ST. U. L.
REv. 639 (1987); Edward Foster, TAKINGS, 4 CoNST. COMMENT. 443, 451 (1987) (book
review); Ellen Frankel Paul, Takings: PrivatePropertyand the PowerofEminent Domain, 55
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 152, 178 (1986) (book review).
45. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rogers Hummel, Epstein's Takings Doctrineandthe Public-Goods
Problem, 65 Tax. L. REv. 1233, 1233 (1987) (reviewing TAKINGS).
46. 1recently had occasion to ask the students in a seminar I conducted at the University
of Chicago Law School whether they had ever been assigned anything by William Crosskey.
Evidently not!
47. See supra Part I of this Article. A particularly troubling eruption of "judicial
activism" is what the United States Supreme Court did in Bush v. Gore, 531 U. S.98 (2000).
See George Anastaplo, Bush v. Gore and a ProperSeparationof Powers,34 Loy.U. CHI.L.J.
131 (2000); see also infra note 287.
48. It is odd that something as innovative as Mr. Epstein believes that the Taking Clause
was intended to be was left out of the Constitution of 1787. Almost all of the other rights
protected by the Bill of Rights of 1791 had long been well-established and hence did not need
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In any event, novelties in these matters should be regarded with
considerable skepticism, including any theory which calls for wholesale
invalidation of hundreds, if not tens of thousands, of statutes enacted by
Congress for two centuries now.
V.
Similar departures from sound constitutional interpretation may be seen
in what has happened in recent decades in the readings of the First
Amendment prohibition of abridgments of freedom of speech or of the press.
This protection is now casually extended to a variety of utterances, including
obscenity and commercial advertising, that were never believed by the
framers of the First Amendment to be entitled to immunity.
It does not seem to be appreciated, that is, that "freedom of speech, or of
the press" is primarily concerned with 'self-government. This is the way I
have summed up my own interpretation of the Speech and Press Clause of the
First Amendment:
The First Amendment to the Constitution prohibits Congress, in its lawmaking capacity, from cutting down in any way or for any reason freedom
of speech and of the press. The extent of this freedom is to be measured not
merely by the common-law treatises and cases available on December 15,
1791-the date of the ratification of the First Amendment-but also by the
general understanding and practice of the people of the United States who
insisted upon, had written for them, and ratified (through their State
legislatures) the First Amendment. An important indication of the extent of
this freedom is to be seen in the teachings of the Declaration of
Independence and in the events leading up to the Revolution.
Although the prohibition in the First Amendment is absolute-we see
here a restraint upon Congress that is unqualified, among restraints that are
qualified-the absolute prohibition does not relate to all forms of expression
but only to that whifh the terms, "freedom of speech, or of the press" were
then taken to encompass, political speech, speech having to do with the
duties and concerns of self-governing citizens. Thus, for example, this
constitutional provision is not primarily or directly concerned with what we
now call artistic expression or with the problems of obscenity. Rather, the
First Amendment acknowledges that the sovereign citizen has the right freely
to discuss the public business, a privilege theretofore claimed only for
members of legislative bodies.49
Interpretations of the First Amendment today evidently do not place much
reliance upon the parliamentary prototype for the "freedom of speech"
language of the amendment." Here, too, one can see political or social
to be in the original Constitution. See infra note 309 and accompanying text.
ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTIONAUST, supra note 2, at 15-16.
50. For Thomas More's "freedom of speech" petition, see ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS
49.
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preferences being substituted for serious constitutional examination. At the
same time, the political context of the Constitution itself, as well as of the
First Amendment, tends to be ignored.
The context of the Taking Clause is similarly disregarded. That clause
comes at the end of the Fifth Amendment, rounding off provisions which are
concerned primarily with limitations upon the Courts and, to some extent,
upon the Executive. 5'
The dominant concern of the Fifth Amendment is with judicial
proceedings which threaten life, liberty, and property: due process has to be
insisted upon in such instances. The Taking Clause guards against any
evasion of the Due Process Guarantee that tries to do to a person on the civil
side of the docket what could not properly be done to a person on the criminal
side.
VI.
A general system of allocating and exchanging property is taken for
granted by the Taking Clause, so far as the courts and the Executive are
concerned. But such general rules are properly subject to legislative
alteration, something that the more libertarian interpreters of the Taking
Clause today do not seem to recognize. Thus, most issues raised with respect
to the regulation or redistribution of property (say, through the use of
environmental protection measures or the use of progressive taxation and
welfare benefits) depend upon political, not judicial, questions.
One critical problem with the libertarian approach here is that it treats
property as if it exists independent of government.52 But is not the property
one has usually determined by law? Most property, at least in the modem
world, depends upon society and law; much of it would not even exist
otherwise. Human beings may have a natural right to property, but that does
not mean that any particular piece of property one has, or one's right to it, is
determined altogether by nature and not at all by convention.
Property allocations and property rights rest upon general rules. These are
subject to change, and sensible people know that. The major decision by the
2, at 256. See also id. at 461.
51. he Fifth Amendment reads:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation.
52. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supranote 40, at 5,308. Compare the Blackstone passages used
in the text at supra note 35. Is not Mr. Epstein aware that he is skating on thin ice by using
Blackstone as he does? More fancy footwork is conjured up. See id. at 22 n.6; supranote 41.

TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note
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United States Supreme Court that lends some support to a libertarian reading
of the Taking Clause is Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon." A coal
company, having sold land in which it retained mineral rights, including the
right to mine coal without corporate responsibility for any damage caused on
the surface, had found its operations curtailed by a subsequently enacted State
law which obliged it to take account of what happened on the surface. One
suspects that Justice Holmes, who wrote the Opinion of the Court, found for
the company because he regarded this law as, in effect, an attempt by the
surface owners to welsh on their contractual undertakings.5 4
But should not the coal company have always recognized that the law
which regulated its development of its resources could change?" After all,
the People of Pennsylvania may not want to have their State littered by sunken
lots, especially in densely populated areas, no matter what miners and builders
have happened to agree to. 6
We know and generally agree that rules may change from time to time.
We are not entitled to unchanging rules about the use and retention of
property, however much we may be entitled to compensation when we as
individuals personally lose to government action the use of our property while
the general rules remain unchanged. Changes in general rules can be

53. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Mr. Epstein does not believe that Justice Holmes went far
enough in Pennsylvania Coal. See EPSTEIN, supra note 40, at 94. On Mahon, see Part 3 of this
Article.
54. The immunity contracted for by the coal company probably meant, in some if not in
all instances, a cheaper price for the purchasers of land upon which to build. Even so, the
holding in Mahon has been largely abandoned by the Court. The Brandeis dissent on that
occasion has generally prevailed. Indeed, it has been argued, the United States Supreme Court
never really applied extensively the doctrine it laid down in Mahon. See, e.g., Neal S. Manne,
Reexamining the Supreme Court's View of the Taking Clause, 58 TEX. L. REv. 1447 (1980).
I suspect that much the same will happen with such cases as Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 841-42 (1987). See infra text accompanying note 59.
55. The Contracts Clause, which was also invoked by the coal company, is irrelevant here,
even in its orthodox interpretation. The Supreme Court did not deal with the Contracts Clause
argument. For another interpretation of the Contracts Clause (which interpretation would also
be irrelevant here), see THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787,supranote 2, at 333; Crosskey, supra note
12, at 352-60; see infra note 79. This interpretation might seem to lend support to Mr.
Epstein's position, except that (I) it applies only to the States, and (2) it assumes a broad
commerce power in the United States. Consider, as well, the implications of Mr. Crosskey's
reading of the Ex Post Facto Clauses as bearing also on civil matters. CROSSKEY, supra note
12, at 324-51. But, however that may be, Mr. Crosskey's Constitution is hardly one of severely
limited powers.
56. Should the State be obliged to pay all landowners not to dig holes which threaten
subsidence? That is, one may be tempted to dig even when there are no prospects of
minerals-if "just compensation" is thereby to be extracted?
All this is not unrelated to the equities of mandatory seat-belt or motorcycle helmet
legislation. Who but the public is likely to pay in our circumstances for most long-term medical
treatment following upon injuries "voluntarily" risked?
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expected to affect the use we can continue to make of the property we have
been entitled heretofore to acquire or to develop. Although we may not be
entitled to compensation in most such cases, we are assured by the First
Amendment that we are entitled to discuss fully the proposed legislative
change and thereafter its consequences. 7
Communities sometimes act foolishly, even unjustly, in the changes they
make in their laws. But most of this conduct, however lamentable at times,
need not be considered to pose constitutional issues, whether under the Taking
Clause or under other provisions of the Constitution.
VII.
The current libertarian approach to the Taking Clause is merely one
manifestation of a general approach that questions the legitimacy of all
government except at the most elementary level. It is an unnaturally cramped
interpretation of the Constitution that would restrict government to keeping
the peace and protecting private property."8
As a moral argument as well, the libertarian approach here can be rather
dubious, legitimating whatever degree of selfishness one happens to be
inclined to exhibit in social relations. It should be evident that a decent people
are not going to permit a moral or political theory, especially when it is of a
doctrinaire tenor, to keep them from being sensible in trying to be and to do
good. We should not want in any event to reduce all governing either to
calculation-certainly not to mere economic calculation-or to judicial
administration.
It is, in short, hardly prudent to permit the Taking Clause to take over the
entire Constitution. Recollections of other bizarre readings of the
Constitution by recourse to the Due Process Clause, and earlier to the slavery
provisions in the Constitution of 1787, should remind us that special pleading,
when couched in terms of constitutional interpretation, can give
constitutionalism (and especially "original intent") abad name among citizens
who continue to hold a commonsensical belief in the common good. 9
57.

On the First Amendment, see supra note 49 and accompanying text; see also supra

note 50.
58. James Wilson did say at the Constitutional Convention, on August 13, 1787, "War,
Commerce & Revenue [are] the great objects ofthe General Government." But he said as well,
on July 13, 1787, "[I cannot] agree that [the protection of] property [is] the sole or the primary
object of Government and society. The cultivation and improvement of the human mind [is]

the most noble object." Compare EPSTEIN, supra note 40, at 344-45. We need not examine
here what John Locke thought about these matters. It is not likely that Mr. Epstein has read
Locke any more carefully than he has read the Constitution.
59. One can be reminded hereof Dred Scott v.Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857),
of Lochner v.New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and of early anti-New Deal cases (see Part I of
this Article).
On original intent and a proper reading of the Constitution, see ANASTAPLO, THE
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3. PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION60
Most of the villages of Egypt are situated upon eminences of rubbish,

which rise a few feet above the reach of the inundation, and are
surrounded by palm-trees, or have a few of these trees in their
vicinity. The rubbish which they occupy consists of materials of
former huts, or of an ancient town...
E.W. Lane

61

I.

The speaker at a University of Chicago Physics Department Colloquium
this afternoon dealt with a highly technical topic concerned with the random
movements and combinations of the minute particles being investigated by
him and his colleagues.62 An anticipation of the randomness involved was

George Anastaplo, How to Read the Constitution,supra
note 8.
The bizarre is reflected in an ingenuous comment by Professor Epstein as quoted in MERRIL'S
CoNsTrrUTION OF 1987, supranote 2;

ILL.

LEGAL

TIMEs, Feb. 1988, at 17:

The more I thought about the concept of taking, the more I realized that, gee, if you start
to apply this, everything becomes a taking. This seems crazy at first. But if you accept

the premise that eminent domain creates aright of compensation, then itjust doesn't make
sense to limit takings strictly to simply land use paradigms.
Compare the observation by Professor Brubaker, a political scientist:
Though he pretends to locate his theory in the ordinary meanings of the people who wrote
and ratified the Constitution, the terms on which the Constitution was written, presented,
and justified to the people and ratified by them-that is, the terms of republican
government-receive not a word. "That honorable determination" referred to by Madison
in the FEDERALIST, "which animates every votary of freedom to rest all our political
experiments on the capacity of mankind for self-government," has no place in Epstein's
world. Politics is not an arena of honor, but a necessary nuisance. In place of republican
government and a people ruling themselves deliberately through a structure of separated
powers, Epstein provides a pallid notion of "representation" inwhich what is made present
again is man's economic, not his political, nature. Politics might as well consist of
punching our preferences into a giant computer program; there is no need for deliberate
process through which we come to realize a common good.
Brubaker, supra note 43, at 276.
60. A talk given in a Constitutional Law course, Loyola University of Chicago School of
Law, Chicago, Illinois, November 21, 2002. On property, see also supra Part 2 of this Article.
61.

E.W.

LANE, AN ACCOUNT OF THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE MODERN

(5th ed., 1836). The prosaic elements in the exalted claims of property are
often lost sight of.
62. For speculations about ultimate particles, see ANASTAPLO,THE ARTIST AS THINcKER,
supra note 4, at 252-53; see also ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTrrUTIONALIST, supranote 2, at 80608; infra note 64; see also infra note 233 and accompanying text.
EGYPTIANs 21-22
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provided by an illustration drawn by the speaker from everyday experience,
labeled by him, "The Drunken Pedestrian and the Lazy Policemen."
This was a story of the drunkard who weaves his way along city streets,
"bouncing" (so to speak) in one of four directions at each intersection
encountered. The question was what the odds were that he would, before
getting to the sanctuary of his home, encounter one of the policemen who had
parked themselves at three of the intersections in the area through which the
pedestrian was moving.63
The illustration aroused considerable interest, perhaps especially among
those of us in the audience who suspected that this might be the only part of
the talk that we could understand." Certainly, the audience's response was
quite lively. I will return to the Saga of the Drunken Pedestrian and the Lazy
Policemen and what we may learn, from this illustration ofrandomness, about
our ways of knowing things."
II.
The case for the protection of property as fundamental to the assurance
of ordered liberty has been made most authoritatively, for the Englishspeaking peoples, by John Locke. The primacy of property for Locke is
reflected in his inclusion within that "property" term much ofone's being, not
only the material possessions one happens to have.66
The Lockean influence is evident among the American Founders. In our
own time it is to be seen in political economists such as Friederich Hayek and
Milton Friedman, culminating for them in the case for the merits of a market
economy.67
Any governmental or other organized communal regulation of how one
uses one's material possession can be regarded with suspicion. Indeed, the
presumption seems to be that any interference with the private enjoyment of
one's possessions is likely to be harmful for everyone, so much so that it
verges on the unnatural. It is almost as if it is natural that one should have the
possessions one has, so much that only the most serious necessity warrants

63. Data were available as to the number of intersections, the location of the pedestrian's
home, the distribution of the policemen, and so forth.
64. On the University of Chicago Physics Colloquium, see George Anastaplo, Thursday
Afternoons, in S. CHANDRASEKHAR: THE MAN BEHIND THE LEGEND (Kameshwar C. Wali, ed.,
1997), at 122; see also infra note 231 and accompanying text.
65. On the ways of knowing, see George Anastaplo, The Forms of Our Knowing: A
Somewhat Socratic Introduction, in JACQUES MARTAIN AND THE MANY WAYS OF KNOWING I

(Douglas A. Ollivant ed., 2002).
66. See Robert A. Goldwin, John Locke in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 476
(Joseph Cropsey & Leo Strauss, eds., University of Chicago Press 1987); infra text
accompanying note 237.
67. See Anastaplo, supranote 26, at 132-205.
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interference with one's possessions or their enjoyment.68
The taxation that may sometimes be necessary is to be exacted only by
a legislature in which taxpayers are represented. The complete taking of
some of one's property for public use may also sometimes be necessary-and
for this one should be fully compensated, leaving one in the same personal
Here, as elsewhere, "sentimental"
economic condition as before.
they have their price. 9
at
least,
be
ignored-or,
can
considerations
A proper political order is aware ofthese considerations. Such awareness
is incorporated in any constitutional arrangement worthy of respect and
allegiance.
Critical here, then, is the belief that the protection of property rights is
vital to the protection of all other rights that may be cherished. Thus, an
effective freedom of speech may depend upon citizens who are able to
maintain themselves despite governmental disapproval. The same may be
said, to some extent, about an effective free exercise of religion.7"
I.
An old-fashioned protection of property rights is seen by some these days
to have been stalwardly exhibited by Justice Sutherland in the Blaisdell
case."1 His dissenting opinion, joined by three other Justices on that
suspension of the property rights of various
occasion, protested the effective
72
creditors in Minnesota.
Justice Sutherland can be extolled as a champion of the original, not of
an evolving, Constitution against the claims of relativism and positivism?7
Indeed, his rigorous constitutionalism on behalf of the Contracts Clause can
be likened by the Justice's admirers to that of Justice Black on behalf of the
First Amendment.
Much is to be said, of course, for a firm constitutionalism, so long as the
terms relied upon are interpreted properly-and so long as the Framers who
originally used such terms were sensible.74 It may be impossible to say what
the social consequences would have been in Minnesota during the Great
Depression if the attempted foreclosures on a large scale had been permitted.

68. See, e.g., supra note 59.
69. Consider, as pointing to something even higher, the pledge, at the end of the
Declaration of Independence, of Lives, Fortune, and Honor.
70. On the importance of property in our regime, see ANASTAPLO, THE
CONSTITUTIONAUST, supra note 2, at 819. On religious liberty, see ANASTAPLO, THE
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 463.
71. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
72. Id. at 448. Justice Sutherland was joined in dissent by Justices Van Devanter,
McReynolds, and Butler.
73. See, e.g., HADLEY ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND: RESTORING A
JURISPRUDENCE OF NATURAL RIGHTS (1994).
74. See, e.g., supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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The creditors argued, of course, that they were being forced, unfairly, to
bear the costs of relieving unfortunate debtors, costs that the entire
community should have borne if relief was generally deemed necessary. The
debtors, on the other hand, no doubt felt that their original contracting had
presupposed the normal fluctuations of a market economy, not the extended
disaster of the Great Depression-and not to recognize this distinction would
be to undermine (in an unforeseeable manner) their property rights."
IV.
Much of Justice Sutherland's dissenting opinion addresses whatever may
be said about the specialness, if not the uniqueness, of the Great Depression.
This the Justice does, in large part, by arguing that the Framers of the
Contracts Clause had been concerned to prevent precisely the kind of wellintentioned relief that the State of Minnesota had resorted to on this occasion.
The effects of such relief measures, for the economy as a whole, were
regarded by the Framers as so disastrous and so unjust that recourse to these
measures should be strictly forbidden. In short, Justice Sutherland argued
there had been serious financial emergencies before 1787-and the
Constitution was explicit about what should not be done in response to
them.76
We need not concern ourselves here with whether Justice Sutherland's
reading of the Contracts Clause is correct. His is the reading generally
accepted today, as it was by the entire Court then, notwithstanding whatever
differences of opinion the Justices had about the adjustments that might be
made in its implementation because of emergencies. 7
One curious feature of the Sutherland reading and application of the
Contracts Clause is that he does not consider (if interferences with
obligations of contracts are as serious as he understands them to have been
regarded by the Framers) why the General Government was not restrained in
the way that the States had been with respect to any impairment of the
obligations of contracts. Why, for instance, was there not done here what
was done about the power of both the General Government and the State
Governments with respect to ex postfacto laws and bills of attainder?7"
One may even wonder whether the States are restrained here as they are
with respect to the conduct of the foreign relations of the Country. One may
wonder, that is, whether what the States (but only the States) may do about
the obligations of contracts was believed to be undesirable, just as one may

75. See, e.g., supra note 41 and accompanying text.
76. See Baisdell, 290 U.S. at 448-83.
77. It need be no more than noted here that the original intention with respect to the
Contracts Clause may have been quite different from what is assumed today. See supra note
55.
78. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9-10.
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wonder whether what the United States might have done about the
international slave trade before 1808 was believed in some quarters to be
undesirable.79
V.
If the United States Government is not limited with respect to the
impairment of the obligations of contracts, this suggests that limitations upon
the rights of property owners were not considered simply, or always,
improper.8 Why, then, in the 1930s, was not the Congress, rather than the
State legislatures, relied upon to provide the much-sought-for debtor relief?.8
Was there no political will nationwide with respect to such matters? The
New Deal did try even more comprehensive financial remedies than debtorrelief, but it faced stiffjudicial resistance in the early years of the Roosevelt
Administration. The lack of debtor-relief efforts by the Congress may reflect
the artificial limitations that had long been imposed by the Courts, requiring
(if anything was to be attempted) something like the Missouri v. Holland
subterfuge.8 2
Certainly, today, there wouldnot likely be any sustained effective judicial
nullification of the Congressional power to moderate the drastic effects of
severe economic troubles upon debtors generally. An enlarged Commerce
Power could be drawn upon, as could bankruptcy-related and appropriation
(if not taxation) powers.8 3
The critical point which has been noticed here is that impairment of the
obligations of contracts was not considered by the Framers to be so
objectionable that the United States government was to be prevented from
ever doing that. This point might well require a reconsideration of the
general approach taken here by Justice Sutherland and his admirers.
Even more revealing is what all this suggests about how the Framers
regarded the prerogatives of the propertied in circumstances where other vital
community interests are at stake. 4
VI.
79. All this bears, I again mention in passing, upon what the Contracts Clause really
means. See supra note 55.
80. Are such limitations apt to be fairer if placed nationwide, rather than State by State?
The thesis of Federalist No.10 is perhaps relevant here. See Part 13 of this Article.
81. There is the Fifth Amendment and its Due Process and Takings Clause to be reckoned
with. See supra note 51. But it can be questioned whether such provisions need be considered
as obstacles to debtor-relief measures in extraordinary circumstances. See ANASTAPLO, THE
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 458.
82. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
83. These and like powers are reinforced by the Necessary and Proper Clause. See, e.g.,
ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note

84.

2, at 336.

For an enthusiastic advocacy of the prerogatives of the propertied, see supra note 41.
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The spiritual ancestor of Justice Sutherland in Blaisdell is Justice
Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon."' The Holmes argument
depended there upon the contracts entered into between the coal companies
and those who had purchased land for home-building. 6
Of course, homeowners (who probably got cheaper lots because of the
risk of subsidence after coal was removed) would benefit by (and they may
well have lobbied for) any State interventions that discouraged subsidenceproducing mining activities by the coal companies. But should not a
community in its own collective interest, be able to keep its landscape from
being disfigured by houses in various stages of disappearance? (Here, there
may be "drunken" houses rather than a drunken pedestrian.) That is, this may
not be a controversy only between coal companies and homeowners."
Should not owners generally recognize that their uses of their own
property may, in some circumstances, create problems that it would be
unnatural to expect the community to disregard? Nor can it be reasonably
expected that the community at large would pay compensation (on the basis
of a "taking" doctrine) because of its various measures, designed to serve the
common good, which happen to reduce the value of some property (even as
it may enhance the value of other property).8
The proper remedy of the threatened property owners here (the coal
owners) is political, not judicial. Justice Holmes, unlike Justice Brandeis
who dissented in Pennsylvania CoalCompany"9 , did not appreciate this. An
even more bizarre effort to substitute judicial for political remedies was that
seen in Dred Scott v. Sanford.9° It is particularly appropriate that Justice
Sutherland relies, in his Blaisdell dissent, upon language from the Chief
Justice in Dred Scott. 9'
VII.
Fundamental to this analysis should be the recognition that almost all of
our property, especially our real estate and our monetary assets, depends upon
the definitions, processes, and protection provided by the community, acting
for the most part through its governments. It can be doubted whether
individual choices, or that amalgam of such choices known as the "market,"
is in the final analysis a better guide to the creation and proper use of

85.
86.
87.

260 U.S. 393, 412-16 (1922).
See supra note 53.
See, e.g., supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.

88.

An obvious instance of this would be the re-routing of a highway.

89. 260 U.S. 393, 416-22 (J. Brandeis dissenting).
90. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). On Dred Scott, see ANASTAPLO, ABRAHAM
supra note 3, at 363.
91. See Blaisdell,290 U.S. at 450.
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property than the considered opinions of the community.92
Also, fundamental here may be the opposition between reasoning and
desiring. Is not the community, far more than the typical property owner, apt
to take the common good into account? Is it not also more apt to be
concerned about corrupting or other destructive influences? Implicit in all the
property-gathering and property-keeping, which the community permits,
facilitates, and protects, must be the understanding that the community should
have the decisive word about how property is used (which includes how it
should not be used in various circumstances). It should also be understood
that the guidance provided by the community might vary from time to time
as circumstances change, including the circumstances of what comes to be
known about how property is being used elsewhere.93
Particularly to be noticed is the fact that when one acquires beautiful
things, or things which may come to be regarded as beautiful or otherwise
precious--one acquires such things at the risk of someday being treated by
the community as a trustee, in effect, of the things one happens to have. This
can mean, among other things, that one may not be able to consume or
destroy at will whatever one has had the good fortune, or the misfortune, to
"own."
These and like conditions are implicit in any mature understanding that
a community may have about property and property-owners. These are
conditions, I repeat, which can properly be changed from time to time,
preferably after a full discussion of competing needs and contending
equities.94

92. See Anastaplo, supra note 26, at 253 (on John Woolman).
93. It has been instructive to watch in Chicago how Mayor Richard M. Daley has been
influenced by civic practices he has observed in Paris.
94. That is, both freedom of speech and a sensitivity about justice are much to be relied
upon here. Consider, in this connection, my November 13, 2002 memorandum for the
organizer of a University of Chicago conference on community regulation of the uses of private
property:
There needs to be provided, as part of the discussions anticipated by your Conference
next year, an examination of the presuppositions about private property usually relied
upon by those who question both the authority and the judgment of any community which
would impose "landmark" or related restrictions upon the owners of any property.
Particularly in need of study is an insistence that private judgment, especially as
registered by "the market," is highly likely to be superior to any public judgment with
respect to such matters as aesthetic mandates. Particularly urged here by the champions
of private property is that the true costs of public undertakings inthese matters be assessed
properly.
The point of departure for the kind of fundamental inquiry that I am suggesting should
include a recognition of the exalted status of private property in the constitutional and
legal systems usefully developed by the English-speaking peoples since at least Magna
Carta.
On the properly elevated regard for private property among us, see ANASTAPLO, THE
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VIII.
Another way of putting these remarks is to recognize the tension between
individualism and civic-mindedness. These can be put to good use in tandem,
but one of them must ultimately prevail when they are in conflict. The
modem emphasis upon the sanctity of property, which does tend to encourage
ever-greater productivity and a generally higher standard of living, can
undermine the sense of community and self-sacrifice, traits which are needed
if there is to be that reliable, continuing protection of property which
property-owners themselves require and expect. It is only prudent to keep in
mind the fact that much of the protection required (say, in police and military
services) has to come from many in the community who do not themselves
have, and who cannot reasonably hope to have anytime soon, much property
of their own.
Of course, everyone, or almost everyone, is likely to benefit when
property is routinely used productively. Care must be taken, in regulating and
drawing upon the more conspicuous property in the community, that the
golden goose not be killed or even intimidated too much, especially in an age
when wealth is eminently (sometimes even callously) mobile.
But one should not make too much of the temperament and fate of the
golden goose, lest decisions with respect to these matters be reduced to
considerations merely of calculating self-interest. The risks, as well as the
insights, of the new-fashionable Law and Economics approach should be kept
in mind upon probing these issues.95
Prudence is very much needed here, a prudence which includes an
informed sensitivity as to what fairness calls for. The "human" aspect of
things, which includes but should not be dominated by economic calculations,
should always be kept in view. A comprehensive sense of the common good
is what the Constitution and its proper interpretation should always aim at.96
Ix.
I return to the Saga of the Drunken Pedestrian and the Lazy Policemen,
a story that very much engaged the interest of today's Physics Colloquium at
its outset. The Saga was returned to in the closing minutes of the
Colloquium-but by then the engaging story had been reduced to a
complicated formula, shown in a slide, which the speaker had to say that he
would try to explain after the meeting to anyone interested. We have here a
cautionary tale about such "scientific" treatments of human nature and

supra note 2, at 213-27; see also infra note 346.
95. See, e.g., Anastaplo, supra note 26, at 132.
96. This bears upon how ErieRailroad.Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), should be
assessed. See, e.g., Anastaplo, Law, Judges, and the PrinciplesofRegimes, supra note 38, at
511.
CONSTITUTIONAuST,
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conduct as are evident in the Law and Economics movement.9 7
It is the risk of dehumanizing human relations, sometimes in the interest
of science (social or otherwise), which has to be guarded against by the truly
prudent-by anyone who is interested in understanding human beings
primarily in human terms and thereby doing the best for them, including by
helping them to become and to remain as good as they are capable of being.98
4. ORESTES, HIS COMPANION PYLADES, AND THE
NATURE OF JUSTICE"
Gellius declares that it is right to hold that not everything a father
orders must be obeyed. "For what," he says, "if a father shall
order his son to betray his country, to kill his mother, or to do some
other base and unholy act?"
Grotius

°°

I.
An instructive study a quarter of a century ago of the American jury, by
Harry Kalven, Jr. and Hans Zeisel, has a chapter on the hung jury which I
discussed with the authors after I happened upon evidence which seemed to
contradict one of their more intriguing findings. 0 ' It turned out that my
evidence, when properly examined, was not what it had seemed to be. That
finding, the Hung Jury "phenomenon" discussed in the American Jury
treatise, can help us understand the Orestes story.
The "Hung Jury" chapter opens with these observations:
The hung jury is, in a way, the jury system's most interesting
phenomenon. In one sense it marks a failure of the system, since it
necessarily brings a declaration of mistrial in its wake. In another sense, it
is a valued assurance of integrity, since it can serve to protect the dissent of
a minority. Also, in terms of sheer numbers, the hung jury is an important
phenomenon, since more than 5 percent of all juries, or some 3000 trials per
year, end in such a mistrial.
This ambivalence toward the hung jury is mirrored in the law's

97. The layman can be left with the impression that the "human" element is sacrificed on
the altar of "scientific" ingenuity. On human nature and conduct, see ANASTAPLO, BUT NOT
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 3, at 303.
98. See, e.g, the concluding chapter of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. On the Ethics,
see ANASTAPLO, THE THINKER AS ARTIST, supra note 4, at 318.
99. A talk given at a Faculty Workshop, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law,
October 22, 2002.
100. HuGo GROTIUs, DE JURE BELuI Ac PAciS BOOK II CHAPTER XXVI (1625). See
LIBERTY, EQUALITY & MODERN CONSTITUTIONAUSM, supra note 31, at I, 228-29.
101. HARRY KALVEN, JR.& HANSZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JuRY 453-63 (1966).
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difficulty in defining the degree of pressure the judge may put on an
apparently deadlocked jury. 2
Included in the lore surrounding the hung jury is the myth of the lone
"hanging juror," a myth which can be instructive for us to draw upon on this
occasion. Kalven and Zeisel provide an instructive table, "First Ballot and
Frequency of Hung Jury."'0 3 They then observe:
[This table] reveals the first ballot constellations from which hung juries are
likely to develop.
To begin with, [this table] confirms our earlier conclusion that the likelihood
of hung juries is not dependent on the direction of the minority votes [that
is, voting for conviction or for acquittal] ....
[There is] a new point that emerges from this table, shedding some light on
the popular notion of the "hanging juror." According to this [popular]
notion, juries hang not so much because of the objective situation of the
case, but rather because once in a while an eccentric juror will refuse to play
his proper role.
The table shows that juries which begin with an overwhelming majority in
either direction are not likely to hang. It requires a massive minority of 4 or
5 jurors at the first vote [of a twelve-member] jury to develop the likelihood
of a hung jury.
If one may take the first ballot vote as a measure of the ambiguity of the
case, then it follows that the case itself must be the primary cause of a hung
jury.10
The authors then conclude their chapter on the Hung Jury with these
suggestions:
But the substantial minority need exist only at the beginning of the
deliberations. During the process it may be whittled away, and we know
from [another table]' 5 how small it may be at the end when the judge gives
up and declares a mistrial.
Nevertheless, for one or two jurors to hold out to the end, it would appear
necessary that they had companionship at the beginning of the deliberations.
The juror psychology recalls a famous series of experiments by the
psychologist Asch and others which showed that in an ambiguous situation
a member of a group will doubt and finally disbelieve his own correct

102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.at 453.
Id. at 462.
Id. at 462-63.
Id. at 460 ("Last Vote of Hung Jury").
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observation if all other members of the group claim that he must have been
mistaken. To maintain his original position, not only before others but even
before himself, it is necessary for him to have at least one ally."°
The experiments by the psychologists referred to here help explain what
goes on among jurors, and indeed within the community at large. The typical
human being senses, and allows for, the limits of his perceptions, especially
in ambiguous situations. This explanation reminds us of how much the
awareness and securing of justice depends upon common sense and
experience as well as upon what one has been taught by one's community.
We probably should not want to have it otherwise. 7
II.
The ancient story of Orestes, as he is within his city, goes like this: o
Agamemnon, the leader of the Achaeans (the Greeks) at Troy, is murdered,
along with his captive Cassandra, upon his return home. This is done by his
wife Clytemnestra and her lover, Aegisthus. The wife had come to hate her
husband because he had sacrificed one of their daughters, Iphigenia, at the
outset of the Trojan War in order to advance his expedition.'"
Thereafter Orestes, the son of Agamemnon and Clytemnestra, who had
been raised in exile, returns home. Orestes believes he has been ordered by
Apollo to kill his mother. And this he does."0
This is the traditional story, with a number of variations offered by
diverse artists about precisely what happened to Orestes and others, including
his sister Electra and his companion, Pylades, after the killing of
Clytemnestra and Aegisthus. Little is said thereafter either about the killing
of Aegisthus along with Clytenestra or, for that matter, about the killing of
Cassandra along with Agamemnon."'
This story, anticipated by Homer, has been retold by playwrights and
others across millennia." 2 It is typical, in the telling of the story of Orestes'

106. Id. at 463 (emphasis added). Irrelevant here are those rare instances in which one or
more jurors may be bribed.
107. Law students, for example, can resent the use of cameras as the basis of citations for
violations of traffic laws. What does this suggest about how much law-abidingness we really
want and on what terms?
108. I draw in this talkupon the Richmond Lattimore translation of Aeschylus' OREsTEIA
as published by the University of Chicago Press in 1953. On the Oresteia,see ANASTAPLO, THE
THINKER AS ARTIST, supra note 4, at 109; George Anastaplo, On Trial: Explorations,22 LOY.

U.Cmn. L.J. 765, 796 (1991) (see infra note 176).
109. See Aeschylus, Agamemnon, in the ORESTEIA, supra note 108.
110. See Aeschylus, The Libatiun Bearers, in the ORESTEA, supra note 108.
111. This is also true of THE EUMENIDES, the third play in the ORESTEIA.
112. In the Twentieth Century, for instance, the playwright Eugene O'Neill drew upon the
troubles of this markedly dysfunctional family in "Mourning Becomes Electra."
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return home on his dreadful mission, that he is accompanied by Pylades.
Orestes and Pylades are cousins who had grown up together in Phocis, a
land not far from Delphi, the site of Apollo's oracle." 3 Phocis had provided
Orestes the protection and training he needed as a youth and was ruled by
Pylades' father, who was married to Agamemnon's sister." 4
Technical reasons may be offered to account for Pylades' presence, such
as that someone is needed on stage with Orestes, especially when he first
returns home. But, usually, Pylades has little to say on stage, in this part of
Orestes' career; others, such as Electra or an old teacher of Orestes, may have
much more to say to him.' 5
In short, Pylades does "have" to be there and we are challenged to
consider why.

mI.
There may be, depending on how a playwright presents the old story,
something more than "technical" reasons requiring Pylades' presence.
An indication of relevant reasons is given in probably the best, and
certainly the most famous, version of the Orestes story to have survived from
antiquity, Aeschylus' Oresteia. Critical to that story, for our purposes, is
what happens when Orestes is finally prepared to kill his mother after having
already killed Aesgisthus:
Orestes: You next: the other one in there has had enough.
Clytemnestra: Beloved, strong Aesgisthus, are you dead indeed?
Orestes: You love your man, then? You shall lie in the same grave with
him, and never be unfaithful even in death.
Clytemnestra: Hold, my son. Oh take pity, child, before this breast where
many a time, a drowsing baby, you would feed and with soft gums sucked
in the milk that made you strong. 16
Here, as we can see, the most demanding invocation is made of the relation
between mother and child. It is this that moves Orestes to turn to Pylades,
who then utters his only speech in the play:
Orestes: What shall I do, Pylades? Be shamed to kill my mother?
Pylades: What then becomes thereafter of the oracles declared by Loxias
[Apollo) at Pytho [Delphi]? What of sworn oaths? Count all men hateful

113. On Delphi, see ANASTAPLO, THEARTISTAS ATHNKER, supra note 4, at 93, 119.
114. Pylades' parents were Strophius and Anaxibia.
115. In the summer of 2002, 1 met an actor who, in his youth, had played Pylades to Sam
Wanamaker's Orestes. He had nothing to say in their version of the story, but nevertheless he
had to pay close attention, shadowing Orestes throughout the play. He remembers this as quite
exacting. (This actor was Robert Thompson, formerly of the Rosary College faculty.)
116. AESCHYLUs, THE LIBATION BEARERS 892-97.
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to you rather than the gods.

Orestes: I judge that you win. Your advice is good. (To Clytennestra:)
Come here. My purpose is to kill you over his body. You thought him
bigger than my father while he lived. Die then and sleep beside him, since
he is the
man you love, and he whom you should have loved got only your
7
hate.'

Thus, Pylades reminds Orestes of Apollo's command, which Orestes
reinforces by reminding his mother in turn of her duty to the husband she had
killed. Even so, should we not want Orestes to hesitate? Would it not be
unnatural for him to act without any reluctance or hesitation? But his sister
Electra, who has no qualms at all, could not be used as well as Pylades here
to confirm Apollo and to urge Orestes to kill their mother. Electra's
encouragement of Orestes would be as if he had urged himself on to this
momentous deed.
An inquiry into what Pylades' lone intervention means is reinforced by
the recognition that Pylades does have much more to say in other plays." 8 It
should be noticed that having Pylades kill Clytemnestra, while Orestes kills
Aegisthus, does not avoid the evident atrocity of matricide, since Pylades
would be acting on this occasion as Orestes' agent.
IV.
What, then, does the use of Pylades suggest? It seems that the doing of
justice, even pursuant to a divine order, needs something more than the doer's
recollection of what has been ordered and one's own interpretation of what
that means. An appropriate confirmation here must come from someone
knowledgeable outside the immediate family. Pylades' cousinship is not
stressed in the play." 9
That is, one needs for this kind of unnatural action (or "situation") the
deepest form of assurance. A supposed order from Apollo does not suffice,
nor does one's own anger or ambition. 2 ° One can be reminded here of
Socrates' response to a report from Delphi about him personally, a report
which Socrates questioned, at least to the extent of testing what Apollo had

117. Id. at 899-907.
118. See EURIPIDES, IPHIGENIA IN Auus. In the tradition, Pylades is reported to have
eventually married Orestes' sister, Electra.
119. Compare Ajax and his divine inspiration. He too sought revenge, but all on his own
(as misled by Athena). See SOPHOCLES, AJAX. Consider also the madness of Heracles in
Euripides' HERACLES. (Is Pylades' cousinship ever mentioned in our play?)

120. Compare the Persians' way of dealing with this kind of situation. Their piety
overcame their desire for the truth, that is, they insist that no child ever kills a parent, that
reported cases do not have the facts right, etc. See HERODOTUS, HISTORY, I, 137; see also infra
note 132.
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been reported as having said at Delphi.'
Orestes' reliance upon Pylades instructs us that one needs something
more than one's ownjudgment or perceptions in such matters. This is related
to the Kalven and Zeisel report about the rarity, if not impossibility, of the
completely lone holdout throughout a jury's deliberations. One can learn
from this that the radically unconventional participant has to persuade at least
one other (who is not like himself in the way that a sibling may be) before he
undertakes a momentous, if not even monstrous, act that is far more likely
than not to be prompted by a delusion.
We should be reminded by all this that justice very much depends upon
a common understanding of things, upon what others also perceive and
appreciate and for which plausible arguments are needed. Such a dependence
is particularly appropriate considering how much the doing of justice is
concerned with a proper ordering of social relations, which ordering includes
settling upon arrangements which appear to be appropriate. 2
V.
We can be reminded by all this of the problem of "solipcism," the term
associated with the metaphysical position that the human being cannot know
truly, or with certainty, anything besides his own perceptions. Thus, there is
no assurance that there is either "a world" out there or what, precisely, is the
cause of the perceptions one does happen to have. 3
The most impressive use of the solipcistic approach is that found in
Descartes, but only to test an approach that presumably goes beyond
solipcism.2 4 Descartes, however, stirred things up, perhaps unsettling oldfashioned philosophy more than he either intended or recognized.
Be that as it may, there is always the problem of determining whether
whatever one may be confident of, so different from what everyone else
believes is a dream, a hallucination, or some other form of delusion. 5
Certainly, things may not be what they seem in such matters.
The would-be heretic, rebel, or iconoclast is properly suspected. If one
121. See, e.g., ANASTAPLO, HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 4, at 8; ANASTAPLO,
THE THINKER AS ARTIST, supra note 4, at 95-96.

122. Are not those activities which "have" to be hidden from view, as was done by the
Nazis and by the Stalinists even at the height of their respective powers, likely to be inherently
suspect? See infra text accompanying note 156.
123. The term "solipcism" was evidently coined by an apostate Jesuit several centuries ago
and was applied by him to his former order. But it refers, in its emphasis upon a kind of selfcenteredness, to a metaphysical position which goes back to antiquity. See, e.g., 7
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 487 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967) (defining solipcism).
On Descartes, see ANASTAPLO supra note 3, at 83; Anastaplo, supra note 65, at I.
125. We are quite unsympathetic, for example, toward those who kill innocent people
because "God" told them to do it. Consider, however, the discussion of Joan of Arc in
124.

Anastaplo, supra note 108, at 921.
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stands alone, or almost alone, one should at least be cautious in insisting upon
one's superiority. Of course, if one is really deluded or delusional, one may
even imagine that one has far more support than one truly has, and if so, there
may not
be much that can be done by one to protect oneself from one's
26
folly.1
Prudent pioneers need to examine themselves and be both willing and
able to explain themselves, making explicit their reasons and inviting
challenging responses from others to the arguments they make. Sometimes
the support they look for, and perhaps most require, has to come from the
heritage of the community, not from any of the associates they happen to have
at the moment. In these ways, then, the risks of megalomania and paranoia
are minimized. They cannot be completely reduced,
27 however, without
innovation.1
and
inspiration
all
completely
eliminating
VI.
It is not only the distinctive individual who needs bolstering. The
community is also shaped and reinforced by reassurances, especially when it
is obliged to assert itself.
Much depends, for the community, on conventions, that is, on agreements
(sometimes incorporated in traditions) as to what is. Such agreements are
grounded in common experience. 2One can hope that such conventions are
somehow connected to the natural.1
The laws of the community, including its constitution, are conventions.
The more they are shaped by a sense of what is right by nature, the more they
are apt to be sound and enduring. Law depends upon common opinion as
well as upon common purposes. It is assumed by any legal system that we
are in touch with one another and that it matters not only what others may do
but also what they may believe.
It is only prudent for one to wonder whether something is likely to be
natural, or grounded in nature, if one is the only person who (after having
thoroughly explained oneself) is persuaded by the facts that one offers and by
the arguments one makes. Self-sufficiency is important; it is a trait to be
cherished. But it is an informed self-sufficiency and hence prudence which
are to be encouraged, especially when one might be moved unduly by selfseeking. 129

126. Consider, for example, the discussion ofThomas More, in Anastaplo, On Trial, supra
note 108, at 950; see also id. at 882, 900.
127. On prophecy, see George Anastaplo, Law & Literatureand the Bible: Explorations,
23 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REV. 515, 521 (1998); see also infra note 134.
128. See ANASTAPLO, BUT NOT PHILOSOPHY, supra note 3, at 303; infra notes 156 and
162.
129. The limits of the Law & Economics approach may be noticed here, especially if it
should make too much of self-seeking. See, e.g., ANASTAPLO, supra note 26, at 132.
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VII.
We can now return, however briefly, to Orestes. After the execution of
his mother, Orestes is "alone." Thus, in the Aeschylus version of the story,
he alone, of all those on stage, sees the Furies at this stage of the proceedings.
The Furies, who monitor specified offenses (including patricide and
matricide, but not infanticide or the killing of spouses), are not concerned
about Pylades. 3 0
Orestes has to be ministered to through ritual purification in Delphi and
thereafter by a trial in Athens. Thus, some community must somehow pass
on him. Apollo's support matters at this stage of the proceedings. Orestes
does not need Pylades at his trial, inasmuch as Apollo himself appears on
Orestes' behalf. 3 '
So what is being said about revelation and about the use and abuse of
myths? How should Orestes' matricide be regarded if there should not be an
Apollo, either to be invoked by Pylades or to be called by Orestes as a
witness and sponsor at his trial?"3 We might also wonder, What does
Pylades, as reliable companion, need in order to be properly confident in his
own daring invocation of Apollo?
Epilogue'
One should avoid the temptation of discounting any reliance upon
Apollo, in such circumstances as confronted Orestes, because it happens to
be obvious to us that Apollo never existed, etc., unless one is prepared to
argue as well that all revelations should be suspect. Of course, one might
respond that the true revelation should be relied upon, but most people
usually do not receive and accept even the true revelation upon any better
ground than the Greeks received their principal stories about Apollo and his
fellow divinities."'3
Besides, there always remains the question, then as now, of who provides
the appropriate interpretation of the revelation of one's day? In any event,
even Apollo's directive may not seem sufficient to everyone, as may be seen
in how the Furies persist in their deadly pursuit of Orestes despite Apollo's

130. The Furies, it should be remembered, had pursued neither Agamemnon for the
sacrifice of his daughter nor Clytemnestra for the slaughter of her husband.
131. That trial is set forth in Aeschylus' The Eumenides. For the trial in Iraq of a son who
had killed his adulterous mother, see Neil MacFarquhar, With Iraq Courts Gone, Young Clerics
Judge, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 4,2003, at Al.
132. See, e.g., Anastaplo, supra note 107, at 877-79 (on Plato's Euthyphro).
133. This Epilogue was prepared.and distributed to the Loyola University of Chicago

School of Law Faculty after our discussion ofmy Faculty Workshop talk on October 22, 2002.
134. On prophecy, see ANASTAPLO, BUT NOT PHILOSOPHY, supra note 3, at 389-90; see
also supra note 127.
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emphatic endorsement of him. 3 '
The persistence of the Furies testifies to, at least, the enormity of
matricide, which might not seem to matter much to an actor (when ambition
and revenge move one) if there is not an authoritative set of opinions about
the divine to guide a community. It testifies as well to the importance for
Orestes of Pylades' support, inducing us to wonder perhaps about what the
considerations are that a Pylades should himself take into account in the most
"awkward" situations. We can recall here the necessity, reported in the
Kalven and Zeisel treatise, of "companionship at the beginning of [a jury's]
deliberations"" 6 if one is to be able to maintain oneself as the lone juror in
the face of any dominant opinion which is usually entitled to considerable
respect.
Whatever Pylades is like in the tradition and however he is used in the
matricide scene by other artists, Aeschylus does seem to present him in a
way, with his lone dramatic intervention, which invites speculations about the
respect that decent human beings should indeed exhibit when they venture to
challenge the authoritative opinions of the community' 37 which has already
nurtured their families for generations and upon which their families will
thereafter rely for generations to come.
5. HOW TO BEGIN TO THINK ABOUT THE GOOD13
Good we must love, and must hate ill,
For ill is ill, and good good still...

John Donne

139

I.
It is sometimes fashionable to talk about the fragility of goodness. 4 This
kind of assessment does assume that there is such a thing, or condition, as
goodness, however difficult it may sometimes be to determine precisely what

it is or how to secure it.
The fragility of goodness may be due, at least in part, to chance (or

135. Indeed, in Aeschylus' The Eumenides, the Furies can criticize Apollo as a usurper,
threatening their age-old prerogatives.
136. See supra text accompanying note 106.
137. The Declaration of Independence, we should recall, exhibited "a decent Respect to
the Opinions of Mankind."
138. A talk given in a Jurisprudence course, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law,
Chicago, Illinois, November 26, 2002.
139. JOHN DONNE, Community 1-2, in JoN DONNE: SELECTED POETRY (John Carey ed.
1996).
140. See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILTY OFGOODNESS (1986).
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"fortuna").' 4 ' It may be due as well to the influence and actions of evil
people. Whether such people exist or have incentives and opportunities to
promote their mischief may itself depend in large part upon chance. 4 2
It may be wondered, moreover, whether goodness is difficult, if not
impossible, to determine in a reliable and consistent manner. That is, can it
truly be known what is good? Who is capable both of knowing this and of
acting upon what may be known?
Some may not wonder about these matters. They may insist instead that
the good which people extol is merely a matter of opinion and as such is
indeed the product of chance influences. Or, at least, they may insist that
whatever the good may be in the abstract, it is impossible, or virtually
impossible, to know what it is in particular circumstances-and truly to know
as well that one does know what it is. For one thing, the consequences of
one's choices may (again, partly because of chance factors) be difficult, if not
impossible, to anticipate. And so one is left with an ethic of intentions.43
ll.
An ethic of intentions can mean, among other things, that one may be
displayed as someone who always means well, however dubious, if not
disastrous, one's choices often turn out to be. And that may not seem good,
and not only to those of a practical turn of mind. This kind of argument,
however, with its recognition of the dubious and the disastrous, does seem to
assume that the good can be known reliably enough to permit appraisals of
what various courses of action have meant when they have been chosen.
Thus, some of the arguments used here seem to concede that there is such
a quality as goodness which can be somehow known and used with respect
to what has been said and done. Underlying these and related observations
may be the recognition, either reasoned to or somehow intuited, that
discourse about human things is difficult, if not impossible, if one does not
have some steady sense of the good that is shared by one's associates.'" This
may be seen even in discourse about material things, including about the care
and uses of the human body.
Chance is no doubt critical in the conduct and consequences of human
activities, and it cannot be altogether guarded against. Perhaps the repeated
intrusion of chance into our affairs serves to remind us of something so vital

141. See MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 146, ch. 26.
142. The careers of Stalin and Hitler come to mind. On the career of ago, see George
Anastaplo, Law & Literatureand Shakespeare:Explorations,26 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 1,98,
109(2001).
143. On Immanuel Kant and an ethic of intention, see ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN
MORALIST, supra note 3, at 27.
144.

See, e.g., the opening passage in ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS. Compare id.

with id. at Book 1, Chapters 7-8.
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to our very existence as our mortality-and hence reminds us of our
dependence upon bodies that cannot be fully subject to our control.
And yet, are there not better and worse ways of anticipating and of
responding to the chance factors and events which are very much part of our
lives? In short, is there not a good inherent in the best responses to what we
learn and do about the limitations of our access to the good? 4"
Furthermore, is there not even a good in that understanding which permits
us to recognize, and perhaps to accommodate ourselves to, the difficulties
that may chance to keep us from knowing what can usefully be known about
the good?
Critical to these remarks up to this point has been the assumption, if not
also the awareness, that understanding is itself a good (if not even the greatest
or most secure good) which is, in some measure, now and then available to
us, permitting us to associate ourselves with all (past, present, and future)
who might understand. Perhaps it is also assumed that all goods, or at least
all substantial goods, depend upon the understanding-that this is somehow
to be expected in the lives of rational animals.
III.
Unfortunately, however, there are people who are, or at least seem to be,
evil. They, including perhaps their very existence, must be reckoned with,
even though the recognition (however secured) of them as evil is itself
testimony to the guidance provided by goodness in any understanding of what
is done and said all around us.
Among the things said are how the evil can talk about themselves. I
remind you of my indignant mobster (on display in Judge Prentice Marshall's
courtroom some years ago) who insisted that no one had ever given him
anything, that he had had to work hard for everything he had gotten. That his
"work"had included considerable violence and theft, he might have gone on
to say, was inevitable considering the harsh circumstances in which he
happened to find himself.
It is particularly important that would-be lawyers discipline themselves
to try to figure out what it is "the other side" was thinking of when it
conducted itself as it did in any transaction that is being litigated. What was
sought for-and why it was believed that one might properly do what was
done to secure what was sought? If one does not know "the other" in this
way, one cannot fully know what one is dealing with. Nor may one be as
as one may be in the response one makes and in the
sensible, or as good,
46
remedy one seeks.
IV.

145.

146.

See id. at Book I, Chapters 9-10.
See ANASTAPLO, HUMAN BEING AND

CITIZEN,

supra note 4, at 46, 74.
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What, then, is at the core of those who may be, or who seem to be,
truly evil? Are not their actions somehow grounded in ignorance? Do they
truly understand what they are doing not only to others, but perhaps most of
all to themselves, however sophisticated they may believe themselves to be?
Vital to any effort to understand what evil means and how it comes
to be is that ancient teaching which insisted that all human action aims at a
good. This is heard at the beginning of both the NicomacheanEthics and the
Politicsof Aristotle. 47 It is a teaching which he48had learned from Plato who
in turn had heard Socrates saying such things.
Is there not somethinggood, apparent to all who study it situation by
situation, aimed at even by evil men? The issue is not whether that which
happens to be sought is indeed good- whether it is wealth or physical and
psychic gratification or power-but whether what is done to get any
particular good, or what has to be sacrificed for it, is worth what is sought.
V.
One can investigate a variety of instances to try to determine whether
there is something good in what is being said and done in questionable cases.
Particularly challenging for us has been what Southern spokesmen said in
behalf of their involvement in slavery before the Civil War. 49 We have
noticed, for example, how the "Necessary Evil" argument was transformed
into the "Positive Good" argument when it became apparent to Southerners
that slavery was not as likely to be phased out in the not-too-distant future as
it might have seemed during the Founding Period.
It is probably inevitable for people of sound mind and a generally decent
disposition to make the best case that they can for the activities they are more
or less "stuck with."' 50 This may be seen in Southern spokesmen, especially
John Calhoun, in the fateful decades before the Civil War.' This can be
consistent with the opinion that slavery would not have been adopted de novo
in the 1830's and thereafter by the South instead of its being by then an
institution deeply established there for centuries. In short, it did not seem to
most Southerners that there was any easy way out-and truly good way
out-for the community as a whole, whatever individuals here and there
might do on their own. One can see implicit in this kind of situation the

147.
148.

See supra note 144.
On how this teaching can be adhered to even in the most trying circumstances, see
PLATO, CRITO; see also ANASTAPLO, HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 4 at 203; infra
note 174.
149. See LIBERTY, EQUALITY & MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 31, at 1, 221,
II, 54,58. Compare id. at 1,252; see also ANASTAPLO, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supranote 3, at 51.
150. "Rationalization" is a term used today for such an effort.
151. See supra note 149.
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caution against innovations, such as the importation of slaves, which can trap
one's descendants, if not oneself, in "impossible" situations. This caution
seems to have been recognized by Abraham Lincoln who said again and
again, in his political career, that Northerners who found themselves in
circumstances similar to those faced by Southerners would probably feel and
act much the same as the Southerners were doing." 2
I have qualified what I have said, about what our actions routinely aim at,
by indicating that insanity poses a special problem here.'53 Perhaps the
insane, too, always aim at some good- but because of their deep-rooted
disability it may be difficult to discern what the relevant good is for them in
some situations. These considerations remind us that the workings of
rationality are vital in what human beings aim at and do. Among the goods
human beings do aim at is an understanding of how things are, an
understanding which may be sought not only because it can be useful in
guiding actions but perhaps even more because it is simply good to know
things. But, we have noticed, what one may learn and how, as well as what
one may do with what one has learned, may very much depend upon chance.
An immediate reminder of this is to compare the quite diverse matters which
happen to be talked about, why, and how in various courses in a law school.
VI.
The workings of chance may be seen in what happens to appear from
time to time to challenge us in our opinions about the character and workings
of the good. We have studied those matters by considering slavery as it, and
its aftermath, affected how this country has conducted itself for more than
two centuries. But it happens, because of material unexpectedly provided to
me by a member of this class, that another challenge to our opinions about the
good also invites our consideration. These materials are speeches by Joseph
Goebbels, the leading propagandist of the German Nazi Party during the
Second World War. Particularly instructive here are speeches made by him
on February 18, 1943 and on December 31, 1943. By this time it had become
evident, even to the most ardent Nazis, that the fortunes of war had turned
against Germany. The disaster at Stalingrad had by then become apparent to
all; the great cross-Channel invasion of the continent by the Allies was
generally regarded as imminent." 4
It is instructive to see what it is that Dr. Goebbels has to invoke in order

152.

Is not this implied in Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address? On that address, see

ANASTAPLO, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 3, at 243.
153. On insanity, see George Anastaplo, Samplings: Nine Talks, 27 POL. SCI. REVIEWER

345, 389 (1998). See also George Anastaplo, Psychiatry and the Law: An Old-Fashioned
Approach, in BY REASON OF INSANITY 167 (Lawrence Zelic Freedman ed., 1983).

154. That invasion wastocome in June1944. See, e.g., Anastaplo, supra note 38, at 499.
On the Nazi regime, see Anastaplo, On Trial, supra note 108, at 977; infra note 159.
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to move the multitudes he depends upon. He certainly knows enough about
the good-about the virtues that civilized people everywhere evidently
recognize-to be able to present his cause as worthy of respect and
dedication. Courage, temperance, and self-sacrifice are made much of by
him, as is a determination to suppress the anti-social and the uncivilized
(which he had long taken the Bolsheviks, the Plutocrats, and the Jews to be).
Goebbels can even speak in 1943 of massive bombings of cities in much the
same way that the Jesuit priest we have studied did.'55
Of course, he does not say much, if anything, explicitly about the massive
atrocities that the Nazis were responsible for. His silence in this respect is,
in effect, a tacit repudiation of what was being done by the Nazis.
Particularly instructive for Goebbels had been the public revulsion upon his
showing of the film-records made of the torture-executions of some of the
officers condemned after the June 20, 1943 plot against Hitler.'
It does seem that Goebbels knew enough about the good, as
conventionally understood, to be able to tailor for public consumption the
propaganda that he developed. But there is more than propaganda that is
revealing here. There are also Goebbels's diaries of the same period, which
I have begun to examine. In those diaries, which he may have expected
would some day be read by an appreciative public, there is also the hatred of
Bolsheviks, Jews, and Plutocrats that is routinely exploited in public.' 57 But
there is also a respect shown in the diaries for various of the conventional
virtues, especially courage, justice, and temperance. Goebbels at least knew
what should be said, even if only to himself, about such virtues.'58
One suspects, upon reading these outpourings, some of them desperate,
all of them unpolished-that how Goebbels usually saw the moral universe
is somehow reflected there. It is significant that the routine slaughter of Jews,
on an unprecedented scale, is not something that can be readily spoken of by
him even in this personal record.
Again and again, in all that Goebbels says-in private as in public-the
claims of the good, even as conventionally understood, assert themselves. He
knows at least enough about the good, and the influence it has-he knows
enough about all that to be able to make a plausibly-sounding case for the
public he must deal with. However deluded and corrupted that public has
become, it must still be spoken to as if it respected the traditional moral

155. See supra note 149 at 11, 199.
156. See supra note 122. On the "dilemmas, not to speak of the horrors, consequent upon
the modem project," see ANASTAPLO, THE ARTIST AS THINKER, supranote 4, at 265-66; see also
supra text accompanying note 128.
157. The Jews are "privileged" to be condemned as leaders of both the Bolsheviks and the
Plutocrats.
158. On Aristotle and the conventional virtues, see ANASTAPLO, THE THINKER AS ARTIST,
supra note 4, at 318-19.
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standards of Germany's sacred heritage. 5 9
To say all that I have on this occasion does no more than suggest those
problems with Goebbels's understanding of things, and hence with his soul,
which kept him from applying properly the moral standards that he invoked
and that he himself might have, in some sense, really believed in. Thus, the
depths and causes of his ignorance-the ignorance of the best educated of the
Nazi leaders-are very much in need of investigation, especially from the
perspective of those who believe in the sovereignty of the good. That
ignorance is reflected in how "unrealistic" the hopes and expectations of
Goebbels and his colleagues were once the fortunes of war had turned
massively
against them. One could wonder, long before this, about their
160
sanity.
VII.
The circumstances which helped make Goebbels and his associates what
they were require investigation. I was reminded, by a concert I attended this
weekend while working on the Goebbels materials, of the difference that
circumstances can make in one's opinions about matters great as well as
small. One of the pieces on the concert program was a sad Shostakovich
symphony, which, one of the musicians told me at the intermission, had
brought tears to the eyes of its composer as he worked on it. The symphony,
and the tears, had been prompted because of the great sacrifices by the
Russians at Stalingrad. It had happened, however, that I had just been
reading, the preceding hour, passages in a Goebbels text in which he
lamented the Stalingrad disaster
for the Germans who had conducted
16 1
themselves so selflessly there.
Thus, the difficulty of being clear about what is truly good on any
particular occasion is illustrated by the sentiments shared both by Russians
and by Germans, even as each side regarded its adversaries as diabolical.
Still, however much they differed in admiring what they did and in
condemning what they did, did not both sides agree that there were good
things worth fighting and dying for? One is challenged, that is, to see what
these two sides shared, of moral worth, in what they did and said on those and
like occasions-and to see, as well, what we can learn, if not even respect, in
how they tried to account for themselves.

159. Those standards were usefully reaffirmed at the 1945-1946 Nuremberg Trial. See
supra note 154.
160. It can be touching, by the way, to see Goebbels, in his diaries, "thank God" for this
or that bit of "good news." He had been so corrupted by this time that he could not understand
that anything which postponed the final destruction of the Nazi regime was not really good news
for the Germans.
161. On how Ulysses S. Grant spoke of the Cause to which Robert E. Lee had dedicated
himself, see GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTIONALIST, supra note 2, at 65 1.
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Chance may be seen here, too-in what we happen to learn as well as in
the condition we are in when we learn it. Is it merely accidental that one sees
something so powerful and so enduring in goodness that even the hypocritical
and the cynical, to say nothing of the diabolical, must repeatedly defer to it
one way or another?' That is, is it not prudent and otherwise good for us to
propose that there is something natural not only in the definition but also in
the staying power of goodness? Indeed, one may even suspect, an enduring
goodness may be drawn upon even by those who lament the fragility of
goodness. 163

6. THE ACCIDENTAL LEO STRAUSS

64

Ah, did you once see Shelley plain,
And did he stop and speak to you,
And did you speak to him again?
How strange it seems and new!
Robert Browning

165

I.
One can be reminded of the range of Leo Strauss's influence by the titles
for the papers for this panel. One paper is on John Locke; the other is on
Moses Maimonides and Nicco16 Machiavelli. " The Strauss work on Locke
is illuminated not only by what he had to say about Thomas Hobbes and his
immediate predecessors, but also by what he had to say about Plato and
Aristotle, among others.167 His work on Maimonides is illuminated by his
Jewish, including Biblical, studies. 6 His work on Machiavelli is illuminated
not only by what he had to say about Xenophon and Aristophanes, among
others, but also by what he had to say about the doctrines of materialists and

162. This is critical, in the first book of Plato's Republic,to the silencing of Thrasymachus
(who is hardly diabolical). Consider also how the prophet Nathan confronts King David with
respect to his acquisition of Bathsheba. See Anastaplo, supra note 127, at 641. Consider how
John Milton must deal with Satan in ParadiseLost.
163.

See, e.g., ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORALIST, supra note 3, at 161 (on George

Orwell's 1984).
164. Remarks prepared for the New Studies on Leo Strauss Panel, Claremont Institute for
the Study of Statesmanship and Political Philosophy , at the Annual Convention, American
Political Science Association, Boston, Massachusetts, August 29, 2002.
165. Robert Browning, Memorabilia.
166.

See, e.g., HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (Joseph Cropsey & Leo Strauss, eds.

1987), supra note 66, at 228, 296, 476.
167. See, e.g., id. at 33, 118, 396.
168. See, e.g, LEO STRAUSS, How to Begin to Study THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED, in
MOSES MAIMONIDES, THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED xi (Shlomo Pines trans., 1963), at xi.
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atheists. 69
H.
One can wonder how the Strauss intellectual career is to be understood
when it is noticed how much of his important work was "accidental" in its
origins, in that they were responses to chance invitations and opportunities.
This can include not only such obvious things as his intriguing Genesis
lecture,' 7 ° but even what is perhaps his most influential work, NaturalRight
andHistory. 7' Perhaps more critical here is the fact that so much of his work
came to be written in English and in a way or about subjects that were very
much affected by experiences in the United States.
Strauss "accidentalism" extends in various ways to those who have
learned from Leo Strauss. I believe that we could all benefit from an
informed inquiry, by a younger scholar today, into how the Strauss one got
from personal, including classroom, association with him compares with the
Strauss one gets from a study of his published work. I, for example, have
long recognized that there are many emerging students of Leo Strauss who
know his published work much better than I ever will. Perhaps I
acknowledge personal limitations when I confess that he would have meant
far less to me if I had not had (for more than a decade in Chicago) as much
personal contact with him as I happened to have.'
Be that as it may, I do have the impression that extended contact with Mr.
Strauss revealed facets of his thought and of his way of thinking, that may not
be evident on the printed page. These can include the concerns and examples
of a practical character that he could draw upon in developing arguments.
These are far more important than the sometimes peculiar impracticality, in
everyday affairs, that he could sometimes exhibit and that are readily
remembered in anecdotes. Those who rely primarily upon the printed page

169. See, e.g., HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 66, at 90, 296; LEO
STRAUSS, SOCRATES AND ARiSTOPHANES (1996).
170. See, LEO STRAUSS, On the Interpretationof Genesis,in JEWISH PHILOSOPHY AND THE
CRISIS OF MODERNITY: ESSAYS AND LECTURES INMODERN JEWISH THOUGHT 359 (Kenneth Hart
Green ed., 1997).
171. LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1953).
172. See, e.g., ANASTAPLO, THE ARTIST AS THINKER, supra note 4, at 249; see also infra
note 176.
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may be more inclined than Leo Strauss's older students are to believe that
"the claims of moral virtue" "did not fundamentally animate and inform his
writings."' 7 3 Some have even gone so far as to argue that morality was for
Mr. Strauss simply utilitarian, invoked primarily, if not exclusively, in the
interest of safeguarding philosophy, that it was not something that he
regarded as worthy of respect for its own sake.'
I do not mean to suggest that no intelligent student who knew him
personally could make such arguments. But I do suggest that such arguments
have to reckon with the substantial moral fervor exhibited again and again by
Mr. Strauss in response both to the great events of his time and to everyday
matters and associations, including of course in his dealings with students and
colleagues.' Indeed, one can wonder how seriously even NaturalRight and
History can be taken if it is not believed that there is for human beings a
substantial (somehow "objective") moral force animating invocations of and
dependence upon natural right.
I have, somewhat accidentally perhaps, touched upon matters that could
well be investigated in an effort to determine what Leo Strauss brought to the
widely-ranging work he did. One further consequence of such an
investigation could be that it might both induce and help us to consider, in an
informed way, how the "published" Plato and Aristotle differed from the
"oral" versions. An aid to such consideration could be an inquiry into what
can be discerned of the "historical" Socrates from the accounts of him that
happen to be available from Plato, Xenophon, Aristophanes, Diogenes,
Laertius, and Aristotle, among others. The transcripts of the Strauss courses,
however cautiously some of them have to be dealt with, can help enterprising
younger scholars identify and examine the differences between the oral
Strauss and the published Strauss.

173.

Steven Lenzner, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, Aug. 28, 2002, at 37.

174. And yet, we recall, Socrates himself was willing, on more than one occasion, to put
his life at risk for the possibility of continuing to philosophize, rather than to commit injustices.
See ANASTAPLo, HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 4, at 8; see also supranotes 148,202,
infra text accompanying note 180; infra text accompanying note 208; infra text accompanying
note 227.
175. See STRAUSS, supra note 169, at 329-45.
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Underlying all of these matters, and how Leo Strauss himself may have
regarded them, is what modem science teaches us not only about the matters
once authoritatively dealt with by Revelation but also about the vastness of
the universe, about the probabilities of rational life elsewhere in other solar
systems and in other galaxies, and about the sobering vulnerability of the
perhaps somewhat accidental human species in the very long run. Such
teachings, which bear upon the question of the nature of nature as well as
upon questions about the workings of Providence-such teachings may have
very much affected those thinkers, especially in Germany, who (somewhat
accidentally) helped challenge76the Leo Strauss that we were privileged to
come to know and to cherish.
77
7. THE CAREER OF HANS-GEORG GADAMER1

One who justifies the wicked and one who condemns the
righteous are both alike an abomination to the Lord.
Do not remove the ancient landmark that your ancestors set
up.
176. A salutary reminder about the character of the millennia-long philosophic enterprise,
inspired by the recollections recorded in these remarks (see, e.g., supra text accompanying note
172), is provided for use here by an old friend, Laurence Betas of St. John's College:
Something underlies everything accidental, namely nature. There are powerful natural
attractions between minds like Strauss's and those of his good students; they seek one
another naturally; they find out about each others' existence. They will find one another.
Especially in the students there is a natural sense of incompleteness that leads them to seek
men, women, books, and experiences that might make them more whole. I guess that what
I am talking about is thephiliainphilosophia,the thaumazein, the mixture of wonder and
admiration, which is said to be the natural beginning of philosophy.
There is a beautiful statement in Goethe's Maximen undReflexionen (877) that puts this
in a more general form: "With the truly like-minded one cannot in the long run keep apart,
they find each other again and again together; with the basically opposite-minded one tries
in vain to maintain unity, but again and again it breaks apart."
See also GEORGE ANASTAPLO, ON TRIAL: FROM ADAM &EVE, TOO.J. SIMPSON app. C (Chance
and the Good Life) (forthcoming); infra text accompanying note 207.
177. A talk given in a Jurisprudence course, The School of Law, Loyola University of
Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, March 20,2002. Some of the observations found in the notes to this
part (e.g., infra note 211) were spoken on this occasion. The full title of this talk is The Career
of Hans-GeorgGadamor:A Provisional Assessment.
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I.

We are scheduled to discuss today the relation between everyday
morality and the legal/political order. Critical to such a discussion is an
awareness of how a supposed basis of morality in nature might be
understood, an awareness which includes an inquiry into the meaning of "the
Good."' 7 9
Our point of departure, in preparing for this discussion, should be the two
accounts you have about an encounter I happened to have a quarter-century
ago with the then-much-acclaimed behaviorist, B. F. Skinner. 8 ° That
discussion, chaired by an eminent philosophy professor, Hans Jonas,
suggested how and why Mr. Skinner relied upon some notion of that very
Good which he tended to dismiss as unknowable. One can see, upon
considering Mr. Skinner's invocation of "survival" as a standard, how the
Good is somehow aimed at even by those who insist upon dismissing it as
completely subjective and hence as "unscientific."''
We should have our scheduled discussion after I make some remarks that
have been inspired by the obituary yesterday in The New York Times of HansGeorg Gadamer, a much-acclaimed philosophy professor who has died in
Heidelberg at the age of 102.82 It is instructive, especially for law students
who are likely to be engaged one way or another in the public life of their
community, to see how the decisions one makes in a period of crisis (in
Professor Gadamer's case, between 1933 and 1945) can affect one's actions
and, even more important, one's understanding of oneself, for a half-century
thereafter. 8 ' The desire, if not even the compulsion, to explain oneself may
itself also testify to the "reality" of the Good.

178. Proverbs 17:15, 22:28.
179. On the Good, the True, and the Beautiful, see ANASTAPLO, THE ARTIST AS THINKER,
supra note 4, at 275-78. On the Noble and the Just, see ANASTAPLO, THE TmNKER AS ARTIST,
supra note 4, at 182. On the Doctrine of the Ideas, see id. at 303. On Revelation, Philosophy,
and the Good, see the Conclusion of this Article.
180. See Appendix A of Part 7 of this Article.
181. See supra text accompanying note 174.
182. Stuart Lavietes, Hans-Georg Gadamer, 102, Who Questioned Fixed Truths, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 23, 2002, at A23; see also infra note 190.
183. Consider, for example, the career ofWemer Heisenberg, particularly as examined in
Michael Frayn's recent play, Copenhagen.
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My one extended encounter with Mr. Gadamer was during an hours-long
dinner three of us had one fine summer evening in Heidelberg in 1984. I was
there to give a talk on "Civil Disobedience," about which I will say more
later.'" Although I had heard Mr. Gadamer lecture in the United States, we
had never before talked at length. I was content to encourage him to do most
of the talking on that occasion, which he was quite willing to do.
This was, at least for me, a memorable evening. For one thing, I do not
recall ever having had so long a private dinner, the length of which was made
possible because Mr. Gadamer (who was then in his eighties) very much
enjoyed the food and drink lavished upon us. Indeed, I have never met
anyone who enjoyed himself more at a dinner table.""
It is important to notice about Mr. Gadamer that he, a quite affable man,
was very good company, at least in such circumstances. It was obvious that
here was a genial, solidly intelligent scholar who could readily "get along"
with people, however rigorous he may have been in the lecture hall and the
seminar room." 6
I do not recall much of what we talked about on that occasion. Perhaps
I have notes on that conversation somewhere. Perhaps, also, the third
member of our party, a former student of mine who was providing such
generous hospitality, remembers more than I do.' 87 What did strike me most
about Mr. Gadamer's opinions during that conversation was how much he
underestimated one of my teachers, Leo Strauss, a man (who had died a
decade before) whom he had been in the university with sixty years before.'
He did recognize Mr. Strauss as a very good Continental-style professor, but
he suggested in effect that if we Americans knew more about the education
that had once been available in Germany we would not make as much of Mr.
Strauss as some of us do. This correction was provided in an inoffensive

184. See ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORALIST, supra note 3, at 537.
185. A runner-up to Professor Gadarner here was Professor Richard P. McKeon of the
University of Chicago Philosophy Department. Mr. McKeon, unlike Mr. Gadamer, was an
ardent democrat who was rather rough on his students.
186. In his last decades, his wife was also quite hospitable.
187. Our host on that occasion was Professor J. Harvey Lomax of the University of
Memphis Political Science Department.
188. On Leo Strauss, see Part 6 and the Conclusion of this Article. See also ANASTAPLO,
THE ARTIST AS THINKER, supra note 4, at 249-71; LEO STRAUSS, THE STRAUSSIANS, AND THE

AMERICAN REGIME, 3-30 (Kenneth L. Deutsch & John A. Murley eds. 1999).
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way, determined though it was. Mr. Gadamer's assessment of Mr. Strauss
was, in this respect, pretty much that held by most talented philosophy
professors everywhere-and as such could not be resented." 9
III.
It was Mr. Gadamer's ability to "get along" with people which should
make him interesting for us. This ability is recognized in his New York Times
obituary where it is recorded:
Dr. Gadamer received two doctorates for his work on Plato, from
Marburg University in 1922 and from Heidelberg-where he studied with
[Martin] Heidegger-in 1929. He began his university teaching career in
1934 at Kiel, moving to Marburg in 1937 and then to Leipzig in 1939.
Unlike his mentor Heidegger, he was never associated with Nazi efforts
to remake German universities, and, as a result, Soviet authorities allowed
him to keep his Leipzig post after World War II.
His ability to avoid politics was due in part to his deep involvement in
academic interests. He once remarked to a colleague, "I basically only read
books that are at least 2,000 years old."
Allowed to move to West Germany in 1947, he received his
appointment at Heidelberg in 1949, retiring in 1968. In the years that
followed he lectured at a number of American universities...190
The contrast with Martin Heidegger, noticed in this obituary as
elsewhere, is striking. Heidegger evidently believed that he could, once the
Nazis were in power, take over the intellectual leadership of their national
movement. Mr. Gadamer has several times recorded his being disturbed by
Heidegger's notorious Rektor's Speech at Freiberg in 1933. He wanted
nothing to do with any such dalliance with the Nazis. 9 '

189. Mr. Gadamer praised Max Weber much more, a scholar that Mr. Strauss subjected to
a severe critique. See STRAUSS, supra note 171, at 36-78. Mr. Gadamer did not
appreciate how critical the theological question is for philosophy as a whole. See the
Conclusion of this Article.
190. Lavietes, supra note 183, at A23. On Mr. Gadamer and Greek thought, see
Anastaplo, Mr. Crosskey, supra note 12, at 260 n.271.
191. See infra text accompanying note 205. On Martin Heidegger as "the Macbeth of
philosophy," see ANASTAPLO,THEARTISTASTHNKER, supra note 4, at 269; Martin Heidegger,
The Self-Assertion of the German University, 38 REV. OF METAPHYSICS 467, 470-80 (1985)
(reprinting the 1933 Rektor's speech).
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Mr. Gadamer was reconciled with Heidegger after his teacher abandoned
his efforts with the Nazis. There is, however, evidence that such efforts on
Heidegger's part lasted substantially longer than Mr. Gadamer reports that
they did. 92 Be that as it may, although Mr. Gadamer did not like what
Heidegger had done with the Nazis, that evidently did not permanently affect
the relations between these two men during several decades thereafter.
In short, Heidegger left a highly questionable career behind as a Human
Being, however influential he remains as a Thinker.
IV.
Mr. Gadamer, an obviously decent man, managed to stay aloof from
politics, being able to hold important academic posts under both the Nazis
and the Communists. Thus, it is reported that "at Leipzig during World War
II, he showed neither open sympathy for nor resistance to Hitler's regime,
concentrating on his work."' 93
Some questions have been raised about this, of course. 94 But there is no
disputing the observation that Mr. Gadamer did not like what, first, the Nazis
and, then, the Stalinists did in and to Germany, as well as elsewhere. This did
not keep him, however, from getting along with both Nazis and Stalinists
fairly well, and evidently with a clear conscience.
Mr. Gadamer can occasionally be spoken of as having "worked quasiunderground" in Germany, as having been "part of the opposition" in the
Third Reich."9" The evidence for this kind of civil disobedience is
unpersuasive. Even so, Mr. Gadamer's credentials, or lack of credentials,
here did not keep Leo Strauss from getting along cordially with him after the
Second World War, so much so that Mr. Strauss gave a lecture at Hamburg
in 1954, pursuant to an invitation evidently secured by Mr. Gadamer. 96 This
is in marked, and revealing, contrast to how Mr. Strauss, to the end of his life,
regarded Martin Heidegger because of his dealings with the Nazis. '

192. See, e.g., ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORAUST, supra note 3, at 152.
193. WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2002.
194. See, e.g., Richard Wolin, UntruthandMethod, NEW REPUBLIC, May 15, 2000, at 38.
195. See, e.g., HANs-GEORG GADAMER ON EDUCATION, POETRY, AND HISTORY 66, 148
(Dieter Misgeld & Groeme Nicholson eds., 1992). On Heidegger and the Nazis, see id.at 9-14.
196. There was also between them an exchange of letters which has been published.
197. See, e.g., ANASTAPLO, THE ARTIST AS THINKER, supra note 4, at 475 n.284.
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V.
When one reflects on the statement, "I basically only read books that are
at least 2,000 years old," one can be reminded of the considerable work done
by Mr. Gadamer on the Platonic dialogues. 98 And one can be readily, if not
even naturally, reminded in turn of the career of Socrates.
It is in the Apology of Socrates that we come upon a passage which has
Socrates recalling troubles he had had with both the oligarchic and the
democratic regimes which had run wild in Athens.' 99 Not that Socrates was
actively engaged in "resistance" to those questionable regimes-but there
was something about the way he conducted himself which, in effect,
challenged such regimes. 2"
Socrates was not put in jeopardy because of his metaphysical
opinions-those were probably considered harmless, because they were
either irrelevant or incomprehensible for most people. The actions he took,
or refused to take, and because of which he was endangered, were actions
which depended not upon metaphysics but rather upon elementary notions
about good and bad, about right and wrong-notions which every decent
human being, in his maturity, should be aware of and responsive to.
The simply "human" response, to which even the most elevated
philosopher should be sensitive, is suggested in a 1948 letter to Heidegger by
one of his pre-War students, a "secular" Jew turned Marxist, who was deeply
troubled by his teacher's dealings with the Nazis. That student, Herbert
Marcuse, is said to have put the challenge thus to Heidegger:
A philosopher can be deceived regarding political matters; in which case he
will openly acknowledge his error. But he cannot be deceived about a
regime that has killed millions of Jews-merely because they were
Jews-that made terror into an everyday phenomenon, and that turned
everything that pertains to the ideas of spirit, freedom, and truth into its
bloody opposite; a regime that in every respect imaginable was the deadly
caricature ofthe Western tradition that you yourself so frequently explicated
and justified.2"'

198.

See infra text accompanying note 206; see alsoHANS-GEORGGADAMER, PHILOSOPHIC

APPRENTICESHIPS (1985).
199. See Appendix B at infra text accompanying note 227.
200. Bad as those regimes could sometimes be in Athens, they were nowhere near as bad
(or as destructive) as the Nazis or the Stalinists always were in Germany, Russia, and elsewhere.
201. RICHARD WOuN, HEIDEGGER'S CHILDREN: HANNAH ARENDT, KARL LOWlTH, HANS
JONAS, AND HERBERT MARCUSE 9 (2001); see also Shlomo Avineri, A Banal Story, NEW
REPUBLIC, Feb. 24, 2003, at 25.
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This kind of assessment of Nazism, against the background of Socrates'
career when successive Athenian regimes went wild, encourages us to
consider further the terms on which one not only collaborates as Heidegger
did but "merely" goes along as most good Germans evidently did for a
decade. Recollections of Socrates can be instructive here. It is significant,
perhaps, that Heidegger's own influential studies of the Greeks seem to skip
from the pre-Socratics to Plato: it can be suspected that he never did
assimilate into his very being the life, insofar as it can be distinguished from
the metaphysics, of Socrates, that life as recorded in, say, the Euthyphro,
Apology, Crito,Phaedo, and Parmenidesof Plato.2 2
Is it also significant that when Leo Strauss was invited, upon the
nomination of Mr. Gadamer to lecture at Hamburg in 1954, he chose (I have
been told) Socrates as his subject?2 °3
VI.
Mr. Gadamer inherited from his most eminent teacher not only his
grounding in historicism, relativism, and German patriotism, but also the
need, albeit far less of a need, to account for his relations with the Nazis
inasmuch as he did stay in Germany and, to some extent, prospered during the
Nazi regime. It may well be, in any event, that our awareness of the Good is
such that we, in retrospect, naturally arrange, if not even adjust, our
experiences to permit us to be comfortable with them.
The Gadamer account is definitely not that of a collaborator, or even that
of an occasional sympathizer with the Nazis, but rather that of an
accommodationist who did have Jewish friends and who could, after the War,
speak with insight and sympathy about Judaism.2 Such sentiments about
Judaism would probably have been regarded by Heidegger as dangerously
cosmopolitan, and hence as a threat to Germanness.
Mr. Gadamer made it clear, as he was entitled to do, that he never
sympathized with Heidegger's 1933 Rektor's Speech, that speech in which
philosophy was recruited for the Nazi program.0 5 The most interesting
passage I know from Mr. Gadamer's various attempts at an apologia is the
following from his post-1968 "Reflections on My Philosophical Journey," a

202. See, e.g., ANASTAPLO, HUMAN BEINGANDCITIZEN, supranote 4, at 8,203; supra note
174; infra text accompanying note 218; infra text accompanying note 228.
203. See Part 6 of this Article.
204. See, e.g., The Philosoply and Religion of Judaism, in HANs-GEORG GADAMER ON
EDUCATION, POETRY, AND HISTORY, supra note 195, 155-64.
205. See supra text accompanying note 191.
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long passage which testifies to the all-too-human tendency to try to make
sense of one's life in the least painful way:
My publication of [an essay on Plato's Republic in 1934] documents my
position vis-a-vis National Socialismwith the motto placed at the beginning:
"Whoever philosophizes will not be in agreement with the conceptions of
the times." As a quotation from Goethe it was indeed well masked, as it was
in continuity with Goethe's characterization of the Platonic writings. But
if one does not want to make a martyr of oneself or voluntarily choose
emigration, such a motto can nevertheless convey a certain emphasis to the
understanding reader in a time of enforced conformity, an affirmation of
one's own identity

. .

. Indeed, from that time on the fact that one

strenuously avoided politically relevant themes (and publications outside
one's special field altogether) was in accord with the same law of selfpreservation. It remains true even to this day that a state which, in
philosophical questions, designates a single "doctrine" about the state as
"correct," must know that its best people will move into other fields where
they will not be censured by politicians-which in effect means by laymen.
In this case, it makes no difference whether they are black or red [Nazi or
Stalinist], no outcry can change anything. So I continued my work
unnoticed and found gifted students ... Fortunately, in those days the
policies of national-socialistic politics, in preparation for war in the East,
somewhat moderated their pressure on the universities, and so my academic
opportunities, which for years had been nil, improved. After ten years of
working in Marburg as a Dozent, I finally attained the long-desired rank of
professor at Marburg in the Spring of 1937. In 1938, an offer of a chair in
classical philology at Halle came, and shortly thereafter I received a call to
the philosophical ordinariate in Leipzig, which confronted me with new
tasks.20 6

Most, if not all, of the points made here may be found elsewhere in Mr.
Gadamer's writings and interviews. Appeals are made by him, on various
occasions, to what is here called "the understanding reader." Such a reader
should no doubt want to give an obviously decent man the benefit of the
doubt, especially with respect to matters in which circumstances and
temperament can very much matter.2 °7
Still, there are at least two serious problems with the account just quoted
from these "Reflections." One problem can be noticed upon considering the
recognition by Mr. Gadamer that he did "not want to make a martyr of
[him]self or voluntarily choose emigration." This is summed up by his
206. THE PHILOSOPHYOFHANS-GEORGGADAMER 13 (Lewis Edwin Hahn ed. 1997).
207. See supra note 176.
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invocation shortly thereafter of the "law of self-preservation. "'208
Martyrdom would have been risked, of course, if one joined or was
identified with opposition, to say nothing of resistance, movements within
Germany. It can be unseemly, for anyone on the outside, to volunteer others
for martyrdom. But emigration, too, was an option that, it seems, Mr.
Gadamer could have taken advantage of, as did others with far fewer
prospects than he would have had abroad.2" 9
The Gadamer experience with "emigration" is rather curious. For he did
leave Germany at least twice during the Second World War. Once, in 1941,
he went to Occupied France, to give a lecture (in effect, on the German view
of relations among States) to an audience of captured French officers. This,
aside from details in the talk, could seem insensitive. On that occasion, of
course, he was still subject to the control of the German authorities."'

208. On the modem respect for the "law of self-preservation," see Laurence Bems, Thomas
Hobbes, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supranote 66, at 396.
209. I am reminded, by way of contrast, of that fine man, Christian Mackauer, who graced
the faculty of the University of Chicago for so many years. He was a German Gentile who
(partly because his wife was Jewish) could not abide the Nazis. Central to affirmation of the
Good can be worthy exemplars. See infra text accompanying note 217. Consider, as well, my
unpublished Letter to the Editor of June 2003, in response to Jenny Strauss Clay, "The Real Leo
Strauss," N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2003, at A29:
Leo Strauss's daughter has reported that she does not recognize her father in the recent
news stories about him as the mastermind behind the neo-conservative ideologues who
control American foreign policy today. Some of us, who were Mr. Strauss's students at the
University of Chicago, also fail to see him as the reactionary guru that some would
evidently like him to be.
I recall, for example, what he said to me after I lost my Bar Admission "loyalty-oath"
case in the United States Supreme Court. (366 U.S. 82 [1961]) That is, his two-sentence
letter to me, of June 22, 1961, was hardly that of a rightwing ideologue: "This is only to
pay you my respects for your brave and just action. If the American Bench and Bar have
any sense of shame they must come on their knees and apologize to you."
I suspect that Leo Strauss, upon confronting those Administration adventurists who now
claim to find in his teachings support for their presumptuous imperialism, would recall (as
he often did) the Dutch grandmother's advice: "You will be surprised, my son, to learn with
how little wisdom this world of ours is governed."
See supra text accompanying note 175; see also Ron Grossman, How An Academic Came to
Dominate ForeignPolicy, CI. TRIB., June 22, 2003, sec. 7, p. 1, 6.
210. He argued on several occasions since the Second World War that France's position
on reparations after the First World War contributed significantly to the German disaster. See
STEVEN P. REMY, THE HEIDELBERG MYTH: THE NAZIFICATION AND DENAZIFICATION OF A
GERMAN UNIVERSITY 229 (2002).
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Another trip out of Germany took him to Portugal, in early 1944, to give
lectures there. Nothing is said, at least in the materials I have seen, about
whether his wife and daughter were held hostage pending his return to
Germany. However that may have been, there is no indication of any interest
on Mr. Gadamer's part in getting himself and his family out of Germany at
any time after the rise to power of the Nazis.
At the same time, we are given to understand, Mr. Gadamer was aware
of the dreadfully stultifying effect the Nazi regime, and later the Stalinist
regime, had on the intellectual life of Germany for decades. And yet, the
sovereign "law of self-preservation," to which we will return,
evidently
21
dictated that he remain and make the best of a bad situation.
VII.
The second serious problem with the account I have quoted from the
Gadamer "Reflections" appears in that part of the passage which begins,
"Fortunately, in those days the policies of national-socialistic politics, in
preparation for war in the East.. . 2 2 This preparation for war led, we are
told, to a relaxation of Nazi control over the universities-and this permitted
Mr. Gadamer a critical academic promotion in 1937. But this seems to have
been several years before the invasion of Russia, which suggests that other
factors might also have been at work here.
What is not mentioned here-although it is mentioned elsewhere in his
works by Mr. Gadamer-is that critical to the opportunities that did become
available to him in 1937 and 1938 is that Jewish professors had been removed
from the posts to which he was called. Of course, his refusal to take
advantage of such openings would not have restored the men removed to
those posts. And we see, even in this country (where the stakes are much
lower), that men in academic life do not hesitate to fill posts for which others
(who, for some reason or other, have incurred the displeasure of the
authorities) are obviously better qualified. 13

211. One thing that he did do, according to what Peter H. von Blackenhagen told a friend
of mhine, was to intervene with a former student of his in the Gestapo to save another former
student who was endangered.
212. See supra text accompanying note 206.
213. Mr. Gadamer reports elsewhere that one or more of the Jewish professors who had
been ousted told him that he should accept the appointments offered to him. Precisely what
men say in such circumstances, and why, would have to be carefully weighed in determining
how their counsel is to be understood. See, e.g., Heidegger, supra note 191, at 481,483; see
also id. at 501 (on the Gadamer career); Anastaplo, supra note 26, at 300-01.
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Chance can play a critical part here, of course, including with respect to
the temperament and circumstances of the people involved. Some people, for
example, are more spirited than others, so much so that they can even seem
to be looking for opportunities to "take a stand." Of course, if the prospect
of getting oneself killed is very high, that can (and usually should) put a
damper on the spirits of most of us. Still, there can be something sobering in
what happens to those who do accommodate themselves to an unjust system,
especially as they try to explain that accommodation in a way that ultimately
satisfies themselves.
Particularly troubling for the good Germans must have been the
recognition that the more they allowed the impositions of the Nazis, the more
dangerous it became to resist future impositions. Shortly after the Nazis took
power, but well before they had consolidated themselves as they did in the
years immediately following, Jewish and "left-leaning" professors were
dismissed from their posts. That was the time for decent people to resist with
a minimum of risk and with a reasonable hope of success." 4
Something is to be said, that is, for a tradition of civil disobedience. That
tradition usually finds its most responsible expression in an established
respect for a vigorous freedom of speech.2" 5 The limitations of the Germans
with respect to these matters contributed to the crippling of decent men who
recognized the evil of the Nazis but did not know how they could remain
good citizens while putting up a determined opposition to the awful things
which were systematically being done in their name.
VIII.
We can return now to our two B. F. Skinner passages by noticing, first,
the role played by Hans Jonas in his chairing of this encounter and in his
subsequent comment upon it. He, as is evident in the first Skinner passage,
also recognizes the authority of Socrates in such matters.2" 6
I draw now upon Mr. Jonas for a comment elsewhere which illuminates
further the Heidegger problem by which Mr. Gadamer was oppressed for
more than a half-century. Mr. Jonas, another student of Heidegger, had fled
from Germany to Great Britain in the 1930's. His comment contrasts the
conduct of Heidegger with that of an undistinguished practitioner of an old
school in German philosophy:

214. Today, one can wonder what is being acquiesced in with respect to the treatment of
people of Arab descent in the United States.
215. On freedom of speech in the United States, see supra text accompanying note 49.
216. See infra Appendix A, infra text accompanying notes 225, 226.
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To illustrate the plight of ethics in contemporary philosophy, let me open
this paper with a personal reminiscence. When in 1945 I re-entered
vanquished Germany as a member of the Jewish Brigade in the British army,
I had to decide on whom of my former teachers in philosophy I could in
good conscience visit, and whom not. It turned out that the "no" fell on my
main teacher [he refers here to Heidegger, without naming him], perhaps the
most original and profound, certainly one of the most influential among the
philosophers of this century, who by the criteria which then had to govern
my choice had failed the human test of the time; whereas the "yes" included
the much lesser figure of a rather narrow traditionalist of Kantian
persuasion, who meant little to me philosophically but of whose record in
those dark years I heard admirable things. When I did visit him and
congratulated him on the courage of his principled stand, he said a
memorable thing: "Jonas," he said, "I tell you this: Without Kant's
teaching I couldn't have done it." Here was a limited man, but sustained in
an honorable course of action by the moral force of an outmoded
philosophy; and there was the giant of contemporary thought-not hindered,
some even say helped, by his philosophy in joining the cause of evil. The
point is that this was more than a private failing, just as the other's better
bearing was, by his own avowal, more than a private virtue. The tragedy
was that the truly twentieth-century thinker of the two, he whose word had
stirred the youth of a whole generation after the First World War, had not
offered in his philosophy a reason for setting conduct in the noble tradition
stemming from Socrates and Plato and ending, perhaps, in Kant." 7
We notice again, in the passage just quoted, the importance of Socrates
in these matters, that Socrates who (we can recall) refused to cooperate in any
way in the condemnation of the generals by bloodthirsty
democrats or in the
2 18
arrest of Leon at Salamis by bloodthirsty oligarchs.
We need not concern ourselves here with what made the Heideggerean
school as advanced as it was believed to be in philosophical circles and what
made the Kantian school appear to be outmoded." 9 The critical thing here is
that there could be said to have been among some academics a proper human
response to human challenges, not simply the professional philosophical
response.220

in

217. ANASTAPLO, THE AMERIcAN MORALIST, supranote 3, at 146-47 (quoting Hans Jonas
J. CENT. CONFERENCES AM. RABBis 27 (1968)); see infra Appendix C, infra text

accompanying note 228.
218. See supra text accompanying note 202; infra Appendix C.
219. See infra Appendix C; ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORAUST, supranote 3, at 27.
220. I mention in passing that years later Mr. Jonas was reconciled with Mr. Heidegger,
something which happened to lead to an embarrassing situation from which I had to extricate
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Indeed, the professional philosopher may have a tendency to believe that
he is necessarily in opposition to the opinion (even the decent opinion) of his
day. This is reflected in how Mr. Gadamer spoke, in his "Reflections," about
the motto he took from Goethe.22' Here, too, more reliable guidance is
provided by Socrates-as in Plato's Crito, where Socrates indicates that the
people at large, or the un-philosophical, are apt (if only by chance) to be right
half of the time. 222 Is it not the duty of the philosophically-minded to
reinforce and refine the decent tendencies of a properly-developed people?
Ix.
However outmoded the Kantian school appeared to be, it could
sometimes provide a reliable moral compass that B. F. Skinner's
"Behaviorism" evidently could not explicitly acknowledge. "Behaviorism,"
as is suggested in the Skinner passage we have before us, 223 relies on a
calculus (sometimes perhaps a rather complicated calculus) about pleasure
and pain, a calculus which is grounded in primitive (and somewhat
accidental) desires and aversions.
Mr. Gadamer was, of course, much more sophisticated about these
matters than Mr. Skinner, but both of these scholars seemed to place a
considerable (perhaps an undue) emphasis upon self-preservation (which Mr.
Skinner could speak of as "survival") as fundamental. This is not to deny that
Mr. Gadamer was better grounded in philosophy, including in the teachings
of Socrates and Plato, than Mr. Skinner-and perhaps better grounded also
than Mr. Marcuse, even though Mr. Marcuse had been another student (with
Mr. Gadamer) of Heidegger. But, I suspect, that both Mr. Skinner and Mr.
Marcuse would have had less to explain away if they too had been confronted
with the kind of challenge that the typical German academic was. Is this in
part due to vital differences in temperament? 22' Such provisional assessments
invite further investigation.
We must wonder, in any event, whether it is an undue regard for selfpreservation (something that does seem to be fundamental to the way that
Martin Heidegger conducted himself, sometimes shamelessly, from the 1930s
to the end of his life)-we must indeed wonder whether that can lead one to

myself. But that is a story for another day.
221. See supra text accompanying note 206. 1 am reminded of the ever-so-subtle thanks
paid to good neighbors in Marcel Proust's Swann's Way.
222. See ANASTAPLO, HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 4, at 203.
223. See infra Appendix A; infra text accompanying notes 225 and 226.
224. See ANASTAPLO, HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 4, at 1; see also
MURLEY, supra note 7, at 539.
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try, again and again, to explain away (not to repent for) whatever seems
threatening in the "image" of oneself that one finds useful and happens to be
comfortable with. It is this which can leave an observer saddened upon
seeing how the reluctant accommodations of decent men, of considerable
talent, accomplishments and good will, may keep them from ever fully being
what they truly aspire to be.

APPENDIX A
A SOCRATIC CROSS-EXAMINATION: B. F. SKINNER, WITH THE
HELP OF GEORGE ANASTAPLO, ON THE LIMITATIONS OF
BEHAVIORISM (1969)
Part One (by Leon R. Kass)225

It is now more than thirty years since I first met Hans Jonas in the pages
of his book, The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a PhilosophicalBiology. I

was then a practicing biochemist working at the National Institutes of Health.
But I was a somewhat eccentric biochemist, both because I had acquired a
moralist's interest in the meaning of the new biology and, even more, because
I had a vague interest in the philosophy of organism, secretly harboring
inarticulate yet definite non-reductionist prejudices. My closest friend,
having read Jonas' "Is God a Mathematician? (The Meaning of
Metabolism)," strongly recommended that I read The Phenomenon of Life,
whose paperback edition had just appeared. I took the book with me on our
family vacation in West Virginia, and pored over it steadily for two weeks.
It left me out of breath from the intellectual effort needed to comprehend the
dense and sophisticated philosophical arguments (and the author's Germanic
style). At the same time, I was thrilled to discover that there was indeed a
way to philosophize non-reductively about living nature (including man) even
in the face of the great accomplishments of modem biology.
A few months later, in the autumn of 1969, I met Hans Jonas in the flesh.
I had organized the first NIH Symposium on Ethical Issues in Biomedical
Advance and, mainly because I wanted to meet him, invited Jonas to be the
moderator. "Look for a short man with a briefcase, holding a cigarette in the
European manner," said my prescient wife as I left for the airport to meet my
esteemed guest. Following her advice, I picked him out immediately and we
soon fell into lively conversation. The next few days were exhilarating.
225.

This passage is copied from the beginning of Leon R. Kass, Appreciating the

Phenomenon ofLife, 23 GRADUATE FAC. PEIL. J. (The New School), 51-52 (2001). On Dr.
Kass, see Gary Rosen, Who's Afraid of Leon Kass?, COMMENTARY, January 2003, at 28.
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Jonas not only moderated with skill and grace; with his opening and closing
remarks and his other substantive interventions, he gave the whole
proceedings the wished-for and fitting tone of moral and philosophical
seriousness. I recall the special delight he took in George Anastaplo's
devastating Socratic cross-examination ofB. F. Skinner, which revealed even
to the meanest capacity the epistemological and moral self-contradictions
inherent in the behaviorist's claims for the truth and beneficence of
behaviorism.
Part Two (by George Anastaplo) 26
My exchange with one of the Bethesda panel bears upon the argument of
this essay (I am the first speaker in the following excerpt):
Anastaplo: ... You used, on at least two occasions, [in comparing us
modems with the ancients], the notion of progress, that "we" are better than
"they." I find that heartening because any serious notion of progress has
some place, if only dimly, an awareness of what the best is. Are you prepared
to say there is a best?
Skinner: I thought I was addressing that question in my talk this
afternoon. There are ways in which we act to make things as we call them,
"better," and we do say that this is good and that is not good, and so on, and
I suppose that if you have good and better, you have a best, but the notion of
the evolution of a species or of culture never gives you the opportunity of
foreseeing the final state. If it's a question of eschatology, I pass.
Anastaplo: May I comment on that? Look, you can't talk about the
better or the good without a notion of the best. I think you do have a notion
of the best. I think you have a notion of the best by which you guide your life
and on which your own comments just now are based. Your notion of the
best, I think, whether you recognize it or not, is a full development of the
human reason, primarily with a view to understanding man and the world
around him. I think that's your secret best. If that is so, then we can begin
to talk seriously about which societies, which cultures, are more apt to
contribute to that, and which ones are less apt to contribute to that. We don't
talk about survival as [the basis for] judgment. For instance, you observed
that survival is the only value by which we will be judged. That simply is not

226. This passage is copied from HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 4, at 282-83 n.7.
The essay drawn upon, "In Search of the Soulless 'Self,"' was prepared for a symposium,
"Research in Neuro- and Psycho-Biology, Prospects and Social Implications," delivered at the
National Institutes of Health in Bethesda, Maryland, on October 17, 1969. The symposium
panel included Hans Jonas (Moderator), Gardner Quarton, B.F. Skinner, and George Anastaplo.
See infra text at notes 318-19.
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true. That is not a fact. We know-we look back over ancient "cultures" (as
we call them) and we see some that we judge and judge very highly, and by
any ordinary notion of survival, they have failed, compared to the trivial or
bestial, barbaric culture which overwhelmed them. And yet I think you
would say that they were better than the ones that conquered them. If you
don't say it, I think that you would have serious problems talking about
progress. If you do say it, then, as I say, we can begin talking seriously about
what makes for the best man, what the proper questions are and how one goes
about discovering what [the answers to] those questions are.
Skinner: I take survival to be a value only in a survival framework, and
if you like to call that begging the question, you can.... You can't judge a
culture simply by choosing those particular features that you admire, and say
that Greek culture was great because of its law and its sculpture and so on.
It was extremely weak in many respects and it happened to be weak because
it overlooked the fact that it made itself extraordinarily attractive to
barbarians, and that was a weakness.... In the long run, I think the culture
which abandons its interest in surviving is not going to survive and in that
sense it is a weak culture, and not a good culture.

APPENDIX B
AND
ON SOCRATES' TROUBLES WITH BOTH DEMOCRATIC
2 27
OLIGARCHIC REGIMES IN ATHENS
For know well, men of Athens, if I had long ago attempted to be
politically active, I would long ago have perished, and I would have
benefitted neither you nor myself. Now do not be vexed with me when I
speak the truth. For there is no human being who will preserve his life if he
genuinely opposes either you or any other multitude and prevents many
unjust and unlawful things from happening in the city. Rather, if someone
who really fights for the just is going to preserve himself even for a short
time, it is necessary for him to lead a private rather than a public life.
I for my part will offer great proofs of these things for you-not
speeches, but what you honor, deeds. Do listen to what happened to me, so
that you may see that I would not yield even to one man against the just
because of a fear of death, even if I were to perish by refusing to yield. I will
tell you vulgar things, typical of the law courts, but true. I, men of Athens,

227.

This passage is taken from Plato's APOLOGY OF SOCRATES, 31D-32E (in the

translation by Thomas G. West and Grace Starry West, published by the Cornell University
Press). See supra text accompanying note 218.
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never held any office in the city except for being once on the Council. And
it happened that our tribe, Antiochis, held the prytany when you wished to
judge the ten generals (the ones who did not pick up the men from the naval
battle) as a group-unlawfully, as it seemed to all of you in the time
afterwards. I alone of the prytanes opposed your doing anything against the
laws then, and I voted against it. And although the orators were ready to
indict me and arrest me, and you were ordering and shouting, I supposed that
I should run the risk [by siding] with the law and the just rather than side with
you because of fear of prison or death when you were counseling unjust
things.
Now this was when the city was still under the democracy. But again,
when the oligarchy came to be, the Thirty summoned five of us into the
Tholos, and they ordered us to arrest Leon the Salaminian and bring him from
Salamis to die. They ordered many others to do many things of this sort,
wishing that as many as possible would be implicated in the responsibility.
Then, however, I showed again, not in speech but in deed, that I do not even
care about death in any way at all-if it is not too crude to say so-but that
my whole care is to commit no unjust or impious deed. That government, as
strong as it was, did not shock me into doing anything unjust. When we came
out of the Tholos, the other four went to Salamis and arrested Leon, but I
departed and went home. And perhaps I would have died because of this, if
that government had not been quickly overthrown. And you will have many
witnesses of these things.
Do you suppose, then, that I would have survived so many years if Ihad
been publicly active and had acted in a manner worthy of a good man, coming
to the aid of the just things and, as one ought, regarding this as most
important? Far from it, men of Athens; nor would any other human being.
APPENDIX C
HANS JONAS ON MARTIN HEIDEGGER
AND THE
28
STATUS OF MORALITY
It would be difficult to exaggerate the reputation of [Martin Heidegger]
in Twentieth-Century philosophical circles.
His notorious public
collaboration with the Nazis in the early days of Hitler's power is instructive,
especially if we take him at his word in his postwar ratification of his prewar
suggestion that "the inner truth and greatness" of the Nazi movement was
directed to "the encounter between global technology and man." (See
228. This passage is copied from ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN
146-48. See supra text accompanying note 217.

MORALIST,
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Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 166; Spiegel Interview
[published May 31, 1976], p. 275.)
The disease accompanying technology may be seen not only in what it
was that Heidegger was responding to, but also in the form of his response.
His response was peculiarly infected by the disease itself. It was a response
by perhaps the greatest European thinker of his time, but it was a response
that was not in the best tradition of European thought.
This is illustrated by the report in 1968 by Hans Jonas, a scholar (now
living in the United States) who had fled from Germany to Great Britain in
the 1930s. His report contrasts the conduct of Heidegger with that of an
undistinguished practitioner of an old school in German philosophy (Journal
of CentralConference of American Rabbis, January 1968, p. 27):
To illustrate the plight of ethics in contemporary philosophy, let me open
this paper with a personal reminiscence. When in 1945 I re-entered
vanquished Germany as a member of the Jewish Brigade in the British army,
I had to decide on whom of my former teachers in philosophy I could in
good conscience visit, and whom not. It turned out that the "no" fell on my
main teacher [he refers here to Heidegger, without naming him], perhaps the
most original and profound, certainly one of the most influential among the
philosophers of this century, who by the criteria which then had to govern
my choice had failed the human test of the time; whereas the "yes" included
the much lesser figure of a rather narrow traditionalist of Kantian
persuasion, who meant little to me philosophically but of whose record in
those dark years I heard admirable things. When I did visit him and
congratulated him on the courage of his principled stand, he said a
memorable thing: "Jonas," he said, "I tell you this: Without Kant's teaching
I couldn't have done it." Here was a limited man, but sustained in an
honorable course of action by the moral force of an outmoded philosophy;
and there was the giant of contemporary thought-not hindered, some even
say helped, by his philosophy in joining the cause of evil. The point is that
this was more than a private failing, just as the other's better bearing was,
by his own avowal, more than a private virtue. The tragedy was that the
truly twentieth-century thinker of the two, he whose word had stirred the
youth of a whole generation after the First World War, had not offered in his
philosophy a reason for setting conduct in the noble tradition stemming from
Socrates and Plato and ending, perhaps, in Kant.
"Thus, there is in this personal experience," Professor Jonas continued,
an indication of the plight of modem philosophy when it comes to ethical
norms, which are conspicuously absent from its universe of truth. How are
we to explain this vacuum? What, with so different a past, has caused the
great Nothing with which philosophy today responds to one of the oldest
questions-the question of how we ought to live?
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Mr. Jonas then suggested an answer to the question of how this had come to
be:
Three interrelated determinants of modem thought have a share in the
nihilistic situation, or less dramatically put, in the contemporary impasse of
ethical theory-two of them theoretical and the third practical: the modem
concept of nature, the modem concept of man, and the fact of modem
technology supported by both. All three imply the negotiation of certain
fundamental tenets of the philosophical as well as the religious tradition.
We notice that Mr. Jonas observed that "ethical norms" are
"conspicuously absent" from "modem philosophy." To what extent did
technology, or the modem natural science upon which it depends, replace oldDid Heidegger's radical approach to
fashioned "ethical norms"?
philosophical questions help undermine the best of German idealism (seen,
perhaps, in thinkers such as Kant)? Or was it that Kant and those
immediately influenced by him were themselves decisively affected by
modem natural science and other developments and hence contributed to the
subversion of the natural basis for "ethical norms"?
Mr. Jonas could himself speak of the principled German professor who
resisted the Nazis as having been sustained by "the moral force of an
outmoded philosophy." Such a man might have been one of thousands. I
suspect that not enough credit is given to many, albeit a minority of, Germans
who had to make very difficult decisions and who did stand for humanity. It
should be remembered that the Nazis had to conceal from the German people
at large the worst atrocities they committed, which suggests that the Nazis
were obliged to recognize that there remained among the German people a
residual sense of humanity that it would have been dangerous to offend too
much, even in the name of national security in time of war.
This residual sense of humanity, I might add, goes far deeper than even
whatever Kant provided. Modem philosophical thought has all too often
weakened the effectiveness of this sense, thereby permitting mere
technological considerations and the economic and other so-called practical
considerations closely allied to technology to dominate communal
developments. One consequence of this is the subversion of the status of the
natural. I will return to this later. For the moment it suffices to notice further
that for Mr. Jonas not only would Kantianism be outmoded, but also perhaps
Platonic thought, which does provide the life of Socrates as a model of how
the thoughtful man should live, especially in dark times.
Let us return directly to Heidegger, whose scholarly thought, as Mr.
Jonas noticed, some say even helped Heidegger to ally himself with the cause
of evil. That thought, to which some contemporary intellectuals subscribe "in
theory" however much they may abhor its practical alliance with Nazism,
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may be in decisive respects too abstract and metaphysical, with insufficient
concern for the ethical and the political. This may be a critical TwentiethCentury failing: ethical questions tend to be regarded as beyond the realm of
philosophy or science; rather, the things truly knowable are "questions of
fact."
Technology as well as modem metaphysics can be seen as peculiarly
well-qualified to deal with questions of fact. But people cannot help noticing
that when technology is in the saddle something vital is missing from human
life, and so a political remedy is sought. It is all too often sought by men who
have themselves contributed to the problem--by men who are, in any event,
ill-equipped to think politically (that is to say, with prudence, which must be
distinguished from the cunning and opportunism to which Heidegger himself
all too often resorted). It is, in these matters, prudent to keep in mind an
observation by Emil Fackenheim: "The Scottish-Catholic historian Maclom
Hay asks why what happened in Germany did not happen in France forty
years earlier, during the Dreyfus affair. He replies that in France there were
fifty righteous men." (The Jewish Thought of Emil Fackenheim: A Reader
[1987], p. 136).
8. CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTED

229

A little learning is a dangerous thing,
Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring.
There shallow draughts intoxicate the brain,
And drinking largely sobers us again.
Alexander Pope20
Three University of Chicago talks that I happened to hear and to respond
to this past week, within a twenty-four hour period, had common features
which can be instructive for us as students ofjurisprudence and hence of that
collective understanding upon which law depends. All three talks, by
distinguished ("cutting edge") intellectuals, were given to audiences that had,
for the most part, little inclination to challenge what was being said. And yet,
in each case, what was said was quite different from our common experience
of things. (These three talks happened to be framed by a breakfast meeting

229. A talk given in a Jurisprudence course, The School of Law, Loyola University of
Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, October 28, 2002. The original title of this talk was "Twenty-four
Hours: Civilization and Its Discontented."
230. ALEXANDER POPE, AN ESSAY ON CRITICISM, II, 215-18.
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on Thursday and an address on Saturday, both of which I will refer to
briefly.)
Late Thursday afternoon there was a talk by a Princeton University
professor, a Nobel Laureate in Physics. His account of research, drawing
upon elaborate sets of data compiled by teams of investigators, suggested
possibilities about the movements of very small particles.
It was true on this occasion, as is usually the case in the weekly
University of Chicago Physics Department Colloquium, that very few of the
physicists present (faculty as well as graduate students) could follow much
of what was said. The research in such a distinguished department today is
highly specialized, so much so that only a small part of an audience is
expected to grasp most of what is said, however important it may be for the
morale of the department that its members show up."'
One could well wonder what "understanding" means in this context-that
is, when the "things" studied are not only to some extent conjectural (or
hypothetical) but are also described in a most limited fashion. Thus, a student
of these matters has observed, "I don't know what an electron is if I don't
describe it mathematically."23' 2 This suggests, among other things, that
electrons cannot be visualized. (Would a poet be better able to describe
electrons and other such things? There do appear to be tiny things there that
can collide and break up.)
A mature physicist present, with whom I walked out of the Colloquium,
said that I had just witnessed some "heavy stuff," conceding thereby that I
said. I responded that I did learn something valuable from the speaker:
"Correlation is everything."
I was then told that Niels Bohr had once said, "The contrary to a deep
truth is another deep truth." Whether this is generally true can be debated,
but it does seem to be characteristic of modem physics that the heresy of one
generation becomes the orthodoxy of the next, only to be replaced in turn by
another heresy.233
At noon on Friday there was a talk by a New York City law professor.
Same-sex marriages were discussed at a Gender Studies Colloquium.
Marriage itself was called into question as an institution that is really
coercive, especially for women. Particularly instructive was how virtually
everyone present seemed to accept the argument that the state is not entitled
to make as much as it does of marriage.23

231.

See Colloquium, supra note 64.
232. ALAIN CONNES ET AL., TRIANGLE OF THOUGHTS 35 (Jennifer Gage trans., 2000).
233. See supra note 62.
234. Compare, e.g., ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORALIST, supra note 3, at 349
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I was the only one there to suggest that the community is entitled to
supervise families in the having and raising of children, and that there is
much to be said for children having two parents. The critical issues with
respect to the status and promotion of marriage by the community may not
have much to do with whether or not same-sex marriages should be permitted.
The massive problems confronted today are from those many opposite-sex
relations which produce children for whom only the mother is responsible.
And, I ventured to suggest, most of us present had benefited from having been
reared by conventional families, however poorly in some cases. (I was
immediately reminded that domestic violence is a serious problem, as if that
obviously called into question the very institution of marriage.)
Thus, I argued, the state may not only have the right but even the duty to
supervise these matters. But, it seems, civilization itself is very much taken
for granted these days, as if it naturally sustains itself without deliberate
efforts or coercive measures on the part of communities. The address I heard
the following day can be understood to have used Plato's Republic in support
of this argument, whatever reservations one might have about the care in
reading displayed on that occasion.
Later on Friday afternoon there was a talk by a distinguished sociologist
from a British university. He identified himself as an old-time Marxist who
decried the shortcomings of capitalism, particularly in the United States. He
endorsed an observation attributed by him to F. Scott Fitzgerald (early in the
Twentieth Century) that America is a place where one does not get "a second
chance." He also observed that our capitalist economy is now in recession,
so much so that it is on the verge of plunging into a depression.
I began my remarks by saying that anyone who considers the present
situation in the United States as verging on a depression simply does not
know what a depression looks like. I was the only one present talking this
way, which led to my further comment that the Fitzgerald lament was simply
wrongheaded. Indeed, I suggested, many if not most families in America
have had the experience of second and even third chances, reinforced by the
easy availability of bankruptcy in this country. This openness of the system
is reflected in the efforts made by immigrants to come here in the large
numbers that they do. Few people have ever made desperate attempts to
emigrate to thoroughly Marxist regimes.235
The speaker granted that immigrants do well in this country, but he
argued that it is the middle class that now routinely has the experience of

("Women and the Law"); LIBERTY, EQUALrTY AND MODERN CONSTrrUTIONAUSM, supra note
31, at II, 161.
235. On opportunities in the United States (both taken advantage of and missed), see THE
AMERICAN MORALIST, supra note 3, at 15.
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falling from prosperity and never recovering. Had I had the opportunity to
say more I would have questioned the toughness of those in the middle class
who may be immobilized by what should be temporary adversities. The
criticism that can be made of capitalism (or more precisely, of modernity) is
that it can lead to such a heightening of expectations, if not also to a softening
of character, as to make setbacks seem both more serious and more enduring
than they need be. But such defects are due to the long-term successes of the
economic system, of which too much can then be made by afflicted
participants. Even so, I notice in passing, these encounters were preceded by
the breakfast meeting I have referred to, during which a determined freemarketer vigorously questioned both the right and the capacity of the
community, acting through its political agents, to place aesthetically-based
restraints upon what "the market" might do with the uses of private property.
(It does not seem to be appreciated by such free-market advocates how much
the definition, allocation, and protection-that is, the very existence-of
property have always depended upon the community.236 )
One remarkable feature of this series of chance encounters was the
repeated exhibition of how doctrinaire our specialists are apt to be. They
were reinforced in this tendency by the bulk of the quite different audiences
that turned out to hear each of them. "Outsiders" in their usual audiences,
including among their readers, are rare. Thus, speaker and audience tend
toward mutual reinforcement, with bad as well as good consequences.
To be doctrinaire is to be, in some respects, quite naive. Perhaps this is
- 0,,,
related, however, to attributes that make speciplicts n, cii,---fill ,1
especially endearing them to the like-minded audiences upon whom they
depend for support. Somewhat worrisome here is how reluctant people are
(have they always been?) to question the authorized presuppositions and
methods of their discipline.
Not that this is altogether bad. Respect for what is generally accepted in
one's immediate association, or community, contributes to the stability of the
arrangements upon which people do have to depend. Thus, although
particular allegiances might be questioned, with a view to their modification,
care should be taken not to disparage the very idea of allegiance, for it is that
upon which civilization does in part depend.
It is particularly important to be aware of one's obligations here,
inasmuch as it has become fashionable to take civilization for granted. It is
such thoughtlessness which leads to the questioning of the intellectual, social,
and economic institutions upon which we must depend, institutions which
have helped shape us into the kind of people we are and indeed want to
continue to be.

236.

See Parts 2 and 3 of this Article.
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Underlying the proper questioning called for in these matters is an inquiry
into the suppositions relied upon, especially by specialists, about what can be
known and how. Fundamental here is the question of what it means to
know,237 keeping in mind what is generally (if not even naturally) relied upon
by a community. Correlation, even if it should not be "everything," is very
much to be respected, including that correlation which tries to weave together
the old and the new, the high and the low, the many and the few. Another
way of putting all this is to say that there is a need, here and there, for
responsible skepticism, not only about institutions, which can be in disarray
from time to time, but perhaps even more, in our circumstances, about those
who study our institutions. Still another way of putting these cautions is to
say that one should see and hence assess what seems to be taken for granted
by the influential intellectuals one happens to encounter from time to time.
238
9. PHILOSOPHY AND THE PROSPECTS AT DEATH

To an understanding endowed with significance and the
contemplation of all time and all being, do you think it
possible that human life seems anything good?
Socrates 239
I.
It is obvious that the significance and consequences of death are of
perennial interest to peoples everywhere. That interest can range in its effects
from desperate efforts to avoid death for oneself to enthusiastic efforts to
inflict it upon multitudes of others. We can be reminded by this date, an
anniversary of the 1944 D-Day, that there arethings worth risking one's life
to defend or to eliminate or to establish. 2
A considerable, if not even overriding, concern with death may be seen
in various (not all) of the introductions to non-Western thought I provide in
my collection, But Not Philosophy.24 ' Such introductions may help us know

237. See supra note 65; see also infra Conclusion.
238. Atalk given at the SeminaryCooperative Book Store, Chicago, Illinois, June 6,2002.
The occasion was provided by the publication of BUT
INTRODUCTIONS TO NON-WESTERNTHOUGHT, supra note 3.

NOT PHILOSOPHY:

239.

PLATO, REPUBuC 286A.

240.
241.

For another D-Day talk, see Anastaplo, supra note 38, at 499.
On death, see ANASTAPLO, BUT NOT PHILOSOPHY, supra note 3, at 379.
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ourselves better, even as we discover what tends to be common to human
beings everywhere. I have found, over the years, that these author "events"
arranged by the Seminary Coop Book Store help me get to know my own
book better as I prepare for the special audience I can expect here.
Desperation at the prospect of death may be seen in my first introduction,
to Mesopotamian Thought, in which the story of Gilgamesh is discussed. An
unsuccessful effort is made by the hero to secure for himself deathlessness,
or immortality, on earth.242
Perhaps the most thorough "handling" of death in these introductions may
be seen among the ancient Egyptians, with their considerable interest in and
their remarkable expenditures on the proper treatment of corpses. Their
massive pyramids stand as monuments to what would today be called an
"obsession," but an obsession that evidently did not keep them from being
fairly cheerful. If burials are managed properly, it seems to be said, the
affairs of the more fortunate dead would be somewhat like their affairs while
they were alive.243
On the other hand, the Hindus and the Buddhists seem to look forward to
the complete extinction of what we call the Self, which would leave the
individual human soul assimilated (perhaps after a series of reincarnations)
into a universal spirit. Buddhism is said to have emerged from the despair
aroused in244
its Founder upon first encountering distressing evidence of human
mortality.
Other schools of thought, such as that of the North American Indians,
suggest how death came into the world.2 45 Still others, such as the Islamic,
provide guidance to the securing of a blissful existence beyond the grave,
having been anticipated here by Christian teachings about proper submission
to the Divine.4 6
Both the divine and personal immortality are muted in the Confucian
teaching, perhaps anticipating somewhat in this respect much of the
philosophical tradition familiar to us in the West. But a form of personal
immortality, if not also of the divine, may be seen in the considerable
deference exhibited among the Chinese to ancestors.247

242. See id. at 1.
243. See id.at 31.
244. See id. at 147. On the Self, see ANASTAPLO, BUT NOT PHILOSOPHY, supra note 3, at
303; ANASTAPLO, HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra 4, at 87.
245.

See, e.g., ANASTAPLO, BUT NOT PHILOSOPHY, supra note 3, at 232.

246.
247.

See, e.g., id. at 175.
See, e.g., id. at 99.
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II.
The title of my collection, But Not Philosophy,reflects the opinion that
Western thought, however varied it may be, is likely to have intrinsic to it
something critical which is not indigenous to non-Western schools of
thought. That is philosophy, in its explicit, self-conscious form.248 To
recognize this is not to deny that various non-Western schools make much of
distinctive cultural elements that their champions consider far more enriching
for human life than what is available in the West.
The philosophic tradition is so much a part ofthe Western way of life that
even the non-philosophical among us (that is, most of us) are shaped by it to
a considerable extent. Vital to the emergence and development of philosophy
is an explicit grasp of the idea of nature, something that was once available
only in the
West (and thereafter also among those exposed to Western
249
thought).
Nature means, among other things, a principle of order and change
independent of any will. As such it is a term not to be found either in the
Hebrew Bible or in the Christian Gospels, coming into the Greek Bible (or
New Testament) with the writings about, and of, that Hellenistic Jew, Saul of
Tarsus. 5 The discovery of nature in ancient Greece, and incorporated
thereafter in the languages of the West, contributed significantly to the
emergence of the modem natural sciences.
The lack of systematic philosophic inquiry has its consequences,
whatever the limitations (including, perhaps, the illusions) of philosophy. It
should at once be added that although there was no serious, or systematic,
philosophical inquiry among the better known non-Western thinkers not in
contact with the West, this does not mean that some of the lessons of
philosophy were not learned by them. Similarly, nature can have its effect
even among those who do not grasp the idea of nature explicitly. 5 '
If a knowing grasp of nature is necessary for truly grasping things as they
are, it may not be possible for the unphilosophical to see and to know
themselves as well as they can be seen and known by the truly
philosophical." 2

248. See, e.g., id. at xvi-xvii. See also the Conclusion of this Article.
249. On the importance of nature, see ANASTAPLO, BUT NOT PHILOSOPHY, supra note 3,
at 387.
250. On the Bible, see Anastaplo, supra note 127. On St. Paul, see George Anastaplo,
Rome, Piety, and Law: Explorations,39 LoY. L. REv. 1, 39 (1993).
251.

On what it is salutary to stand for here, see ANASTAPLO, BUT NOT PHILOSOPHY, supra

note 3, at 322-23.
252. See, e.g., supra note 65.
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Among the things that human beings "naturally" want to know about
themselves is what becomes of them at death. The most dramatic
philosophical responses to death (or, rather, to dying) may be found in Plato's
Phaedo. This can be said to be one of the more "practical" Platonic
dialogues, having been conducted on the brink of Socrates' dying. 2"
Socrates considers himself obliged to minister to the profound sense of
impending loss that his companions feel on this occasion. This leads to a
series of arguments developed by him in support of the proposition that the
human soul (if not also the souls of other living earthly beings) is immortal.
Indeed, arguments are even made that the human soul is so enduring that it
exists both before and after one's life on earth."5 4
Doubts have been expressed ever since the days of Socrates as to the
soundness of these arguments, some of which doubts are evident in the
dialogue itself.25 In fact, Socrates' companions are not so persuaded by his
arguments for the immortality (or non-dissolution) of the soul, that they can
restrain their grief at the end, however serene their master is when he drinks
the poison.
Certainly, there is not among the companions of Socrates the kind of
celebration, of a release from earthly bonds and an expectation of glorious
rewards, associated with, say, early Christian martyrdom. 56 Even in ordinary
circumstances, the tombstone of a departed Christian (as in a Canadian
graveyard I visited
recently) can speak of him as having been freed from
257
"Nature's Toils."
IV.
The emphasis in Plato's Phaedo is not placed on the survival and future
career of the particular soul, although Socrates can speak of conversing
thereafter with the blessed. Rather, the emphasis seems to be placed, in large
253. On death and dying, see ANASTAPLO, HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 4, at
214; see also infra text accompanying note 259.
254. See also PLATO, REPUBLIC,Book X. Compare this with the end of Plato's APOLOGY
OF SOCRATES where Socrates is uncertain whether the human soul survives the dying of the
earthly being.
255. See the articles on "Immortality" in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIAOFPHILOSoPHY (Paul Edwards
ed., 1967).
256. On the martyrdom of Joan of Arc and of Thomas More, see Anastaplo, supra note
108, at 919, 950; see also George Anastaplo, Law & Literatureand the ChristianHeritage:
Explorations,40 BRANDEIS L. J.191, 298 (2001).
257. See PLATO, PHAEDO 114C.
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part at least, on demonstrating the survival of something that we can call
"soul-stuff."
The key question for most of us here is whether the individual or personal
soul continues to live beyond the grave. We are far less concerned, except
perhaps as students of the theory of souls, about whether one's soul existed
prior to one's birth. The soul we tend to care most about is the soul as it has
been shaped by its particular associations "this time around." This is related
to the problem of individuation.5 8
It may be, on the Socratic premises, that it is not the individual, as
individual, who survives death. Individuality is intimately linked to the body.
Although the intellect may be the element in the soul least connected to
bodily activities, it can be wondered whether even the intellect could continue
to operate, or at least to observe and to learn, without whatever it somehow
derives from bodily associations.
Another way of putting the reservations that most of us (at least in the
West) have with the principal arguments in the Phaedo is to return to the
notion that the soul exists before its life on earth and hence after its life on
earth. But we know from experience that we know now little if anything
about existence before life on earth. And it seems that we know now little
more, if anything, of existence after life on earth. If we, during pre-life and
post-life existence, should know as little in turn of life on earth, what can
"personal immortality" mean?
Still another way of expressing these reservations is to observe that since
people (in the West) do not lament not-being before birth, why should they
be troubled by the prospects of not-being after death, however troubled and
troubling the process of dying may sometimes be?259
V.
The conversation that we are told about, in considerable detail, in the
Phaedo, is that between Socrates and his companions. This remarkable
conversation about the nature of the soul, to which considerable attention has
been devoted for more than two millennia now, was both preceded and
followed by the exchanges Socrates had that fateful day with members of his
household, exchanges which are barely reported in this dialogue.
Perhaps the most remarkable thing to be noticed about those exchanges
is what Socrates' wife says when his companions enter for hours-long

258. "The quarrel between the ancients and the modems concerns eventually, and perhaps
even from the beginning, the status of 'individuality."' STRAUSS, supra note 171, at 323.
259. On the doctrine of reincarnation, see ANASTAPLO, BUT NOT PHILOSOPHY, supranote
3, at 390.
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conversation with him: "Socrates, now's the last time your companions will
talk to you and you to them!" 2" She does not seem to have been resentful of
his way of spending so much time with others of like mind. Indeed, she may
even sense that Socrates is better for such conversations-or, at least, that
there are people of talent and distinction who treasure such conversations.
But she says nothing to suggest that Socrates would someday, after all their
deaths, be able to talk again with his companions.
This reminder of family associations-Xanthippe is first seen here with
a child in arms-should suggest the importance of the body in helping to
make us what we are. The role of the body may be seen both in the family
which contributes to our shaping and in the community which authorizes,
protects, and guides the family.
VI.
However much is said in this dialogue about the immortality of the
human soul-and especially about the interference of bodily associations
with the liberation and full development of the soul-the sight of Socrates'
family reminds us of the importance of various bodily associations for the
development of the better souls we do have access to. Even the language
upon that understanding itself very much depends is provided us by some
community.
Indeed, we can wonder whether any substantial, secure knowing is
possible without the guidance to what it means to know which is provided by
the apprehension of material things by our bodily senses. It is revealing that
we say, perhaps instinctively, "I see" when we come to understand something
that is being explained to us.
Is there, then a problem with Socrates' seeming disparagement of the
body and of particulars? Is there something merely ritualistic about this
disparagement in the somber circumstances in which his distraught
companions find themselves? Is it not significant that Plato makes a point of
having it recorded that he was not present for this conversation? 26 ' Would he
have been obliged, or at least equipped, to raise objections to Socrates'
arguments that the others did not raise?
Other well-known arguments found in the Platonic dialogues tend to be
better regarded by students of these matters than those recorded in this
dialogue. These include arguments about the relation between knowledge
and virtue or between ignorance and vice.262 Should it even be regarded as

260.
261.
262.

PLATO, PHADEO 60A.
Seeid.at59B.
See PLATO, MENO (George Anastaplo & Laurence Bems, trans.) (forthcoming),
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virtuous to display, on such an occasion as this, more assurance about the
prospects of the human soul at death than the available evidence can support?
VII.
It may be true, as the Homeric gods (as well as others) can say, that
human beings are but creatures of a day. But it may also be true that (so far
as we can know) only such creatures of a day truly live, however briefly-and
however limited and even self-deceptive human life can be.
Indeed, it can be argued that beings such as the Greek gods do not truly
live on their own, even if they have the exalted existence assigned them by
a Homer. Do not they depend for the meaningfulness of what they do upon
the human beings with whom they are somehow associated?
May we go even further by saying that one does not truly live unless there
is an awareness of the death in one's future, however much the body may be
needed for the full workings of the soul? Or is this kind of talk merely a
rationalization, as we try to make the best of our natural limitations, moving
us to argue that the prospect of death contributes to the meaning and hence
richness of life? Certainly, what life is may be difficult, if not impossible to
grasp, without an awareness of that form of not-life known as death.
Be all this as it may, the prospects at death do look in at least two
directions: life, "always" on the threshold of ever-present death, may be best
seen not only by looking forward to something somewhat uncertain and
perhaps unknowable, but also by looking backward to something more or less
certain and hence somewhat knowable. By thus looking backward, well
before our deaths, we can grasp things in our everyday lives which help us
learn and know what it means to know.263
10. AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION TODAY 264
How far your eyes may pierce I cannot tell;
Striving to better, oft we mar what's well.

Introduction.
263. Consider, for example, how the fortunes of a dead man's descendants affect "him."
See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHics IlOaIO-14.

264. These remarks (of 2001) were originally entitled, "On Amending the Constitution:
Merits, Temptations, and Perils." The journal which contracted for those remarks, Law and
ContemporaryProblems,proved to be unable to publish them as written. On the Sabbath, see
infra note 302.
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I.
The point of departure for this inquiry is the booklet, "'Great and
Extraordinary Occasions':
Developing Guidelines for Constitutional
Change," issued in 1999 by the Constitutional Project. 2"
This laudable project of The Century Foundation was prompted in large
part by that remarkable flood of proposed constitutional amendments
encountered a decade or so ago which threatened to drown the Constitution
itself. Eight "Guidelines for Constitutional Amendments" are offered in that
1999 booklet, guidelines which presuppose that amendments should be
reserved for "great and extraordinary occasions. '"267
I have, in the course of my commentary on the Constitution of 1787,
discussed the provisions for constitutional amendments in Article V. 26, My

265.

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR, act I, sc. iv, 345-46.

266. This booklet, GREAT AND EXTRAORDINARY OCCASIONS, was published in 1999 by
The Century Foundation Press of New York City. It has been identified as "A Publication of
Citizens for the Constitution, A Project of The Century Foundation." I am privileged to have
been listed as one of the six dozen "Endorsers" of the booklet. See id. at xii-xvii. See, for the
distinguished leadership of this Project, infra note 300.
267. The "Guidelines for Constitutional Amendments," id. at 7, are the following:
I. Does the proposed amendment address matters that are of more than immediate
concern and that are likely to be recognized as of abiding importance by subsequent
generations?

2. Does the proposed amendment make our system more politically responsive or protect
individual rights?
3. Are there significant practical or legal obstacles to the achievement of the objectives
of the proposed amendment by other means?
4. Is the proposed amendment consistent with related constitutional doctrine that the
amendment leaves intact?
5. Does the proposed amendment embody enforceable, and not purely aspirational,
standards?

6.Have proponents ofthe proposed amendment attempted to think through and articulate
the consequences of their proposal, including the ways in which the amendment would
interact with other constitutional provisions and principles?
7. Has there been full and fair debate on the merits of the proposed amendment?
8. Has Congress provided for a nonextendable deadline for ratification by the states so
as to ensure that there is a contemporaneous consensus by Congress and the states that the
proposed amendment is desirable?
268. See ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supranote 2, at 179-95. The uses that
have been made, for two centuries now, of Article V of the Constitution are discussed in THE
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2.
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discussion on this occasion, working from the 1999 booklet, has been
supplemented by discussions developed by me on other occasions during the
past decade.269
Controversies about proposed amendments encourage, and sometimes
even oblige, us to reconsider first principles. The Constitution Project has
served nobly to enhance public awareness of the issues we face when a
multitude of amendment-proposals threaten a secure constitutionalism.
Such proposals, expressing considerable passion (including unease about
what is happening nationwide to familiar standards and practices), can be
hard to resist, but perhaps even harder to accept. Each of the recent
amendment-proposals has been dedicated to a good cause.
It is difficult in these situations to separate "constitutional" issues from
"political" issues. This is a variation of the problem encountered when
Federal Courts undertake to decide whether Acts of Congress pass
constitutional muster.270
Much of the alarm about our most recent amendments-craze was due to
concerns in some quarters about the particular amendments being proposed.
One may have pet projects of one's own even as one laments the ready
recourse to constitutional amendments by one's fellow-citizens. One of my
own pet projects, for example, is implicit in the following Letter to the Editor
I prepared in 1992:
It is not too early for political scientists in this country to think seriously
about the 1996 Presidential election.
For example, it is not improper to continue permitting the Presidential
candidate of each political party to select a Vice Presidential running mate
alone? That is, is not this a practice that is not only subject to grave abuses,
but also runs counter to the spirit of the Republic? Would it not be prudent
instead to make routine use of the Twenty-fifth Amendment for this
purpose?
The Twenty-fifth Amendment provides a simple way for filling the
office of Vice President when it is vacant: the President sends a nomination
to Congress for examination and approval. Why should not all Vice
Presidents be chosen in this way? It is not possible to have this happen even
without another constitutional amendment if Congress and the major parties
agree? Would we not be apt to get sounder choices fro Vice President if a
newly-elected President had to submit a Vice Presidential nomination for
deliberate consideration by Congress, as was done with Gerald R. Ford in
1973 and with Nelson A. Rockefeller in 1975? Our desire to do something
269. Other discussions by me of these, and related, matters may be found by consulting the
bibliographies cited in supra note 7. See also infra note 346.
270. On judicial review, see ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTIONALIST, supra note 2, at 816
(Index); ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 335 (Index); ANASTAPLO,
THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 460 (Index).
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should be intensified when it is remembered how many of our Vice
Presidents have become Presidents during the past century.
This kind of reform would increase confidence in our political
institutions and move us closer to the mode of Presidential and Vice
Presidential selection originally provided in the Constitution."'
Of course, there are problems even with this modest proposal, however
useful it may be in suggesting instructive political issues. It can be even more
instructive to return to the Constitution Project booklet, for it can help us
notice and investigate enduring questions in constitutionalism.
The booklet's distinctive title, "Great and Extraordinary Occasions," is
taken from FederalistNo. 49. The importance of The Federalist for the
drafters of this 1999 booklet is testified to by their use, in a prominent
appendix therein, of the concluding remarks in FederalistNo. 85, the final
number of that 1787-1788 series.272
It is recognized in FederalistNo. 49 "that a constitutional road to the
decision of the people, ought to be marked out and kept open, for certain
great and extraordinary occasions." It is the ultimate authority of the people
in a republican regime that I invoked in a Letter to the Editor (of November
4, 1998), "Why Should Not the Majority Rule?" Here is the text of that 1998
letter:
A perverse use of party discipline in this country in recent years has
been the repeated recourse to threats of filibustering in the United States
Senate, thereby subverting the duty of the majority to rule. The November
3' election returns mean, among other things, that there is still no filibusterproof margin enjoyed by the dominant party in the Senate.
The proposals for constitutional amendments submitted to the First
Congress in 1789 included many suggestions that a "supermajority" (as we
call it) be required on one issue after another. The First Congress refused

271. See George Anastaplo, Involve Congressin Vice PresidentialChoice, N.Y. TIMES,
September 20, 1992 (Letter to the Editor); see also George Anastaplo, Letter to the Editor,
CHCAGo TRIBUNE, August 8, 2000, Commentary section, at 14.
272. The concluding remarks in FederalistNo. 85, which are reproduced in the booklet
(Appendix C, at 33-37) begin,
Let us now pause and ask ourselves whether, in the course of these papers, the proposed
Constitution has not been satisfactorily vindicated from the aspersions thrown upon it; and
whether it has not been shown to be worthy of the public approbation, and necessary to the
public safety and prosperity.
The other appendices in the booklet are Appendix A (pp. 27-30), "A Compendium of
Constitutional Amendments"; Appendix B (pp. 31-32), "Constitutional Amendments
Considered in the 104" and 105' Congresses"; and Appendix D (pp. 39-43), "What's Wrong
with Constitutional Amendments?" (by Kathleen M. Sullivan). See also supra Part 13 of this
Article, notes 19, 295 and accompanying text.
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to change what the Framers had done in limiting severely-that is, to a halfdozen instances-the occasions on which more than a majority is needed to
resolve questions in either House of Congress.
The current Senate rule that keeps a bare majority from ending debate,
even after a reasonable time for discussion of the relevant issues, is probably
unconstitutional. A self-respecting Senate majority, with the cooperation of
the presiding officer, should some day be able, by the use of well-reasoned
points of order, to correct both the Senate filibuster rule requiring a threefifths vote to end debate and the Senate rule requiring a two-thirds vote to
change the rules of that body.
The restoration of majority rule in the Senate probably depends upon
an informed public opinion. A truly self-respecting people would demand
that their legislatures should always be free to act efficiently, making due
allowances for adequate discussion, for fair procedures, and for traditional
privileges.
In short, We the People have to revive, and
to insist upon, a reliable
273
standard of constitutionalism in this Country.
Publius,' 74 as author of The Federalistseries, has one critical concern, in
closing out these celebrated newspaper articles: the suppression of the
amendments-craze of his day.
The amendments-craze on that occasion made much of the fact that the
proposed Constitution did not have a Bill of Rights. Critics of the proposed
Constitution had lamented this, insisting that the Constitution should not be
ratified until the lack of a Bill of Rights had been remedied. 2
Publius recognized, of course, that attempting to supply a Bill of Rights
before ratification of the Constitution would put the entire effort in jeopardy,
which was what some of the advocates of a Bill of Rights hoped for. That is,
another constitutional convention would have had to be called; the State
ratifications already secured would have had to be repeated.

273.

See George Anastaplo, Letter to the Editor,

CHICAGO

SuN-TIMEs, Nov. 11, 1998, at

18; George Anastaplo, Letter to the Editor, HICKORY (North Carolina) DAILY RECORD,

November 15, 1998, at A4; see also supra notes 293, 299. A recent Chicago Tribune editorial
endorsed the usefulness of the filibuster in the Senate. On why we need the filibuster, see C.
TRIB., May 27, 2003, at 18.
274. "Publius" should be distinguished, at least for the authorial stance taken, from
Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, the creators of this "author." See, e.g.,
Martin Diamond, The Federalist, in STRAUSS & CROPSEY ET AL., supra note 66, at 659; infra
notes 281 and 372.
275.

See ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONsTITUTION, supra note 2, at 39-41.

The attempts made in the Constitutional Convention to include a bill of rights in the proposed
Constitution came too late in the summer for its few advocates to develop much support for it
among the by-then weary delegates. See supra notes 281 and 292.
276. By the time the People in New York ratified the proposed Constitution on July 26,
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So desperate is Publius's concern here that the argument is developed, in
FederalistNo. 84 and No. 85, that a Bill of Rights is not only unnecessary but
perhaps even harmful. We can see here what is encountered again and again
thereafter in American struggles, the tailoring of constitutional arguments to
political concerns. 7
We are "naturally" encouraged, therefore, to dig deeper into this matter

than we otherwise might. At the very least, we can be reminded of the
limited reliability of The Federalistfor constitutional interpretation, however
useful it continues to be for political instruction." 8

II.
The concluding paragraph of FederalistNo. 85, and hence of the entire
Federalistseries, draws upon David Hume to buttress the argument against
of the proposed Constitution until a Bill of Rights
suspending ratification
279
it.
to
added
be
should

1788, ten other states had ratified. The remaining two, North Carolina and Rhode Island,
ratified on November 21, 1789 and May 29, 1790, respectively. See ANASTAPLO, THE
CONsTITUTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 286-87; see also infra note 378.
277. The most notorious instance of this remains Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393 (1857). See ANASTAPLO, ABRAHAM LiNCOLN, supra note 3, at 363. See also note
90 and accompanying text.
278. On The Federalist,see the index in each of the volumes cited in supra note 2; See
supra note 2; see also Part 13. In these matters (including questions about the extent of
Congressional powers and about the status ofjudicial review), I continue to find the work ofone
of my law school teachers, William W. Crosskey, to be most illuminating. See Anastaplo, Mr.
Crosskey, the American Constitution, and the Natures of Things, 15 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 181
(1984).
279. This is the concluding paragraph of FEDERAIST 85, which includes this quotation
from David Hume:
The zeal for attempts to amend, prior to the establishment of the Constitution, must
abate in every man who is ready to accede to the truth of the following observations of a
writer equally solid and igneious: "To balance a large state or society [says he], whether
monarchical or republican, on general laws, is a work of so great difficulty that no human
genius, however comprehensive, is able, by the mere dint of reason and reflection, to effect
it. The judgments of many must unite in the work; EXPERIENCE must guide their labor;
TIME must bring it to perfection, and the FEELING of inconveniences must correct the
mistakes which they inevitably fall into in their first trials and experiments." These
judicious reflections contain a lesson of moderation to all the sincere lovers of the Union,
and ought to put them upon their guard against hazarding anarchy, civil war, a perpetual
alienation of the States from each other, and perhaps the military despotism of a victorious
demagogue, in the pursuit of what they are not likely to obtain,. but from TIME and
EXPERIENCE. It may be in me a defect of political fortitude but I acknowledge that I
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Much is made here by Publius of the need to rely upon Time and
Experience in deciding what changes might be needed in the proposed
Constitution. Ratify first, it is urged, and then amend. Experience, it is
argued, must be drawn upon, not just what Hume properly disparages as "the
mere dint of reason and reflection."28
It is startling to notice here (in the very last paragraph of The Federalist)
what it is that can seem, in effect, to have been thereby qualified, if not even
repudiated-to wit, that stirring invocation, in the very first paragraph of The
Federalist series, of the unprecedented reliance upon "reflection and
choice." 28 ' What, then, is to be taken as Publius's true sentiment, with
cannot entertain an equal tranquility with those who affect to treat the dangers of a longer
continuance in our present situation as imaginary. A NATION, without a NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT, is, in my view, an awful spectacle. The establishment ofa Constitution,
in time of profound peace, by the voluntary consent of a whole people, is a PRODIGY, to
the completion of which I look forward with trembling anxiety. I can reconcile it to no
rules of prudence to let go the hold we now have, in so arduous an enterprise, upon seven
out of the thirteen States, and after having passed over so considerable a part of the ground,
to recommence the course, I dread the more the consequences of new attempts because I
know that POWERFUL INDIVIDUALS, in this and in other States, are enemies to a
general national government in every possible shape.
Publius cites here David Hume, The Rise ofArts and Sciences, in ESSAYS, v. 1,p. 128.
280. On David Hume, see Robert S. Hill, David Hume (1711-1786), in HISTORY OF
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 66, at 535.
281. The opening paragraph of FederalistNo. 1 (first published on October 27, 1787),
reads,
After an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting Federal Government,
you are called upon to deliberate on the new Constitution for the United States of America.
The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences, nothing less
than the existence of the Union, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed,
the fate of an empire, in many respects, the most interesting in the world. It has been
frequently remarked, that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by
their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are
really capable or not, of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or
whether they are forever destined to depend, for their political constitutions, on accident
and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis, at which we are arrived, may with
propriety be regarded as the area inwhich that decision is to be made; and a wrong election
of the part we shall act, may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general
misfortune of mankind.
Scholars consider both FEDERALIST 1 and FEDERALIST 85 to have been "actually" written by
Alexander Hamilton. Comparesupra note 274.
FederalistNo. 85 was first published on May 28, 1788. Not long after, James Madison was
to assure his Virginia constituency that he would, if elected to the First Congress, press for a
Bill of Rights. Madison is often spoken of, mistakenly, as "the Father of the Constitution." He
can properly be spoken of as "the Father of the Bill of Rights" (with George Mason, also of
Virginia, being its "Grandfather"). See ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION,
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respect to the status of reason in public affairs-the celebration of reason at
the outset of FederalistNo. 1 or its apparent subjugation at the end of No. 85?
Or should it be said that each sentiment was "believed" when it was said?
Is not that the way of the statesman, and properly so? Besides, circumstances
may alter cases. We should be reminded, in any event, that The Federalistis
not "objective" or "dispassionate" political philosophy, nor was it meant to
be. All this should remind us as well how difficult it can be to distinguish
between "constitutional" issues and "political" issues.2" 2
However much "reason and reflection" may seem to be played down in
FederalistNo. 85, in order to discourage immediate reliance upon what we
might call "utopian projects," would not Publius have conceded that whatever
Time and Experience reveal should itself be subjected to "reflection and
choice?"2 3
Publius, we have noticed, was concerned about any measure, advocated
(whether or not in good faith) by those considering the proposed Constitution,
which might threaten the immediate ratification of the Constitution. This
would threaten, in turn, the development of a National Government able to
keep the new Nation together.
Besides, it can also be noticed, the principal opponents of the proposed
Constitution were far less concerned about the lack of a Bill of Rights than
they purported to be. Thus, their use of the Bill of Rights issue was no less
"rhetorical" than Publius's disparagement at that time of bills of rights.
Indeed, we suspect, if a Bill of Rights had originally been included in the
28 4
proposed Constitution, Publius would have had no difficulty justifying it.
The more or less "conservative" approach taken by Publius in Federalist
No. 84 and No. 85, discouraging amendments-before-ratification, is no doubt
defensible. But it, like much else in The Federalist, is crafted for the
situation. That same "conservative" approach, if used more or less

supra note 2, at 13-21, 315-20; infra notes 308 and 382.
282. One of the earliest instances of such difficulty may be seen in the Bank Bill
Controversy of 1791. See George Anastaplo, Abraham Lincoln and the American Regime:
Explorations, 35 VAL. U. L. REv. 39, 151 (2000); see also supra note 277.
For a recent instance of this difficulty of distinguishing between "constitutional" and
"political" issues, see Barbara Crossette, U.S. says UNarms proposal tramples 2dAmendment,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 10, 2001. See ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 2, at 463 (index on the Second Amendment); see also ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN
MORALIST, supra note 3, at 367-74; Editorial, An American Retreat on SmallArms, N.Y. TIMES,
July 11, 2001, at A20.

283. In these matters must there not be recourse ultimately to what was drawn upon by the
Declaration of Independence when it invoked "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God"? On
our natural grounding in nature, see ANASTAPLO, BUT NOT PHILOSOPHY, supra note 3, at 303.
284. See supra note 281. A model of adaptability in these matters is provided by
Shakespeare's Falstaff. See Anastaplo, supra note 142, at 202.
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mechanically, would have questioned the principles and stymied the progress
both of the movement to Independence and of the recourse thereafter to the
Constitutional Convention. "' It was such a "conservative" approach thatmay

285. The principles of the movement to Independence are drawn upon in remarks I had
occasion to prepare for a recent Fourth of July gathering, "On Reading, Once Again, the
Declaration of Independence":
It is again that time of year for celebrating the birth of the United States of America, a
celebration which often includes public readings from the Declaration of Independence.
Most professional speakers on such occasions recognize that the typical audience is likely
to respond favorably only to the opening and closing passages of the Declaration. It is
there that general principles are stated and that decisive actions are announced.
Thus, at the outset of the Declaration there is this solemn invocation:
When in the Course of human Events, it becomes necessary for one People to
dissolve the Political Bands which have connected them with another, and to assume
among the Powers of the Earth, the separate and equal Station to which the Laws of
Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind
requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the Separation.
We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness-That to secure these Rights, Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed.
And at the conclusion of the Declaration it is announced:
That these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, Free and Independent States
...and that [as such] they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract
Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent
States may of right do.
The Declaration of Independence gets to this fateful announcement only after having
drawn upon that great political remedy which we know as "the right of revolution." It had
been said in the Declaration, immediately after it was argued that Governments derive
"their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed," "that whenever any Form of
Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to
abolish it, and to institute new Government. ..
"
The venerable right of revolution can be both threatening and reassuring. It is
threatening because it can seem to undermine long-established ways of life. This can
disturb those conscientious citizens who are concerned, as all everywhere should be, about
Law and Order. But it is reassuring in that it reminds everyone of the natural, if not even
the divinely-ordained, right of a people to good government and of their right as well to
get rid of bad government.
Above all, the right of revolution is an authoritative confirmation that there are indeed
principles of proper government and a good life. It is thereby insisted, in effect, that there
naturally exist standards of good and bad, of right and wrong, which are ultimately
independent of what any particular government might happen to acknowledge, to endorse,
or to act upon.
Often overlooked during ceremonial readings of the Declaration of Independence is the
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be seen in the defective Articles of Confederation as well as, some might say,
in the near-fatal compromises with respect to slavery made in the closing
decades of the Eighteenth Century.2"
The tendency-an almost natural tendency-to elevate our paritisan
positions to constitutional stature was most recently dramatized for us during
the Bush v. Gore election litigation.287 The arguments made on each side, in
November and December 2000, shifted as circumstances changed. This sort
of accommodation to circumstances can sometimes be deliberate
and hence
28
shameless, but more often it is charmingly unconscious.
array of two dozen grievances literally at the core of the document. It is "natural" enough
that this array should be skipped today: many of these grievances are not rhetorically
appealing; some of them seem outdated and otherwise hard to understand. But it is in that
array of grievances that one sees now, as one could see then, how the fundamental
principles invoked at the outset of the document had been violated.
It is important to be reminded that the invocation of principles is not enough: such
invocations have to backed up by facts. Individuals may have rights, of course, but so
does the community at large, including the vital right not to have a decent government
disturbed for "light and transient Causes." It is this distinction that President Lincoln
insisted upon, in 1861, when he argued that the South simply did not have at that timejust
cause for invoking any right of revolution. It is never enough to say, "We don't like what
is happening-and so we quit!"
Thus we can see both in the beginning and in the ending of the Declaration of
Independence the elevated heights to which the proclamation of liberty and the cause of
legitimate government can soar. But we can see at the heart of the Declaration that
disciplined respect for relevant facts upon which a decade of struggle had been grounded
prior to that memorable Fourth of July in 1776.
It is such discipline that political life is always in need of, especially at a time when
there can be a lot of loose talk, some of it even highminded talk, taking the place of
informed and reasoned discourse. The salutary rigor of the authors of the Declaration of
Independence is testified to, therefore, by their allocation of more than half of their
founding constitutional statement to a recital of the grievances which would provide "the
Facts" necessary to "be submitted to a candid World."
On the guidance provided by nature, see supra note 283.
286. John Woolman's gallant career can remind us of what could be said, and said well,
against slavery at that time. See Anastaplo, supra note 26, at 253-95; see also, John Wesley,
Thoughts Upon Slavery, in LIBERTY, EQUALITY & MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note
3 1, at 1, 252-66. For an instructive account of the virtual abolition of slavery and serfdom
worldwide, see J.R. MCNEILL & WILLIAM H. MCNEILL, THE HUMAN WEB 252-58 (2003).
287. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 38 (2000). See also SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL, WHEN
ELECTIONS Go BAD: THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 2000

(2001); Conference on Bush v. Gore. A ConstitutionalRetrospective, 34 LoY. U. CI. L.J. 1-234
(2002); supra note 47; infra note 289.
288. See, e.g., James A. Baker III, Letter to the Editor, Bush v. Gore: The Fateful
Readings, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2001, at A24. Consider the following response by Steven
Shabad:
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This may be seen also in the scholarly commentary upon this litigation.289
m.
The minority of citizens nationwide (sometimes the majority, perhaps, as
at times in New York State), which wanted substantial changes in the
proposed Constitution before its ratification, sensed that it could not get the
amendments it really wanted once the Constitution was ratified. The
amendments "really wanted" by the minority concede, by implication, how
broad and deep the powers of the National Government were intended to be
under the proposed Constitution. 90
The plight of this minority may be gauged by noticing what was and what
was not included in the first set of amendments proposed by Congress to the
States in 1789, that set which we know as the Bill of Rights. The scope and
the limitations of the national Bill of Rights we now have are markedly more
modest than those proposed by the original critics of the Constitution.29
That is, those who wanted amendments prior to the ratification of the
proposed constitution were right about one critical matter: the amendments
that would follow upon ratification would not be fundamental. Almost all of
the Bill of Rights provisions were already, and had long been, the effective

I am gratified that even James A. Baker III, a Bush partisan, now implicitly
acknowledges the political bias of the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore (letter,
July 7). Mr. Baker's remarks that one of the court's two critical decisions was decided by
a 7-to-2 vote, "with one of two Democrats joining six of seven Republicans."
Let's put aside his interesting insight into the party affiliations of all nine justices,
although I'm not aware that they are publicly known. More to the point, I find it both
remarkable and sadly accurate that Mr. Baker cavalierly describes what was supposed to
be a purely legal decision as if it were just another party-line vote-by a politically
lopsided court.
Letter to the Editor, Politics ofBush v. Gore, N.Y. TIMEs, July 10, 2001, at A22.
289. See, e.g., the collection in 68 U.Cl. L. REV. 613-791 (2001). See also supra note
287. It seemed to me, soon after the balloting closed on November 7,2000, that the Presidential
election was, and would continue to be, essentially a draw-and that the best thing for the
country would be an immediate recourse to lots. I made this suggestion inLetters to the Editors
of November 10, 2000. See, e.g., CHICAGO DAELY LAW BULLETIN, Nov. 13, 2000; CHiCAGO
TRIBUNE, Nov. 15, 2000; see also Anastaplo, Bush v. Gore anda ProperSeparationofPowers,
supra note 47, at 132.
290. For the amendment-proposals that came out of the Virginia and New York ratification
conventions, see ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONsTITUTION, supra note 2, at 298314; see also CROSSKEY, POLrnCS AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 12; supra notes 276,
278; infra note 293.
291.

On the Bill of Rights, see ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITuTION,

supra note 2, at 11-106, 315-329. See also Parts 2 and 11 of this Article.
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law of the land among Americans.292
That the amendments proposed by Congress in 1789 were not
fundamental should be apparent upon examining the proposed amendments
generated by the opponents of the Constitution in Virginia and New York, the
proposed amendments that were submitted to Congress along with the
required unqualified ratifications of the Constitution out of those State
conventions. Not one of the scores of proposals from various States that
threatened in any way to reduce the powers granted to the National
Government got far in the First Congress.2 93
In fact, there has never been any amendment to the Constitution that has
reduced, or hedged in, any substantial power that the Framers of the
Constitution intended the Government of the United States to have. If
anything, the powers of the National Government have been magnified
because of the substantial restrictions that have been placed upon the States,
most obviously by means of the Fourteenth Amendment.294 The futility, if
not the folly, of the measures recently incorporated in amendment-proposals
should be evident to anyone who is familiar with how complicated and
somewhat unpredictable the effects of amendments can be.
A substantial anti-Nationalist minority in the Country was
outmaneuvered, if not even suppressed, in 1787-1789. This was anticipated
in how the Constitutional Convention was made up and controlled-and even
in how the pro-Constitution people captured and exploited thereafter the
' That there did remain considerable anti-Nationalist
name of "Federalist."295

292. Thus, little changed when the Bill of Rights was ratified on December 15, 1791 except perhaps for the obviousness of the constitutional principle (antedating the Constitution
itself) that the aggrieved party later invoked (unsuccessfully) in Barron v. Baltimore. That
principle, properly understood, could lead oneto wonder whetherBarron was correctly decided.
See infra note 294; see also Anastaplo, Law, Judges, andthe Principlesof Regimes, supranote
38, at 519.
293. See supra note 290. The Virginia and New York proposals drew upon proposals
made by opponents of the Constitution in other State Ratifying Conventions (such as
Massachusetts). All but a dozen or so of those proposals were set aside by the First Congress.
The politicians who controlled the 1787 Constitutional Convention, and thereafter the
ratification process, were also in control of the First Congress-and they had no intention of
surrendering by amendments what they had secured in the Convention and during the
Ratification Campaign. Certainly, they believed that the majority should be able to rule-and
to rule effectively. See supra note 272.
294. In effect, the Fourteenth Amendment reversed Barron v. Baltimore. See supra note
292.
295. The term "federal" is never used in the Constitution of 1787. It is used in the
Confederate Constitution of 1861, beginning with its significant use in the revamped Preamble:
We, the people of the Confederate States, each State acting in its sovereign and
independent character, in order to form a permanent federal government, establish justice,
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passion to be dealt with eventually may be seen in the recourse that the
successors to the "Anti-Federalists" have had to constitutional restructuring,
first by way of constitutional interpretation, then, by way of attempted
Secession, and thereafter again by way of constitutional interpretation.296
Indications of the kind of amendments sought by some in 1787-1789 may
be seen in the changes made, in 1861, when the Confederate States adapted
to their use the Constitution of 1787.297 Something of that 1861 spirit,
without the underlying dedication to the cause of slavery, may be seen in
recent judicial attempts to curb the powers of the National Government under
the Commerce Clause.29 But these attempts are likely to be superseded or
made obsolete by global technological and social developments that will
make it generally obvious (if it is not already apparent) that the American
economy has to be subject, as much as possible, to the discretion of the
National Government.'"
Critical to our approach to these matters should be a recognition of the
difficulty, several times referred to on this occasion, of distinguishing
constitutional judgments from political judgments. Our periodic amendmentproposals agitations remind us that constant efforts do have to be made to
distinguish the constitutional from the political. These worthy efforts have
been enhanced by the Constitution Project, with its salutary advocacy of
restraint upon recourse to constitutional amendments.30 0
It should also be recognized, however, that even the recent amendmentproposals agitation is a perverse tribute to the Constitution itself, however
much that document might seem to be assaulted by so many campaigns for
"reform." It seems to be assumed, that is, that if one's moral or political
position can somehow be incorporated in the Constitution, then that position

insure domestic tranquility, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our
posterity-invoking the favor and guidance of Almighty God-do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the Confederate States of America.
See infra note 297.
296. The Flag can stir emotions-but not as deeply as slavery once did (pro and con) and
as abortion can still do (again, pro and con). See Part 12 of this Article.
297. On the Confederate Constitution, see ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTrUTION OF 1787, at
125-34, 341-61.
298. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see also Anastaplo,
"McCarthyism," The Cold War, and Their Aftermath, 43 S.D. L. REV. 103, 152-53 (1998).
299. This is not to deny that the National Government, and especially the Congress which
is ultimately in control when it wants to be, may make mistakes. One mistake to be guarded
against is that of keeping a properly-constituted majority from ruling. See supra note 273 and
accompanying text; see also supra note 293.
300. See supra note 267. Particularly to be noticed, among the "Members of Citizens for
the Constitution," are the Co-Chairs, Mickey Edwards and Abner J. Mikva; the Legal Advisor,
Louis Michael Seidman; and the Executive Director, Virginia E. Sloan.
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is bound to be generally accepted as truly good.3"' Of course, one does tend
to want one's own fundamental revision of the Constitution to be the last.30 2
30 3
11. NATIONAL COURTS AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS

All that is valuable in the United States Constitution is one
thousand years old.
Wendell Phillips

31

We are again challenged to think about what we have "always known,"
or have30 long
believed ourselves to know, about the courts and the Bill of
5
Rights.

The First Congress drafted and circulated among the State legislatures the
initial constitutional amendments primarily in response to demands that had
been made in some quarters during the Ratification Campaign for a bill of
rights. Even so, some critics of the Constitution, including a few who had
been the most outspoken about the need for a bill of rights, were anything but
happy with the amendment-proposals that Congress turned up with in 1789.
What Congress supplied simply did not provide these critics what they really
301. On the aspirations and follies of relying upon a constitutional amendment to promote
Prohibition, see ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 195.
See also WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE.
302. All men, Aristotle has taught us, aim for the good. See the Conclusion of this Article.
But, we know from experience (as Aristotle did also), the aim of some is better than that of
others. It can be instructive to compare the aim of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment
with the aim of the drafters of the 1861 proposal by Congress which would have been the
Fourteenth Amendment had it been ratified: "No amendment shall be made to the Constitution
which will authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with
the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws
of said State." ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 299. This proposed
amendment of 1861 was intended to assure the Southern States, who were then attempting to
leave the Union, that there would never be any fundamental revision of the Constitution that
would put their institution of slavery in jeopardy. But astute Southerners recognized that no
form of words, even if incorporated in the Constitution, would suppress for long the steadily
growing moral condemnation of slavery in the United States. Or, to paraphrase something once
said about the Sabbath, 'The Constitution was made for Man, not Man for the Constitution."
See infra note 385.
303. A paper prepared for the Georgetown Institute for the Study of Politics Panel (The
Justiciabilityofthe Bill ofRights), Annual Convention, American Political Science Association,
Washington, D.C., August 31, 1991.
304. Wendell Phillips, Speech, Boston, Mass., (Feb. 17, 1861).
305. On the Bill of Rights, see ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 2, at 11-46; Parts 2 and 3 of this Article.
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wanted, which was (it became evident) not so much a bill of rights as it was
a curtailment of the substantive powers of Congress, something that the First
Congress had no intention of permitting.3 °6
Once the Bill of Rights we now have was ratified, public complaints
about the lack of a bill of right, naturally subsided. The political energies that
had been expended on the curtailment of the much-enhanced powers of the
new National Government were then directed to political, as distinguished
from constitutional, issues. This can be said to have led to the electoral
"revolution" of 1800, helped along by Federalist miscalculations with respect
to the 1798 Alien and Sedition Laws.3 7
The more astute political observers between 1787 and 1791 seem to have
anticipated that the drafting of a Bill of Rights would change nothing but the
form of organizing some of the opposition to the Constitution of 1787. My
impression is that few if any citizens noticed a difference, once the Bill of
Rights was ratified,30 8 especially since almost all of its provisions confirmed
rights, privileges, and immunities that had been long recognized in America.
The effects of such provisions had been expected and enjoyed for decades in
America, as in Great Britain, sometimes without the authority of formal
written declarations.30 9
Most of the Bill of Rights was intended to guide and limit the courts.
That is, the amendments recognized (in some cases refined) rights and
practices that all courts in the United States, not only the national courts, had
previously respected. Such guidance for and by the courts did not depend on
or require judicial review as we know it. When judicial review does appear
in its 1803 Marbury v. Madison form,3 ' the Supreme Court did not rely on
any provision of the Bill of Rights. I mention in passing that the reading in
Marbury of the "original jurisdiction" provision in Article Ill of the
Constitution may be mistaken.3 ' I also venture to notice that what I have said
3" may be far
thus far can even be taken to suggest that Barron v. Baltimore

306.
293.
307.

On the more substantial amendments sought for by some, see supra notes 290 and
On the Alien and Sedition Acts, see 2 LIBERTY, EQUAUTY, & MODERN

supra note 31, at 26. Those laws, which did have an expiration date, were
repudiated at the polls rather than in the courts or by constitutional amendments.
308. Ratification was completed on December 15, 1791, appropriately enough by James
Madison's State of Virginia. See supra note 281.
309. Of course, some of those rights could be found by the British in documents such as
Magna Carta (1215), The Petition of Right (1628), and the English Bill of Rights (1689). See
CONSTITUTIONALISM,

ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 244, 259,263; see also

supra note 48.
310. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
311.

See, e.g.,

ANASTAPLO,

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 139-43.

312. 32 U.S. 243 (1833). See Part 2 ofthis Article; Anastaplo, supra note 38, at 519.
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more questionable then it is generally taken by legal scholars to be.
Gary Glenn has pointed out for us that the United States Supreme Court
did not begin to talk much about the Bill of Rights as an entity until late in the
Nineteenth Century.3" 3 This is approximately the same time that the
Fourteenth Amendment began to emerge as a powerful constitutional
provision."" Once people had gotten used to the notion that the Fourteenth
Amendment brought privileges and immunities, or liberties, to bear upon the
States, they were able to regard the initial amendments as a body-and so the
term "Bill of Rights" appeared in judicial opinions. In common discourse,
including political talk, that term had been used for almost a century to refer
to those initial amendments. It may be that judges also began to use the "Bill
of Rights" term as a way of introducing the question of what was to be
"incorporated" into the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. a" 5
The growing judicial emphasis upon the Bill of Rights after passage of
the Fourteenth Amendment may also reflect a shift in the status of the rights
it protects. Just as the English Bill of Rights of 1689 confirmed what had
been developed over centuries,3 16 so the national Bill of Rights in the United
States confirmed protections that Americans already expected. The great
rights and immunities had been developed in large part by the workings of
common-law judges. Additionally, the growing judicial emphasis, since the
late Nineteenth Century, upon the Bill of Rights is related to that steady
depreciation of the National Courts as common law tribunals.3" 7
It is possible that the growing judicial emphasis on the Bill of Rights may
reflect a shift toward a positivistic orientation in jurisprudence. The great
rights of the English-speaking peoples were once important, and had their
effects, not primarily because of the occasional formal enactment that
confirmed them. Rather, those rights had been developed by the courts and
by legislatures sitting as constitution-shaping assemblies. When rights are
developed in this way, they are much more likely to be thought of as natural
or, at least, as intrinsically related to a particular kind of regime. If
positivism3"' becomes the mode of the day, much more is apt to be made of

313. Professor Glenn is a member of the Political Science Department at Northern Illinois
University. See Anastaplo, Law, Judges, and the Principlesof Regimes, supra note 38, Part 4
(discussing another paper by Professor Glenn).
314. See ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 458.
315. See id. at 457 (on the dubious readings of the Due Process Clause resorted to,
somewhat out of necessity).
316. See supra note 309.
317. On Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, see ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 458; ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supra note 2,
at 333; Anastaplo, Law, Judges, and the Principlesof Regimes, supra note 38, Part 8.
318. On positivism, see ANASTAPLO, HuMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supranote 4, at 329; see
also Part 8 of this Article, Appendix A.
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particular enactments that seem to legitimize them.
But even the positivists, in making as much as they do of specific actions
as the basis of authority, somehow rely upon principles which cannot
themselves rest upon positive enactments. Or, to put all this still another way,
virtually everyone relies upon some form or another of natural right in his
calculations-with the critical difference here being between those who know
what they are doing so and those who do not know." 9
12. THE FLAG DESECRATION AMENDMENT

320

The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the
Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive
and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the
several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation to
support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be
required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust
under the United States.
32
United States Constitution '

I.
Once upon a time Robert R. McCormick, publisher of the Chicago
Tribune, was perhaps the most influential journalist in this country and a
leading figure in the conservative wing of the Republican Party, perhaps even
as conservative at times as the Politics Department of this University. He
was in unquestioned command of the Tribune, then as now one of the great
newspapers in the United States. So firm was his control that he could even
institute unilateral reforms in the spellings of words used in his paper,3 22 at
least so long as he lived.
One day (I have heard) Colonel McCormick, while presiding over an
editorial board meeting at the Tribune Tower on North Michigan Avenue in
Chicago, became so incensed with something one State's Legislature had
done that he ordered that State's star to be immediately cut out of the

319. On natural right, see ANASTAPLO, BUT NOT PHILOSOPHY, supra note 3, at 323.
320. A talk given at the Constitution Day Banquet, Politics Department, The University
of Dallas, Irving, Texas, September 17, 1995. See 141 CONG. REC. E1956-57 (Daily Ed.
October 18, 1995) (statement of Rep. Jacobs); 141 CONG. REC. S 16676 (Daily Ed. November
3, 1995) (statement of Sen. Simon).
321. U.S. Constitution art. VI.
322. Since Colonel McCormick's death, the Chicago Tribune has reverted to the use of
conventional spellings.
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American flag in the main lobby of the Tribune Tower.323 Of course, the
Colonel's editors were disturbed by this turn of events, but they knew he was
not a man to be contradicted when his passions were aroused.
Still, one of them did venture to wonder out loud, however deferentially,
whether there was a law against thus evicting a State from the Union. The
Colonel, upon hearing the query about the relevant law, ordered the
newspaper's lawyers to be consulted right on the spot.
All of them, including the Colonel, could of course hear the critical
question asked from their end of the telephone conversation that followed:
"Is there any law against cutting a star out of the Flag?" The senior partner
at the other end of the line, who must have suffered considerably at times as
one of the Colonel's lawyers, was so agitated by this unexpected question
that his shouted response could be heard by everyone in the room: "Oh, for
Heaven's sakes, what blasted fool would want to cut a star out of the
Flag?!" 3'24 I do not know what happened thereafter either to that lawyer or to
the flag in the Tribune lobby at the hands of Colonel McCormick. I do know
that this episode can serve to remind us that the Flag can be abused in a
variety of ways, most if not all of them well-intentioned.
The Constitution, too, can be abused at times. Particularly notorious
have been the decisions by the United States Supreme Court in the pre-Civil
War Dred Scott case,32 in the post-Civil War pro-segregation cases,326 and
in a century of challenges to Congress's power to regulate commerce among
the States.327 Many today would add to this list the Court's abortion
decisions in recent decades.32 We should not be surprised that the Supreme Court makes mistakes. We
all do, not least when we act through one or another of the branches of our
governments. It has always been difficult to determine what should be done
about misinterpretations by the Supreme Court. This question includes the
issue of what the authority of the Court should be when it reads the
Constitution differently from the other two branches of the National

323. There is an ironic touch to this story that probably no one noticed at the time. The
Colonel's grandfather, who founded the Chicago Tribune, had been a supporter of his fellow
Illinoisan, Abraham Lincoln, a champion of keeping all States in the Union.
324. The language used by the lawyer in conveying these sentiments was much stronger
than this.
325. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). On Dred Scott, see supra
note 90; infra note 336.
326. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 3 (1883); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883); ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTrTUTION, supra note 2, at 456, 462.
327. On conmerce and the commerce power, see ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787,
supra note 2, at 332.
328. On the abortion decisions, see ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 2, at 455.
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Government.3 29 Far less difficult to determine is what should happen when
the Supreme Court's reading of the Constitution differs from the reading by
any State government.33 °
The American people have, at least until quite recently, been reluctant to
resort to constitutional amendments in order to correct even obvious judicial
misinterpretations of the Constitution. Of the twenty-seven amendments
which we have had, only four of them represent (at least in part)
Congressional efforts to reverse judicial interpretations: the Eleventh
Amendment (of 1798) with respect to the judicial power of the United States,
the first sentence in the Fourteenth Amendment (of 1868) with respect to a
critical DredScott ruling, the Sixteenth Amendment (of 1913) with respect
to the power of Congress to levy an income tax, and the Twenty-sixth
Amendment (of 1971) with respect to eighteen-year-olds suffrage. The
attempt to ratify an amendment (proposed in 1921) empowering Congress to
regulate child labor proved unnecessary when the Supreme Court reversed
itself on this issue. 33' A related, but far more important, reversal came with
the Court's eventual recognition of a Congressional Commerce Power which
resurrected the expansive spirit of Chief Justice Marshall with respect to this
issue.332
During the first decade after the 1973 Roe v. Wade3 3 3 abortion decision,
there was serious talk about a constitutional amendment reaffirming the longaccepted powers of the States to regulate abortions. But it soon became
evident that such an amendment could not muster the support it would need
either in Congress (two-thirds of each house) or in the States (three-fourths
of their legislatures). It has also become evident that a constitutional
amendment would have little effect on the abortion rate.334 The sustained
outbreaks of abortion, as well as illegitimacy, worldwide should remind us
that neither the Constitution nor the Supreme Court's reading of it is
ultimately responsible for such problems in our time.3"
One consequence of a technology-based nullification of government
power to supervise abortion and birth-control measures may be the
involuntary liberation of those troubled souls who have long felt,
understandably enough, that they should dedicate themselves wholeheartedly
to political and social actions (including constitutional amendments) so long
329.

Consider the care with which the Veto Power of the President is provided for. See
1787, supra note 2, at 339.
On the Supremacy Clause, see id. at 338.
These are the Eleventh, Fourteenth, Sixteenth, and Twenty-sixth Amendments.
For the 1924 proposals, see ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supra note 2,

ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF

330.
331.
332.
at 299.
333.
334.
335.

410 U.S. 113 (1973). See supra note 328.

See, e.g.,

ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORALIST, supra note 3, at 399.

On abortion, see id. at 603.
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as it seemed possible to do something about what they consider terrible
deeds.33 6 Now these latter-day Abolitionists will have to devote themselves
almost exclusively to education and social programs, to persuasion, and
perhaps above all to prayer, in order to deal responsibly with what they must
still consider a desperate situation. 37
II.
Even so, there is something touching in the form that the faith which
many have in the Constitution can take; a change in the Constitution, they
seem to believe, can cure this or that distressing problem.33 8 They do not
realize that if the Constitution should come to be readily adapted to changing
circumstances it would lose much of its dignity and power. That is, there
may well be something to the recent complaint (albeit by a partisan
Democratic member of the House of Representatives) that some of her
colleagues are treating the Constitution as though it were "a rough draft."3'39
It can be instructive as well as troublesome to confront the recent
indulgence in attempts at constitutional amendments. In virtually every
instance since the 1971 eighteen-year-olds-vote amendment (the Twentysixth Amendment), the more strenuously advocated amendments, if ratified,
either would have had no appreciable effect or would have done considerable
harm (in addition to the danger of teaching people to treat the Constitution
like a mere statute).
The most illustrious thus far of these recent exercises in constitutional
frivolity is one that has been enshrined in the Constitution, the Twentyseventh Amendment "ratified" in 1992, only two hundred and three years
after it was originally sent out to the States for ratification by the First
Congress. It provides: "No law varying the compensation for the services
of the Senators and Representatives shall take effect until an election of
Representatives shall have intervened." 4" The mode of completing
ratification of this amendment, so long after its original submission to the

336. They are, in some respects, in the same "situation" in which the early Nineteenth
Century American Abolitionists found themselves. Certainly, the use of the courts by
Abolitionists seemed to make matters worse. See supra note 325.
337. On the anti-slavery abolitionists, see ANASTAPLO, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 3,
at 361.
338. See, e.g., Part 10 of this Article.
339. Richard E.Cohen, In Charge ofConstitutionalChange, THENAT'LJ., June 24, 1995,
at 1669 (quoting Patricia Schroeder).
340. This had been one of the twelve amendments proposed by Congress iAi1789, ten of
which became the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTrru rON, supra note 2, at 326-29.

HeinOnline -- 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 831 2002-2003

TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 70:737

States, was rather dubious. 4 ' The official acquiescence in this "ratification"
reflected an awareness of the popular discontent with Congress at the time.
The rule laid down in this amendment is defensible-but it was hardly
needed in the light of the general practice of Congress for two centuries now
of having its pay increases take effect for the succeeding Congress. Even the
Equal Rights Amendment proposed in 1972, which would have served as a
grace note for the Constitution, now seems superfluous also. It has been
virtually implemented in effect by many statutes and judicial interpretations
on behalf of women. Our experience with the proposed Equal Rights
Amendment has been somewhat like that with the proposed Child Labor
Amendment more than a half century before. 42
I have suggested that an Abortion Amendment would not "work," even
if it could be ratified. The same should be said about the proposed Balanced
Budget Amendment.3 43 Whether a balanced budget is a good thing for the
country depends in part upon circumstances-but it has long been hard for
me to see how a constitutional amendment would bring about such
balancing. 3" (I have discussed this matter at length in my constitutional
commentaries. The best argument for such an amendment that I know is that
Senator Paul Simon, who grew up as I did in southern Illinois, has advocated
it.)
So much, at least for the time being, for the amendments that would not
work. Then there are the proposed amendments that could "work"--and that
we would come to regret in their operations. First, there is a School Prayer
Amendment. The Supreme Court may well have been mistaken in its
interpretations here and elsewhere of the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment since the Second World War." s But, in our present
circumstances, legislative or other official battles over the appropriate
prayers for school children are not likely to be edifying, especially as
demands come to be made for equal time for all kinds of bizarre cults. When
Johnny comes home with a heretical prayer he has been taught at school, to

341. Such frivolity is prevented by the Congressional practice, initiated in the Twentieth
Century, of providing a period in which the ratification of a proposed amendment must take
place to be effective.
342.

See supra note 322.

343. See ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supranote 2, at 206 (for
excerpts from the version of the Balanced Budget Amendment approved by the House of
Represenatives on January 26, 1995); see also infra note 346.
344. On balanced-budget amendments, see ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 455; ANASTAPLo, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supra note 2,
at 331; see also infra note 346.
345. On religious liberty and the Constitution, see ANASTAPLO, THEAMENDMENTSTOTmE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 463; ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supra note 2,

at 337.
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say nothing of a blood-curdling Satanic incantation, his parents' enthusiasm
for school prayers is likely to be moderated.
Also likely to be moderated is the enthusiasm of citizens for term
limitations once they see what happens when Congress (and hence the
country) comes to be run by amateurs--or by the bureaucrats and lobbyists
upon whom desperate amateurs will have to rely for guidance.346 It is

346.
The following Memorandum, "To Amend Means to Improve," which I prepared a
decade ago, examines the limits and risks of constitutional amendments:
"To Amend" Means "To Improve"
The considerable talk we hear these days about a balanced-budget amendment and about
a legislative term-limitation amendment challenges constitutional scholars and other
citizens respectful of the integrity of the Constitution.
Both amendments would probably be troublesome if ever ratified. The first would be
troublesome because it is an exercise in constitutional frivolity that is not likely to work
and may thereby disillusion and demoralize people. The second is troublesome because
it is likely to work, thereby crippling the Government ofthe United States. It does not help
matters that the principal balanced-budget proposal currently before Congress contains
language that invites confusion and litigation. It is also language that is singularly
unfelicitous for permanent enshrinement in the Constitution.
Those who recognize how a balanced-budget amendment could readilybe circumvented
by both the Congress and the Executive suggest other ways of accomplishing such an
amendment's proper purposes. One suggestion is that a limitation be placed upon the
amount of taxation that is permitted annually. But circumvention is likely here also, as
may be seen in how State governments have had to work their way around such limitations.
In fact, no mechanical rule or formula can take the place of sound political judgment by
both the people and their governments, National as well as State, if there is to be sound
guidance of the economy and of social relations in varying circumstances. Such guidance
depends upon sensible assessments not only of the causes and consequences of deficits but
also of the costs, consequences, and desirability of balancing the national budget at any
particular time. Here, as elsewhere, myths and misinformation have to be reckoned with.
Many of these questions about economic and fiscal (and hence social) policies are better
addressed directly, and preferably by legislators, as circumstances change.
A curious aspect of any balanced-budget debate always is that two-thirds of each House
of Congress can be pressed to vote for a constitutional amendment that might eventually
"require" a balanced national budget, while at the same time a simple majority of each
House could at once vote for a balanced budget during any session of Congress if so
minded.
Those who recognize that term limitations for legislators can truly be crippling look to
other remedies to deal with what they conceive to be the underlying problems. One set of
remedies has to do with changes that could reduce the advantages of incumbency,
including severe limitations upon political contributions and campaign expenditures. (A
reconsideration by the United States Supreme Court of its unfortunate First Amendment
rulings with respect to these matters should be encouraged. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 [ 1976].) Most of these remedies, too, are more appropriate for legislation than
for constitutional amendments, especially since occasional experiments and periodic
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somewhat reassuring that the Republican leadership of the current Congress
has had enough sense to reconsider its 1994 campaign promises with respect
to term limitations. This reminds us how maturity and self-interest can
sometimes work together for the common good.
II.
The proposed Flag-Burning Amendment, which has been advocated at
one time or another by forty-nine state legislatures, is another example of an
amendment that falls short of great and extraordinary occassions 47 The
proposal for such an amendment arose after the Supreme Court released its
opinion in Texas v. Johnson. 48 That case originated with a deplorable
political protest by one Gregory Lee Johnson here in Dallas during the 1984
Republican National Convention. The Court divided 5 to 4, holding that
states cannot make flag-burning illegal. 49 Still, I should say that certain
public acts-like burning flags, conducting street marches, and spending
large sums of money on political campaigns-are more than the speech

revisions are apt to be needed.
It is often said that those who hold legislative offices today are virtually impossible to
remove. But this is not, as many seem to believe, because incumbents are immune from
public scrutiny and control. On the contrary, incumbents these days tend to be very
sensitive, perhaps unduly so, to the opinions of their constituents. Indicative of what has
long been happening is the fact that incumbents do say quite different things about the
issues of the day, depending on precisely where they happen to be from and what part of
the electorate they rely upon. Public-opinion polling makes it easier for each incumbent
to tailor his words and deeds to the opinions and immediate desires of his constituents.
Would members of Congress, knowing that they can serve for only a few more years once
they finally manage to "learn the ropes," be inclined to devote themselves wholeheartedly
to their demanding duties, unconcerned about preparing the way for their subsequent
careers? And do we truly want amateurs in charge of our affairs?
It is likely, in any event, that most if note all of the constitutional amending agitated for
from time to time (including such things as the line-item veto) would be much better dealt
with through legislation which can be readily adjusted and, if need be, improved or even
repealed as circumstances change.
See 141 Cong. Rec. E739-40 (Daily Ed. Mar. 30, 1995)(statement byRep. PatsyT. Mink); CI.
DAILY L. BULL, April 22, 1995, at 26. It is somewhat reassuring that the Republican Party
leadership in Congress has had enough sense, in recent years, to reconsider its 1994 campaign
promises with respect to term limitations. This reminds us how maturity and self-interest can
sometimes work together for the common good. See supra note 94.
347. See supra text accompanying note 272.
348. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
349. The vigorously conservative Justice Scalia voted with the majority to invalidate the
State law in this case. Id. at 398. On this Justice, see George Anastaplo, In reAntonin Scalia,
28 PERSPECTIVES INPOUTICAL SCIENCE 22 (1999).
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protected by the First Amendment, however much they are intended to
support or even to express political sentiments. Such conduct can be highly
provocative and otherwise disruptive, and as such should be subject to
regulation by any government properly concerned about domestic tranquility
and political propriety. The flag-burner, in any event, should not be surprised
by the passions he arouses.
However well-intentioned those citizens may be, the effect of such
amendments can be that of desecrating the Constitution. The proposed Flag
Desecration Amendment proposal read, "The Congress and the States shall
have power to prohibit the physical desecration of the flag of the United
States."35 An inventory of the difficulties with this proposal can well begin
with the observation that heretofore the Constitution has been the only thing
held -up in the Constitution itself as virtually sacred, with even an oath to
" ' Certainly, the Flag
support it prescribed by the Framers.35
was never thus
provided for, however unfortunate (if not even insulting and otherwise
despicable) certain conduct directed at the Flag may be.
IV.
There are a number of serious problems with various proposed Flag
Desecration Amendment. The most serious problem is that the proposed
amendment virtually implies that all other forms of desecration are to be
considered generally immune from any governmental supervision.3 52 The
amendment could inadvertently confirm a long-term tendency to deprive the
sacred of all government support and protection. That is, the amendment
effectively tells us that unless government is explicitly authorized by the
Constitution to prohibit a particular form of desecration, it cannot act without
some other reason, such as injury to property or a breach of the peace. We
certainly do not want to immunize those that desecrate through hate speech,
cemetery vandalization, or defacing of religious symbols.3 53
V.
One question that the prudent citizen should be asking here is whether
350. Flag Desecration Resolution, H.R.J. Res. 79, 104th Cong. (1995). Is the Eighteenth
Amendment the only amendment which explicitly empowers both Congress and the States with
respect to any matter?
351. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 1, art. VI.
352. Thus, an intriguing exercise in documentary interpretation can be developed here.
Would it then be understood, for example, that the desecration of the Constitution, despite its
required support by various officers of government, could not be legislated against?
353. On hate speech and related matters, see GEORGE ANASTAPLO, CAMPUS HATE SPEECH
CODES, NATuRAL RIGHT, AND TWENTIETH CENTURY ATROCrnTES (1999).
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there is a serious problem deserving the attention of a constitutional
amendment. What is the harm being addressed by such an amendment?
Perhaps no more than a dozen flag-burnings in a bad year. Whether it is a
bad year depends, in large part, upon the publicity available for flagburners-and that depends, in turn, upon whether a burning is apt to provoke
an indictment and then a prosecution. The Supreme Court's decision in
Texas v. Johnson already serves to discourage flag-burning. If nothing is
done to amend the Constitution here, things will probably remain as they are
now. It should be recognized, by the way, that the deliberate flag-burner
these days runs the risk these days of being immediately manhandled by the
citizens in his vicinity that he dares to offend.
It is odd in any event to be as concerned as we can be about something
so rare and usually so inconsequential as flag-burning when so much else is
permitted to corrupt us unimpeded, beginning with the blatant sexual and
violent indulgences portrayed by the mess media.35 Symptomatic of this
deterioration is the headline in this morning in a local paper: "TV, movies
test sex's appeal to mainstream audiences: As barriers fall, many wonder,
'
what's next?"355
Constitutional government cannot be expected to prosper
if our citizen body should be rendered unfit by having its passions and
sensibilities twisted out of shape. Once this happens it will not do much
good-and indeed may even make matters worse-to rely more and more
upon our criminal justice system to subject ourselves once again to a proper
discipline (especially when, as now, that system is overworked because of a
deeply-flawed drugs-control policy). 56 Nor will it do any good, and may
make matters even worse, to rely more and more upon private arsenals to
protect ourselves from the consequences of the degradation of all too many
of our fellow citizens. 7
In critical respects the Pro-Choice people and the Pro-Guns people share
a somewhat naive reliance upon extremist self-help principles grounded in
uninhibited property rights. 358 This sort of thing is reflected as well in such
displays as the shameless advertisements by tobacco companies which are
designed to trap impressionable youngsters in a deadly addiction. 359 A selfrespecting and self-confident community should be able to supervise, with a
view to the common good, the uses (private as well as public) of all of the
354.

See ANASTAPLO, HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 4, at 117-38 (discussing

obsescenity).
355. Tom Maurstad & Beth Pinsker, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 17, 1995, at IA.
356. See, e.g., George Anastaplo, Governmental Drug-Testing and the Sense of
Community, 11 NOVA L. REV. 295 (1987).
357.

On gun control, see ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra

note 2, at 459; ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORALIST, supra note 4, at 367.
358. See supra Parts 2 and 3 of this Article; infra note 360.
359. See, e.g., Your Basic 3-Piece Suit, PARADE MAGAZINE, Sept. 17, 1995, at 20.
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property that it makes possible and protects.36°
VI.
The Texas v. Johnson decision turned on a reading of the First
Amendment. Although I continue to have reservations about that reading, it
should be acknowledged that there was something valid in what the majority
of the Supreme Court said on that occasion. There is a serious First
Amendment problem whenever only a few of many instances of any type of
offensive action are selected for prosecution-those few which are
accompanied by, or are understood to convey, sentiments particularly
disliked by the local prosecutor or by his constituents.
There are lots of offensive things done with the Flag these days, most of
them much more serious, ifonly because they are much more pervasive, than
what results from a rare flag-burning. We have learned to put up with
considerable routine abuse of the Flag, much of it for commercial purposes.
This epidemic of flag abuse is rather sad, especially when I remember how
we used to cheer the Flag when it appeared in movie theatre newsreels during
the Second World War.36'
Be that as it may, the Congressional proponents of the contemplated Flag
Desecration Amendment assure us that it is not intended to repeal the First
Amendment. This means that critical freedom-of-speech challenges will be
posed whenever prosecutors can be shown to ignore almost all flag
desecrations but those accompanying or expressing political sentiments they
find personally offensive. Equal protection challenges can also be expected
to highly selective enforcement of State laws.362

Traffic laws, for example, are clearly constitutional. Yet the policeman
who stops only those speeders displaying bumper stickers he does not like
can expect to have his policy of selective enforcement seriously challenged
on several constitutional grounds. The fact that there is a constitutional
amendment authorizing a general enforcement policy may not matter. We
once had a Prohibition Amendment-but if a prosecutor had enforced
substantial
prohibition laws only against his political opponents,
3 63
constitutional challenges should have been expected.

360.
Article.

See ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTIONALIST, supra note 2, at 819; Parts 2 and 3 of this

See ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORALIST, supra note 4, at x, xiii.
On the equality principle and the Equal Protection Clause, see ANASTAPLO, THE
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 458; ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN
MORAUST, supra note 4, at 609.
363. All this is aside from the technical problems of what "the flag of the United States"
should be taken to mean and how "physical desecration" should be understood. What, for

361.

362.
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VII.
I have used the current Flag Desecration Amendment campaign to
suggest what the Constitution should mean to us. In this way, at least, even
this misguided campaign can be put to salutary use. Much of what I have
said about how the Constitution needs to be treated should be apparent to
more mature members of Congress. They should know that a cheap form of
patriotism is being indulged in by some of their amendments-hungry
colleagues at the risk of disfiguring the Constitution itself. All this should
remind us of how a disciplined and sensible legislative body operates. For
one thing, it keeps many excesses safely under control in its committees,
having learned long ago how public opinion can be misled.3 "
I should like to pay special tribute to one member of the House of
Representatives, a Democrat from Indiana, Andrew Jacobs, who tried to
salvage something from his colleagues' recent stampede by offering to add
to the Flag Desecration Amendment the provision that the spending of money
for the election of public officials no longer be considered constitutionallyprotected speech either.365 He reminded us thereby of still another
unfortunate First Amendment reading by the Supreme Court, its 1976 ruling
in Buckley v. Valeo. a" That ruling undermined what Congress had tried to
do, a generation ago, to control campaign financing in this country. I
continue to believe that the First Amendment should not be understood to
keep us from experimenting with reasonable measures to prevent our
elections from being bought367-or from seeming to be bought by excessive
expenditures of funds, whether by private persons, by
3 6corporations, unions,
and other organizations, or by the government itself.
But even the serious mistake by the Supreme Court in the Buckley does
not warrant a constitutional amendment. Rather Congress should try again
and again-and we in turn should all try to help the Court to recognize what

example, can be done with a protestor who displays a flag that is cancelled like the flags we are
accustomed to seeing on postage stamps-or with a protestor who bums publicly a blow-up of
cancelled flag-decorated postage stamps. Would it matter if the burning was of a blow-up of

uncancelled flag-decorated postage stamps?
364. On the uses of prudence, see ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORALIST, supra note 4,
at 618; infra note 418. See also the Introduction and the Conclusion of this Article.
365. See 141 CONG. REC. H176 (January 4, 1995).
366. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
367. For recent experiments here, see the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of
2001. It maybe that such measures are not apt to be effective until the general political morale
in this country is elevated-and then, it can be argued, such measures would not be needed.
368. One can be reminded of governmental excesses here when one sees how the hearts
and minds of American citizens can be recruited in the promotion and conduct of dubious
military campaigns.
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it too should want to recognize: the true reading of the Constitution.
69
13. THE USE AND ABUSE OF THE FEDERALIST3

The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible
Union, composed of indestructible States.
Salmon P. Chase

370

The Federalistis a much-praised book, the importance of which is hard
to exaggerate.371 It can even be argued that Publius,372 the author of this
collection of eighty-five newspaper articles, is our first great political
scientist. That Publius is obviously partisan in "his" discourses does not
detract from "his" stature as a student of politics, for it can be suspected that
the political observer who is completely neutral (or, as we say today, "nonjudgmental") in his accounts is not a reliable participant in serious political
affairs.
It is only after we recognize that Publius was truly political, and hence
partisan, that we can make proper use of The Federalist. A significant clue
to the "situation" in New York in 1787 is provided by the array of signatures
appended, on September 17, 1787, to the final draft of the Constitution
prepared by the Constitutional Convention. The signatures are presented as
those of witnesses. Since the delegates did not sign on behalf of their States,
the signatures do no more than testify that this is indeed the document that
had been consented to by all of "the States present" on this occasion. 373 The
primary purpose for choosing this form for signatures seems to have been that
it permitted delegates to sign, even if they did not fully endorse the text of the
Constitution. Another consequence of this form is of immediate interest for
us: it permitted someone-in this case Alexander Hamilton-to sign as a
delegatefrom New York.
Hamilton could not have signed on behalf of New York, however his
signatures may have appeared to many casual readers of the Constitution. For
the last two months of the Convention, New York had not had a sufficient
369. A talk given to Professor Thomas Engeman's class in the Political Science
Department of Loyola University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, February 22, 2001.
370. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868) (Chase, C.J.). Compare the
Calhoun sentiment in infra note 385.
371. For discussions of The Federalist,see George Anastaplo, The Constitution at Two
Hundred: Explorations, 22 TEX. TECH L. REv. 967, 1042-53 (1991); supra Part 10 of this
Article.
372. See supra note 274. Publius, it can be said, makes some arguments that Alexander
Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison would not be apt to make in their own name.
373. See ANASTAPLO, THE CoNSTrTUTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 219-21.
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number of its three-member delegation present for the vote of that State to be
cast.3 74 Delegates could speak on the floor of the Convention, even when
their State delegation was divided or could not vote for lack of a quorum.
Delegates could also serve as witnesses at the end of proceedings, no matter
what the status had been of their States' votes in the Convention.
The lack of New York votes, after July 10, reflects the opinion of the
dominant political organization in that State, led by Governor George Clinton
that the document that was likely to emerge from the Convention would not
be in conformity with the organization's support for limited-government and
what we now know as "States' Rights."37' 5 The withdrawal from the
Convention by the majority of the delegates from New York anticipated the
difficulties there would be in their State when the time came to ratify the
Constitution the following summer.
It was because of these difficulties that The Federalistand other proConstitution articles were prepared. Publius' overriding purpose in The
Federalistwas to secure votes in New York for the proposed Constitution,
not simply to expound the Constitution.
Publius, in order to secure votes in a vigorous political contest, had to
adapt "his" arguments to constantly shifting circumstances, especially inNew
York, during the seven months that The Federalistarticles were published.376
The Federalistpaid special attention to the complaints lodged against the
proposed constitution by local politicians who were afraid that an enhanced
National Government would diminish their importance and influence.
Publius found it expedient, therefore, to play down the centralizing
tendencies of the proposed constitution, arguing that concerns about a lack
3 77
of a bill of rights could be readily ministered to in the first Congress.
Those shifting circumstances included the news coming in from other States
that the Constitution had been ratified by their conventions. By the time the
last number of The Federalistwas published, eight States had ratified, three
of them by unanimous votes in their conventions, four others by margins of
two to one or better. It was soon apparent that the Constitution would be set
in motion by the requisite nine-State minimum, even if New York and
Virginia should refuse ratification.378
374.

See Dennis J. Mahoney, Robert Yates (1738-1801), in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE

AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 2082.

375. Abraham Lincoln and others came to believe that "States' Rights" had degenerated
into Secessionism, if not into Treason.
376. They were published between October 27, 1787 and May 28, 1788.
377. On the stages of the Bill of Rights in the First Congress, see ANASTAPLO, THE
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTIoN, supra note 2, at 315.

378. Of course, the participation of both Virginia (the tenth State to ratify) and New York
(the eleventh) would be needed for the new constitutional system to work properly. It mattered
far less that North Carolina and Rhode Island were still holding out in 1789. See ANASTAPLO,
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This historical context bears upon how we should use The Federalist.
Those articles are certainly important as indications of American conditions
ands interests at that time. They are important also, perhaps even more so,
for their perceptive reflections upon human nature and serious politics. Much
can be learned from polemical articles such as these that draw upon the
experiences and thoughtfulness of remarkably talented men. But, it should
be added, these newspaper articles, partly because of their mode of
preparation and of their immediate purpose, are not unqualifiedly reliable for
constitutional interpretation, however suggestive they may be on various
points.
Other advocates for the Constitution, in other circumstances, could
readily make quite different arguments based on quite different readings of
the Constitution.379 Of course, this has not prevented politicians of both
parties from using The Federalistto support their respective positions.3 8 In
short, with regard to constitutional interpretation as distinguished from
political instruction, The Federalist should be regarded as a remarkably
competent lawyer's brief would be. Such a brief is obliged to take account
of circumstances, especially the prevailing opinions of the audience.
The divisions, if not even contradictions, built into The Federalistare
reflected in what happened shortly thereafter, during the First Congress. The
two principal contributors to The Federalist,Alexander Hamilton of New
York and James Madison of Virginia, divided sharply on the constitutionality
" ' In the decade following, Hamilton
of a proposed National Bank measure.38

THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supra note 2, at 328 n. 153; see also supra note 276.
379. Thus, the reading of the Constitution, by such an opponent as Patrick Henry in
Virginia, could be quite different from that of Publius, as may be seen in this excerpt from his
June 4, 1788 protest in the Virginia Ratification Convention:
I would make this enquiry of those worthy characters [here] who composed a part of the
late federal Convention. I am sure they were fully impressed with the necessity of forming
a great consolidated government, instead of a confederation. That [the government
provided by the Constitution] is a consolidated government is demonstrably clear; and the
danger of such a government is, to my mind, very striking. I have the highest veneration
for those gentlemen; but, sir, give me leave to demand, what right had they to say, We, the
People? My political curiosity, exclusive of my anxious solicitude for the public welfare,
leads me to ask, Who authorised them to speak the language of We, the People, instead
of, We, the States? States are the characteristics and the soul of a confederation. If the
States be not the agents of this compact, it must be one great, consolidated, national
government of the people of all the States.
Id. at 38; see also infra note 385.
380. Justices of the United States Supreme Court also draw on The Federalist, often
without appreciating how politicala document it properly was. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
381. See Anastaplo, supra note 282, at 151-71. This can be considered the first major
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and Madison would take quite different positions in their readings of the
Constitution, no doubt influenced in large part by their quite different
circumstances. Madison's sectional loyalties, for example, have been said to
have influenced the position he took on the National Bank bill and on other
issues. 2
The dominant New York politicians were so out of step with national
sentiment that not one of their amendment proposals calling for a change in
the substantive powers of the new national government was taken seriously
in the First Congress. 83
The circumstances in New York, I have suggested, had to be taken into
account by Publius: for "him" to have done otherwise would have been
foolish and self-defeating. Therefore, Publius was reluctant to acknowledge
the full extent of the powers of the proposed national government, powers
that would be made much more of in other circumstances. On the other hand,
opponents of the proposed Constitution made much of such powers, at times
exaggerating them, during the Ratification campaign, even claiming that the
38 4
States would be reduced to a trivial role in the new constitutional system.
Thus, the 1787-1788 circumstances in New York bear upon how The
Federalist is now to be read by the explicator of the Constitution. In
addition, one must consider the longstanding English constitutional system
that the Framers of the Constitution drew upon and carefully modified for
American conditions and aspirations.
Finally, one cannot reliably interpret the Constitution of 1787 without
being aware of the grand constitutional development, centuries in the making,
which its Framers adapted to their special circumstances in North America.
This development, it could be said, conquered chance as much as it was
possible to do in establishing a political order grounded in "the Laws of
Nature and of Nature's God. 3 a 5

debate in constitutional interpretation once the implementation of the Constitution began.

382. The most challenging appraisal of the career of James Madison remains that of
William W. Crosskey. See supra note 281.
383. For their proposals, see ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 2, at 305.
384. See supra note 379. Once the Constitution was ratified, many of its former opponents
took to arguing that the new National Government was one of very limited powers, while many
of its former proponents took to arguing that that Government was one of quite broad power.
This means, among other things, that we are obliged ourselves to read the Constitution carefully,
using but not altogether relying upon what partisans "naturally" say in various circumstances.
385. The Declaration of Independence.
On the Declaration as an authoritative
constitutional document, see ANASTAPLO, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 3, at I I and 31; infra
text accompanying note 395; see alsosupra text accompanying supra note 370. Compare John
Calhoun's sentiment: "I never use the word 'Nation' in speaking of the United States. I always
use the word 'Union,' or 'Confederacy.' We are not a Nation, but a Union, a confederacy of
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CONCLUSION: REVELATION, REASON, AND THE GOOD 1

Aristotle opens the NicomacheanEthics with the observation, "Every art
and every inquiry, and likewise every action and choice, seems to aim a some
good, and hence it has been beautifully said that the good is that at which all
things aim."387 A comparable observation opens his Politics as well.388
To recognize that all of us aim at "some good" leaves questions about a
possible hierarchy among the goods sought and about better and worse ways
of seeking the goods that one settles upon. An overarching question here is
whether there is an authoritative account available of the whole in which
human action fits. And, pursuant to the guidance provided by any such
account, what is the best kind of life for a human being-that characterized
by unquestioning obedience (say, as in the case of Abraham389 ) or that
characterized by determined questioning (say, as in the case of Socrates39 °)?
Less exalted manifestations of these two ways may be seen in the
steadfast loyalty of the Orthodox Believer, on the one hand, and in the
dedication of the Enlightenment Scholar, on the other.39' Leo Strauss, when
he wrote, seventy years ago, his Philosophy andLaw392, understood to rescue
the religiously Orthodox from the centuries-old assault of the Enlighteners,
an assault (reinforced by the findings and technology of modem science)
which had seriously called into question, among educated men and women
equal and sovereign States." Letter from John C. Calhoun to Oliver Dyer (January 1, 1849);
see supra note 302.
386. These remarks were prepared for a course on Leo Strauss's Philosophy
and Law (infra
note 392) conducted by Professors Joel Kraemer and Paul Mendes-Flor, in the Divinity School
of the University of Chicago. My visit, of March 12, 2003, was to the last class meeting before
Professor Kraemer assumed emeritus status.
387. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETICS 1094a-3 (Joe Sachs trans., 2003). Perverse
testimony in support of Aristotle here may be found in the Duc de la Roche foueauld
observation, "Hypocrisy is the tribute which vice pays to virtue," Maximes (1678).
388. Aristotle is quite confident about this at the outset of his treatise:
Since we see that every city is some sort of partnership, and that every partnership is
constituted for the sake of some good (for everyone does everything for the sake of what
is held to be good), it is clear that all partnerships aim at some good, and that the
partnership that is most authoritative of all and embraces all the others does so particularly,
and aims at the most authoritative good of all. This is what is called the city or the political
partnership.
ARISTOTLE, POUTICS 1252al -5 (Canes Lord trans., 1985).
389. See, e.g., Anastaplo, supra note 108, at 854.
390. See ANASTAPLO, HUMAN BEING AND CITIZEN, supra note 4, at 8.
391. This juxtaposition is anticipated in Moses Maimonides' The Guide of the Perplexed.
See, e.g., ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORALIST, supra note 3, at 58.

392.

LEO STRAUss, PHILOsOPHY AND LAW: CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF

MAIMONIDES AND His PREDECESSORS (Eve Adler, trans., 1995).
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in the West, the received opinions of the religiously-minded.
The Enlightenment came to be questioned further, in Mr. Strauss's time
because of social aberrations, if not even political monstrosities, for which
the Enlightenment was held at least partially responsible. That is, there may
not have been (before the Twentieth Century) the severe questioning of the
premises and methods of Enlightenment-sciences that there had been of the
doctrines (as distinguished from the social consequences) of religious
movements. 93 And so the Strauss rescue of revelation seems to place its
emphasis upon restoring the intellectual position of the Orthodox to
respectability.
At the heart of this rescue effort is the insistence that if God is
omnipotent, the ordinary rules of evidence and of logic cannot be used to
assess the claims of revelation. Consider how this insistence is put in the
Introduction to Philosophy and Law:
The critical examination of the arguments and counterarguments brought
forward in this quarrel [between Orthodoxy and the Enlightenment] leads
to the conclusion that there can be no question of a refutation of the
"externally" understood basic tenets of the tradition. For all these tenets rest
on the irrefutable premise that God is omnipotent and His will
unfathomable. If God is omnipotent, then miracles and revelations in
general, and in particular the Biblical miracles and revelations, are possible.
Of course for orthodoxy, and therefore also for the Enlightenment, it is a
question not so much of the possibility or impossibility as of the reality or
unreality of the Biblical miracles and revelations; but in fact almost all the
Enlightenment's attempts to demonstrate the unreality of the Biblical
miracles and revelations depend on the express or tacit premise that the
impossibility of miracles and revelations in general is established or
demonstrable. Yet in carrying out their critique, precisely the most radical
Enlighteners learned-if not as something clearly known, then at least as
something vividly felt-that as a consequence of the irrefutability of
orthodoxy's ultimate premise, all individual assertions resting on this
premise are unshakable. 3"
Thus the path to Goodness charted by Orthodoxy was restored to intellectual
respectability, or so it could seem at that time.
It later came to seem in the course of the Strauss career, perhaps in part
because of his use of his experience in the United States, that a kind of
collaboration, if not even partnership, between the Orthodox and the
Enlighteners could come to be noticed, if not even celebrated. This may be

393. On reason and revelation (or on science and piety), see
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 3, at 389-91.
394.

STRAUSS, supra note 392, at 29.
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seen, for example, at the outset of his NaturalRight and Historybook, where
the Self-evident Truths sentence in the Declaration of Independence can be
drawn upon:
The nation dedicated to this proposition [of the Declaration] has now
become, no doubt partly as a consequence of this dedication, the most
powerful and prosperous of the nations of the earth. Does this nation in its
maturity still cherish the faith in which it was39conceived
and raised? Does
5
it still hold those "truths to be self-evident"?

It is intriguing that the apostles of Enlightenment (among whom would be
numbered the principal draftsman ofthe Declaration of Independence) can be
spoken of here as people of faith.396
And so, one of Mr. Strauss' most intimate students could speak of his
teacher in this way shortly after his death in 1973:
The most impressive alternative to philosophy in the life of Leo Strauss is
summed up by the name of a city, Jerusalem, the holy city. What if the one
thing most needful is not philosophic wisdom, but righteousness? This
notion of the one thing most needful, Mr. Strauss argued, is not defensible
if the world is not the creation of the just and loving God. Neither
philosophy nor revealed religion, he argued, can refute one another; for,
among other reasons, they disagree about the very principles or criteria of
proof.... This mutual irrefutability and tension between philosophy and
biblical revelation appeared to him to be the secret of the vitality of Western
Civilization.397
Thus, the specialness of a particularly-vital West is proclaimed, a specialness
which may permit it and it alone, of all the grand regions of the world, truly
to understand what has happened elsewhere. Here, as in the Philosophy and
Law passage from which I have quoted, the Orthodoxy that is relied upon is
grounded in Biblical revelation.
I have had occasion to examine in this fashion the presupposition here:
Leo Strauss has suggested that "the only question which ultimately matters"
is whether "the Bible or philosophy is right." Is this so? It may depend
partly upon what one takes the Bible, or revelation, to include and whether
any other (that is, nonbiblical) revelations are to be taken seriously. How
are the various schools of non-Western thought, especially when they
395.

STRAUSS, supra note 171, at 1.
396. On the Declaration of Independence, see ANASTAPLO, ABRAHAMLINCOLN, supra note
3, at 11,31.
397. ANASTAPLO, BuT NOT PHILOSOPHY, supra note 2, at 127 (quoting Laurence Berns).
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invoke revelation, to be regarded vis-i-vis philosophy? Do any of them
have pathological features in need of treatment?39
Pathological revelations, and pathological features in generally sound
revelations, can often be recognized and usually discounted as such, as may
be seen in responses to the pronouncements we hear from time to time about
UFO visitations and messages. 99 Thus, even the pious can bring the
"methods" of the Enlightenment to bear upon not only pathological but also
upon primitive religions.
My examination of the insistence by Mr. Strauss that "the only question
which ultimately matters" is whether "the Bible or philosophy is right"
continues in this fashion:
Certainly, the Strauss suggestion here seems to depend upon his
extraordinary capacity for theoretical pursuits and upon his happening to be
personally grounded in Judaism . . . [I]s a reliable thoughtfulness

presupposed whenever reason and revelation are placed in juxtaposition,
including an awareness (guided by nature) of what the truly divine surely
does not call for or permit? That is, should both genuine prudence and an
inspired revelation tend to direct one to the same judgment in any particular
situation? In any event, the prudent statesman (or responsible prophet) may
well emphasize different things to different peoples with respect to the same
matter."

Righteousness (a special kind of law-abidingness) can be set off against
philosophic wisdom. But the righteous are not as apt as the philosophic are
to want (or perhaps to be equipped) to understand "the other side." The
"other side" for the righteous can include not only the philosophic but also
other, purported, revelations which may be stoutly repudiated.
But then, it can be said, the desire to understand the other side is a
compulsion, perhaps even a suicidal perversion, of the philosophic, not of the
righteous.
II.
Ihave found, upon returning recently to NaturalRightandHistory,40 1 that
the questions I am asking here have been anticipated, at least to some extent,
by Mr. Strauss himself. Consider, for example, the following passage:

398. Id. at 373.
399. On UFOs and their reception, see George Anastaplo, Lessonsfor the Student ofLaw:
The Oklahoma Lectures, 20 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 19, 187 (1995).
400. ANASTAPLO, BUT NOT PHLOSOPHY, supra note 2, at 373.
401. STRAUSS, supra note 171; see supra text accompanying notes 170-71.

HeinOnline -- 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 846 2002-2003

2003]

CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE GOOD

847

Man cannot live without light, guidance, knowledge; only through
knowledge of the good can he find the good that he needs. The fundamental
question, therefore, is whether men can acquire that knowledge of the good
without which they cannot guide their lives individually or collectively by
the unaided efforts of their natural powers, or whether they are dependent
for that knowledge on Divine Revelation. No alternative is more
fundamental than this: human guidance or divine guidance. The first
possibility is characteristic of philosophy or science in the original sense of
the term, the second is presented in the Bible. °2
It is not said here that the second possibility is presented only in the Bible, but
that does seem to me the tenor of much of Mr. Strauss's handling of these
matters.
He continues, developing further what the confrontation of the Biblical
and the philosphic can mean:
For both philosophy and the Bible proclaim something as the one thing
needful, as the only thing that ultimately counts, and the one thing needful
proclaimed by the Bible is the opposite of that proclaimed by philosophy:
a life of obedient love versus a life of free insight. In every attempt at
harmonization, in every synthesis however impressive, one of the two
opposed elements is sacrificed, more or less subtly but in any event surely,
to the other: philosophy, which means to be the queen, must be made the
handmaid of revelation or vice versa.? 3
There then follows, in NaturalRight andHistory, a passage which develops,
in an even more subtle way, what had been suggested in the Philosophy and
Law excerpt which I have quoted:
If we take a bird's-eye view of the secular struggle between philosophy and
theology, we can hardly avoid the impression that neither of the two
antagonists has ever succeeded in really refuting the other. All arguments
in favor of revelation seem to be valid only if belief in revelation is
presupposed; and all arguments against revelation seem to be valid only if
unbelief is presupposed. This state of things would appear to be but natural.
Revelation is always so uncertain to unassisted reason that it can never
compel the assent of unassisted reason, and man is built that he can find his
satisfaction, his bliss, in free investigation, in articulating the riddle of
being. But, on the other hand, he yearns so much for a solution of that
riddle and human knowledge is always so limited that the need for divine
illumination cannot be denied and the possibility of revelation cannot be

402.
403.

Id. at 74.
Id. at 74-75; see infra text accompanying note 408.
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refuted. 4

This, it can be said, is familiar ground, developing as it does the Strauss
reflections of several decades earlier in Philosophy and Law.
There then follows the most challenging part of this discussion:
Now it is this state of things that seems to decide irrevocably against
philosophy and in favor of revelation. Philosophy has to grant that
revelation is possible. But to grant that revelation is possible means to grant
that philosophy is perhaps not the one thing needful, that philosophy is
perhaps something infinitely unimportant. To grant that revelation is
possible means to grant that the philosophic life is not necessarily, not
evidently, the right life. Philosophy, the life devoted to the quest for evident
knowledge available to man as man, would itself rest on an unevident,
arbitrary, or blind decision. This would merely confirm the thesis of faith,
that there is no possibility of consistency, of a consistent and thorough
sincere life, without belief in revelation. The mere fact that philosophy and
revelation cannot refute each other would constitute the refutation of
philosophy by revelation."
The use here of terms such as seems andperhapssuggests that "the refutation
of philosophy by revelation" is far less certain than the casual reader may
suppose. Certainly, Mr. Strauss never conducted himself as if philosophy
were "infinitely unimportant"-or as if the path laid down by some revelation
or other was the one that he should personally follow.
When a "bird's-eye view" is resorted to, it does seem that a perspective
is provided which permits a reliable grasp of both the doings of revelation
and those of reason. Such a perspective also seems to be relied upon for an
assessment of what contributes to the vitality of the West-and for the
evident endorsement (here as elsewhere) of that vitality as desirable.
We have already noticed that something other than revelation may be
needed to sort out revelations, including those which are either primitive or
perverse. But there are various long-established, rather sophisticated,
religions, especially of the East, that Leo Strauss never seemed to be much
interested in (even though he could refer to them from time to time).4°6
When he talks of revelation and its merits, the emphasis is upon Biblical
revelation. And when Biblical revelation is referred to, it is primarily the
Hebrew Bible that is looked to, not the Greek Bible." 7 Christianity is
regarded as, at best, a Jewish sect, however much the work of Christian

404.
405.
406.
407.

Id. at 75.
Id.
See, e.g., id. at 71.
See, e.g., STRAUSS, supra note 170, at 311 (Why We Remain Jews).
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scholars such as Thomas Aquinas may be respected.4 °8
It is hard to overestimate Leo Strauss' allegiance to Judaism, even though
he was not what is called an observant Jew. He was very much aware of his
Jewish sympathies. 9 Thus, it can be said, Mr. Strauss had standards for
distinguishing among the revelations (ancient and modem) that he
confronted. And, it can also be said, he could ignore, when he did not simply
reject, revelations with far more adherents and far more direct influence
worldwide than the one that he personally happened to take most seriously.
Is there any reason to believe that the revelation which he happened to
take most seriously should not be subjected to the same scrutiny by the
philosophically-minded as the other revelations which he evidently regarded
as inferior? That is, is the approach to these matters by philosophy as
vulnerable as Mr. Strauss found it prudent to suggest?
M.
The basis for the specialness of the Mosaic Law does have to be
recognized-and this may be seen in the emphasis placed by Mr. Strauss
from time to time on Deuteronomy 4:5-6. It is there, we are told, that Moses
could say, in the course of his leavetaking:
Behold, I have taught you statutes and ordinances, even as the Lord my
God commanded me, that ye should do so in the midst of the land whither
ye go in to possess it.
Observe therefore and do them; for this is your wisdom and your
understanding in the sight of the peoples, that, when they hear all these
statutes,4' shall
say, "Surely this great nation is a wise and understanding
0
people."
Thus, it seems, the prophet Moses, whatever the gulf between Reason and
Revelation, had himself enough access to worldly wisdom to be able to
anticipate the "secular" judgment about the Israelite institutions that would
be expressed by other peoples. I notice, in passing, that there are also
passages in the Greek Bible which regard the Christian revelation as the
epitome of wisdom, something which is reinforced in that Bible by its use of
the language in which philosophy emerged.""

408. See STRAUSS,supra note 171, at 326; see also supra text accompanying note 403.
409. See, e.g., George Anastaplo, Leo Strauss and Judaism, 1998 THE GREAT IDEAS
TODAY 457 (1998).
410. Deuteronomy 4:5-6 (in a Jewish Publication Society translation); see George
Anastaplo, Law & Literatureand the Austen-Dostoyevsky Axis: Explorations,46 S.D. L. REV.

712,751 (2001).
411. See, e.g., I Corinthians 3:19 ("For the wisdom of this world is foolishness with
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We see, also again and again, that Reason and Revelation may not be as
far apart as had been said. Moses was aware of standards that other peoples
could use in judging Israel-just as other peoples, down to our day, have
praised various regimes (including the revelations upon which they
depended), regimes such as the Spartan, the Roman, and the American." 2
An awareness of the Good seems to be drawn upon in sustained
judgments about regimes, an awareness which permits an admiration of some
regimes and a detestation of others." 3 Ourjudgments of these regimes, both
good and bad, look past revelations that their peoples may have happened
very much to depend upon. What one ultimately looks to in these matters
may be reflected in the differences between revelation-based natural law and
philosophy-based natural right. 44 One can see here how the prudent
statesman may make use of whatever decent revelation his people may
4 15
happen to inherit.
Thus, nature is critical here, that nature so vital to philosophy and so
likely to be ignored by revelation. Indeed, we can suggest, any longstanding
regime, even if it is not explicitly aware of nature, is likely to be rooted
enough in nature to have some reliable grasp of the Good. 4 6 And the same
may be said of the effective prophet, if only as a rhetorician of a high order.
We see, again and again, that human actions do aim at the Good in a
variety of circumstances. This is so, it seems, whether the banner under
which a people is mobilized is one invoking revelation or one invoking,
indirectly if not directly, philosophy. Leo Strauss, it seems to me, was
enough of a Socratic to discern that both the Prophet and the Philosopher are,
in the final analysis, ultimately guided by visions of the Good. Much of what
I have suggested on this occasion is reflected in this observation from one of
Mr. Strauss' oldest students:
The American tradition of popular government in the person of [Abraham]
Lincoln [can be] seen to depend upon the statesman as prophet. And
prophecy, as I learned from [Leo] Strauss, who had it from

God.").
412. We might well wonder what Plato and Aristotle wold have made of the Mosaic
regime, had they known it. Maimonides may provide suggestions about how to begin to think
about this matter. See supra note 391.
413. Detestable regimes, both ancient and modem, include such as those of the childsacrificing Carthaginians, the Aztecs, the Nazis, the Stalinists and the insanely murderous Pol
Pot.
414. See ANASTAPLO, BUT NOT PHILOSOPHY, supra note 3, at 323-33.
415. See ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN MORAUST, supra note 3, at 453. On George
Washington's FarewellAddress, see Anastaplo, Constitutionalism,the Rule ofRules, supra
note 7, at 136.
416. See ANASTAPLO, BUT NOT PHILOSOPHY, supra note 3, at 303.
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Maimonides-and ultimately from Plato's Athenian Stranger [in the

Laws]-was the political name for political science. 7

Is, then, the philosopher more apt to make proper use of prophecy, in the
ordering of the political community, particularly as circumstances change,
than the prophet is to make proper use of philosophical speculations, in an
effort to understand what he is doing and how long he (and his successors)
should continue to do it?
We wonder, with this question, how that prudence may be developed and
maintained upon which an effective and hence beautiful dedication to the
Good depends generation after generation, even if not to the end of time, to
say nothing of what lies beyond Time. 1 8

Id. at 131 n.38 (quoting Harry V. Jaffa).
On prudence, see ANASTAPLO, ABRAHAMLINCOLN, supranote 3, at 368; ANASTAPLO,
THE AMENDMENTS TO CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 462; ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN
MORAUST, supra note 3, at 618; ANASTAPLO, BUT NOT PHILOSOPHY, supra note 4, at 390;
ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, supranote 2, at 337; ANASTAPLO, HUMANBEINGAND
CmIzEN, supra note 4, at 329; ANASTAPLO, THE THINKER AS ARTIST, supra note 4, at 401; see
also supra notes 42, 209; supra text accompanying note 1.
417.
418.
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